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
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places in the Table. The question is on the *identity* of places ; and correspondence of distance is but one sort of evidence in aid of it. I will add reasons for thinking that this form may not answer the proper purpose, which is the ascertaining of Truth.

Mr. Ellis's Table—Treatise, p. 172.

Ancient Stations.	Modern Places.	Actual distances in Roman mīles.	Peutingerian distances in Roman miles.
Segusio.	Susa.		
Stabatio.	La Ferrière.	8 $\frac{3}{4}$	8
Durotincum.	Granges de Dervieux.	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	7
Mellosedum.	Bramana.	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	10
Catorissium.	Villarodin.	5	5
Culabo.	Orelle.	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	12
Morginnum.	St. Jean de Maurienne.	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	14
Turecionnum.	La Chapelle.	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	14
Mantala.	Maltaverne.	16 $\frac{1}{4}$	15
		89 $\frac{3}{4}$	85

This is not a statement of places as in the Table. Stabatio is not the first station from Susa : it is the fourth. Three stations are omitted between Segusio and Stabatio : namely, Martis, Gadaone, and Brigantione. The distance from Segusio to Stabatio is not 8 miles nor 8 $\frac{3}{4}$; but 38. Also the 1st of the Ancient Stations is Vigenna ; Mantala belongs to the route in the Peutingerian Table, where it is not M. In short, this is but a copy of Mr. Ellis's improved

I will now give the places and distances as marked in the original document : and, as M. Ellis begins from Susa, I will also begin from Susa ; though it is 30 miles earlier than the line which

enter the ancient stations accurately with the distances, as expressed in the Chart: giving in another column the modern places, which D'Anville deemed to correspond with them; and in another, those which Mr. Ellis deems to correspond. For the former I refer to D'Anville's dictionary called "*Notice de l'Ancienne Gaule*;" for the latter to Mr. Ellis's *Treatise*, pp. 172—173.

Tabula Peutingeriana. Charta de Peutinger.

Track from Susa to Embrun, and on to Vienne; as marked by Stations and distances in that ancient document. Together with corresponding modern sites as explained by D'Anville a hundred years ago; and as now explained by Mr. Ellis.

Stations in the Chart,
with distances marked in
Roman miles.

Modern sites according
to D'ANVILLE.

Modern sites according
to Mr. Ellis.

From Segusio to

Martis . . . xviii

Gadaone . . . viii

Brigantione . . v

30

From Brigantione to

Stabatione . . viii

Durotinea . . vii

Mellosecto . . i

Catoriasium . . v

Celabone . . .

Morginio . . .

Turecionne . . .

Vigena . . .

From Susa to

Oulx.

Césanne.

Briançon.

From Susa:

(MISSING: LINE 22-
LINE)

ages,
pper
in the
to "Ad

*Reasons given by the two antiquaries for their views on the
modern sites.*

Martis, 17 m.

D'Anville treats this as the modern Oulx : Ad Martis
in the Itineraries. First station from Susa.

Mr. Ellis says nothing on the site.

Gadaone, 8 m.

D'Anville, who observes the line of the Itineraries,
through Turin to the Alps, makes Gadaone to be
Césanne at the foot of the M. Genève. In the
Jerusalem Itinerary, it is Gesdaone.

Mr. Ellis says nothing on the site.

Brigantione, 5 m.

D'Anville calls this Briançon, which is beyond the
chain of mountains passed after ascending from
Césanne.

Mr. Ellis says nothing on this site.

Stabatione, 8 m.

D'Anville, believing that the only road forward from
the Genève is that which descends upon Briançon,
and that the only road which there diverges from
the line down the Durance is that to Grenoble,
began to reckon the 85 miles given by the Chart to
Vienne, with the 8 entered from Brigantione to
Stabatione, which place he therefore apprehends as
Monestier.

Mr. Ellis calls this place La Ferrière, which is 8 m.
from Susa.

Durotinco, 7 m.

D'Anville thought Villard d'Arènes to be the probable
representative of this place. From Monestier you
reach it by passing over the Col du Lautaret. The

distance being about 12 miles, he suggests that the vii. ought to be xii.

Mr. Ellis supposes that Durotincum was Granges de Dervieux, a place which he names as being on the plateau of the Little Mont Cenis. He tells us, that Durotincum is almost pure Celtic: *dur* being water, *tin* a source, and *cum* a valley: so he is satisfied with having the first of these represented by *Der*, while *vieux* denotes antiquity. *Treatise*, p. 172.

Mellosecto, 10 m.

This place in the earlier edition by Bertius was written Mellosedo. D'Anville conjectured the site to be near Mizouin on the Romanche, the distance being somewhere about 10 miles.

Mr. Ellis' site is Bramante or Bramans on the Arc, a place to which you descend from the Little Mont Cenis. He explains the Celtic origin of Mellosedo, and converts it into the Latin Bramans thus: *Maol*, bare—*Lon*, a meadow—*Sead*, seat. *Maol* and *Lon* are represented by the Latin *Pratum*; and *Sead* by *mansio*. Accordingly Prati Mansio, alias Bra-mans, has supplanted Mellosedum, as "an equivalent term, identical in meaning." *Tr.* p. 174.

Catorissium, 5 m.

D'Anville suggested for this station Bourg d'Oysans, supposed to have been the principal town of the Uesni.

Mr. Ellis proposes a village on the Arc called Villarodin, which he conceives belonged to the Caturiges, whom he locates on this occasion in the Upper Maurienne. To account for the word being in the genitive plural, as he says it is, he alludes to "Ad

deam Vocontiorum ;” and suggests that the name of the station may have been in full Dea Catorissium, *Teagh* being Celtic for a house.

Culabone, 12 m.

D’Anville, like the rest of the world, considered this name to represent Grenoble, Gratianopolis ; whose earlier name was Cularo, here spelt Culabo. He says—“ Cularo conserve son nom primitif dans la “ Table Théodosienne ; où il faut lire Cularone au “ lieu de Culabone.” Pilot (*Histoire de Grenoble*) says,—“ Le nom de Graisivaudan, mot formé de “ Gratiano vallis, fut d’abord donné à la vallée où “ est situé Grenoble. On l’a depuis étendu à tout “ le pays formant le comté ou gouvernement de “ cette ville.” D’Anville saw that 12 miles was inadequate, as the distance from Catorissium ; and supposed a station to be omitted. His conjecture is confirmed by the writer called the geographer of Ravenna, who, giving an additional station, writes Cantourisa-Fines-Curarone. I need not again refer to the correspondence of Plancus and Cicero. Pilot states the ancient Cularo to have risen to celebrity under the Emperor Maximian ; and cites a Roman inscription over one of the ancient gates in honour of Diocletian and Maximian, in which are the words *Muris Cularonensibus*.

Mr. Ellis makes Orelle, a village on the Arc above S. Michel, to represent the Culabo of Peutinger’s Table : and, though he well knew what D’Anville had written on Culabo being the same as Cularo, and had read Pilot’s history, he did not in his *Treatise*, see p. 175, allude to the circumstance, that it had ever been thought to be Grenoble : while

perhaps no one before himself had suspected it of being anything else. When he is challenged upon it, his whole defence, besides etymology, is that Grenoble had been Cularo, not Culabo: and he says (*Camb. Journal*, v. iii. 15), "The identity of "Culabo and Grenoble is obviously all but impossible." This seems to mean that there can be no inaccuracy of distance, nor variety of spelling: he might have observed that it is found in manuscripts as Civaro, Cularo, Calaro, and Curaro, all of which were mentioned by D'Anville.

Mr. Ellis's argument for his own Culabo, Orelle, was more lively. Pilot, meaning to speak of the ancient Grenoble, not thinking of Orelle, says—"Cularum signifie proprement lieu reculé, extrémité." Mr. Ellis was pleased with the idea "reculé," as consisting with Orelle, "ora, extremity or border:" and imagined Ora to signify the last village of the Caturiges on the Arc: and illustrates the idea with "the Gaelic Culaobh, the back part of anything: the "Piedmontese Culaton, estremità, parte deretana: "the Italian Orlo: the Spanish Orilla: the Col de la Cula, a pass at the extremity of the valley of "Barcelounette:" to which is added, in his Defence, "the Low Latin Culata, rei alicujus pars extrema." *Journ.* iii. 15.

The principle on which Mr. Ellis cherishes such exchange of names is enunciated, p. 174, when he is turning Mellosedum into Bramans. "When the "Celtic language was dying out in the Alps, and a "Latin or Romance dialect was taking its place, the "old name fell into disuse, and was replaced by an "equivalent term of Latin origin." Hence Mr. Ellis conjectures, that there was once on the Arc a Celtic

village Culabo, which name fell into disuse, and was replaced by the Latin Orelle (ora): that upon the former dying out about 1,400 years ago, the latter came into use as an equivalent, to represent "parte deretana." Now, on Mr. Ellis's part, there is neither any proof of the early existence of Orelle, nor of what the name had been, which died out when Orelle began. Moreover, whether Cularo or Culabo was to be replaced by Latin, the change would not, on Mr. Ellis's principle, be required. Culus was Latin already. The last syllable, *ro* or *bo*, would be neutral in the question. In the case of Grenoble, on the contrary, we have evidence of facts: evidence of the old name and evidence of the name which superseded it.

Before Mr. Ellis defended himself in the *Journal of Phil.* iii. p. 15, he seems to have looked again at D'Anville's Cularo; where he would learn that, at the Council of Aquileia, A.D. 381, there was present a Bishop of Gratianopolis; which place therefore had very lately changed its name from Cularo. Hereupon Mr. Ellis makes this sagacious comment—"If, as Mr. Law seems to suppose, the Peutingerian Table dates from the time of Theodosius, Grenoble ought to appear rather under the name of Gratianopolis than under that of Cularo." Now I am used to speak of that document as Carte de Peutinger. Learned men have judged by internal evidence that it is of the period of Theodosius: D'Anville always calls it "Table Théodosienne." But it would be futile to contend that the old name of the place was never used for any purpose after the Bishop had assumed the new name, which would attach to him on his consecration. Whether the

parchment we speak of was prepared at Rome or Constantinople, and whether the artist was a school-master or a quartermaster, such a thing would be for a long time more likely to bear the old name Cularo than the new name Gratianopolis. I thought I had travelled through Conflans, till I found myself in a diligence with the rector of Albertville. Novelties did not circulate in general application 1,500 years ago more rapidly than they do now.

Morginno, 14 m.

D'Anville points out Moirans, which is 14 miles from Grenoble, and by the Chart in a direct line to Vienne. Mr. Ellis names St. Jean de Maurienne: and, if Culabone could be Orelle, this might be Moirans: not if Culabone is Grenoble.

Turecionno, 14 m.

D'Anville finds the modern Ornacien as best representing the place which intervenes between Moirans and Vienne; but doubts about the accuracy of distances, 14 and 15.

Mr. Ellis has no more etymological resources; but finds a place on the Arc called La Chapelle, 14 miles below St. Jean de Maurienne, and marks it Turecionnum.

Vigenna, 15 m.

D'Anville sought Vienne as the terminus, and found it, as Dr. Smith's *Dictionary* finds it now. See Morginnum and Turecionnum.

Mr. Ellis has now left the valley of the Arc; and, as the next station that pleases him after La Chapelle is Maltaverne, he stops at Maltaverne, and goes no further. But to suit his last prescription, he calls it Mantala: because Mantala belongs to a different

line of march. It is on the other side of the Isère, between Montmelian and Chambery, in our route of *Alpis Graia*: (Mr. Ellis's Ivrea route.) It is there, not only in the *Peutingerian Table*, but in the *Antonine Itinerary*. Mr. Ellis breaks down in all his points. He provoked the whole inquiry, to explain 85 miles of what he called "the Turin and Vienne road." He keeps Turin out of his map. He avoids Vienne as the terminus; and takes pains to do so.

We have here seen two conflicting expositions of a Way curiously delineated nearly 1,500 years ago. D'Anville begins at the prescribed beginning, and ends at the prescribed end: he points out some figures as erroneous, and stations as probably omitted: so that 85 miles laid down as the total distance is probably below the truth. As most of the names expressed are not met with elsewhere, he conjectures the sites, where materials are wanting for identifying them. And his view has, I believe, hitherto had the concurrence of the literary world. Mr. Ellis admits this, saying that the track in the Chart "has hitherto been considered to have passed over the Col du Lautaret between Briançon and Grenoble," p. 168; and he probably stands alone in professing to doubt it. He begins with inventing three roads from Turin to the Rhone; an invention which only serves the purpose of verbal confusion: he lays down three data for argument, termini, and distance: and withdraws them one after the other: pretends to search for a town on the Rhone, that he may talk of it as accessible from the Cenis: but having chosen the wrong road, and named all wrong places, exhausts the distance he was pledged to, and breaks down without reaching the town at all. This casualty happens at Maltaverne: and he cannot get a

yard further. Etymology, his capricious friend, takes pains to get stations for him : but even etymology shrinks from the termini. If any there be who are blind to the honest good sense which guides one of these antiquarians, let them admire the grave eccentricity and comic etymology of the other : let them admire, that a man should indulge himself with a vision of the places on the Arc in Peutinger's Table. But, if they are falling into the delusion themselves, let Briançon, Grenoble, and Vienne suffice, either separately or jointly, to wake them out of it. It is said most mistakenly in Mr. Ellis's defence (*Journal*, vol. iii. p. 15), that "the argument for D'Anville's route rests almost entirely on the supposed identity of Grenoble with Culabo." That identity is indeed enough of itself. But the justice of D'Anville's stations, and the impossibility of Mr. Ellis's stations, are the necessary result of the one accepting Briançon and Vienne as the termini of those 85 miles, and the other defying his own senses with Susa and Maltaverne ; in the vain hope of supporting a proposition, which has no rival in print—"The road over the Little Mont Cenis is laid down in the "Peutingerian Table."

Two commentators, besides Mr. Ellis, have in the last few years come forth in favour of the Cenis : but neither of them has mistaken that mountain for the Pass of Ammianus, or recognised the apparition of the Petit Cenis in the document which perpetuates the name of Peutinger. They have enough to answer for without grasping such fancies as these. The ingenious Larauza, and the learned Ukert, proceed up the Arc, innocent of the derivations of Bramans and Dervieux.

CHAPTER IX.

Mr. Ellis on the Mont Cenis. His appeal to Cæsar's march from the Inner to the Outer Province.

MR. ELLIS now carries back his proof of the antiquity of the Cenis to within 160 years of Hannibal's invasion. He declares that "the Mont Cenis was crossed by Julius Cæsar "when on his way to intercept the Helvetii in Transalpine "Gaul." He cites the following well-known words :—

"Ipse in Italiam magnis itineribus contendit, duasque ibi "legiones conscribit; et tres quæ circum Aquileiam hiema-
"bant ex hibernis educit, et qua proximum iter in ulteriorem
"Galliam per Alpas erat, cum his quinque legionibus ire con-
"tendit. Ibi Centrones et Graioceli et Caturiges, locis supe-
"rioribus occupatis, itinere exercitum prohibere conantur.
"Compluribus his præliis pulsus, ab Ocelo, quod est citerioris
"provinciæ extremum, in fines Vocontiorum ulterioris pro-
"vinciæ die septimo pervenit; inde in Allobrogum fines, ab
"Allobrogibus in Segusianos exercitum ducit. Hi sunt extrâ
"provinciam trans Rhodanum primi."

Where then did Cæsar cross the Alps in this seven days' march from the inner province to the outer province? He names the two termini; Ocelum whence it began, and Vocontiorum fines into which it arrived. Also he names three peoples as opposing his advance on the higher parts of the pass. Much has been said already, both on Ocelum and the Vocontii: and, if it has been said rightly, the pass can be no other than the Mont Genève. But I will notice each name separately.

Ocelum and Scingomagus.

The question of Cæsar's track depends mainly upon identifying the beginning of it. Mr. Ellis expressly admits in his defence, 1856 (*Journ. of Phil.* vol. iii. pp. 18, 19), that, if Ocelum were shown to be Uxeau, Cæsar cannot have crossed the Mont Cenis. Mr. Ellis may by this time be aware of the opinion of Mr. Bunbury, given thus in Dr. Smith's *Dictionary*:—"In Strabo's time Ocelum was the frontier town of the kingdom of Cottius, and it was from thence that a much frequented road led over the pass of the Mont Genève by Scingomagus (Césanne), Brigantium (Briançon), and Ebrodunum (Embrun), to the territory of the Vocontii. D'Anville has clearly shown that Ocelum was at Uxeau, a village in the valley of Fenestrelles, and not, as supposed by previous writers, at Oulx, in the valley of the Dora." But, as Mr. Ellis is not bound by the decision of D'Anville, or of Mr. Bunbury, I must combat the adverse arguments.

It will not be disputed that Ocelum citerioris provinciæ extremum is the same place as "Ὠκελον τὸ πέρας τῆς Κοττίου γῆς in the fourth book of Strabo, 179; which was the last place in the route, so far as he details it, from the Rhone over the Mont Genève into Italy; a place which Cæsar only had named before him. The other place which Strabo names between the pass and Ocelum, Scingomagus, is not found elsewhere, save in Pliny. D'Anville first corrected the error of supposing that the two names represented places, which afterwards appeared under other names in the Itineraries, belonging to the Imperial line constructed through Oulx and Susa. He identified Ocelum as the place now called Ucello, or Uxeau, near Fenestrelles. It is called Occello by the geographer of Ravenna, and Uxellum in documents of 1064. He also objected that Oulx, or Exilles, which others contended for, were not τὸ πέρας, but in the heart of the Cottian

territories. And he found evidence of Scingomagus between Césanne and Ucello.

The route through Susa to Césanne and the Genève pass, was improved for Roman purposes after Augustus had conciliated Cottius. This is the road of the Itineraries, which is continued to Briançon, and the Rhone. Before that time Roman generals had obvious reasons for preferring a line through Ocelum to Césanne and the pass. In the days of Pompey and Cæsar, when the anti-Roman confederacy was strong in the mountains, and Susa was the head-quarters of the enemy; when there was no beginning of the friendship which led to an improved ascent to the Genève, under the superintendence of Cottius himself; a Roman general, desiring to arrive speedily into the outer province, which he could not reach without crossing the enemy's country, would at all events avoid the hostile capital, and the line which connected it with the pass.

The probabilities then are much against Mr. Ellis's notions, that the Ocelum of Cæsar and Strabo was placed between Turin and Susa; and that Susa itself was the Scingomagus of Strabo; for it assumes that these places took new names before they were entered in an Itinerary. If Cæsar had carried his five legions through that hostile capital, it would have given matter for his narrative: he would not have passed through it unmolested. My belief is that Pompey, using the Genève pass sixteen years before, had established Ocelum as a Roman frontier post. Mr. Ellis* thinks "that Pompey crossed the Genève, approaching it by the ordinary route through Susa." I believe that not to have been an ordinary route to the Romans till long afterwards. When Cæsar set out from Ocelum on his expedition, bodies of the Cottian confederates came to interrupt his progress from their head-

* Journ. of Philol. iii. 20.

quarters, through Oulx, as well as from the district of the Durance.

D'Anville contended, and, as I apprehend, successfully, against M. de Valois, Cluvier, and others, that Uxeau was the Ocelum of Cæsar,* and opposed those who, equally with himself, conceived Cæsar's pass to be the Genève, but who supposed his line to it to have been that of the Itineraries : in that line they conceived Ocelum to be represented by Exilles or Oulx, places which are above Susa in the line recorded in those registers. I conceive that no road from the Genève to Susa was made for Roman use so early ; and that it certainly did not exist so soon as Hannibal's time. For the time of Strabo there is no evidence of any descending route but by Scingomagus and Ocelum, which may probably have been in use at a period before the Romans were acquainted with it. Mr. Ellis has no occasion for it above Susa ; at which place he pronounces Hannibal to have come down from the Cenis, and Cæsar to have turned up to the Cenis. He makes that place to be the Scingomagus of Strabo, and Ocelum to have been 27 miles lower down the valley, now Avigliana, or Buttigliera. He has noticed my comment as if he did not comprehend it, and affects to concede, for the sake of argument, that Cæsar quite avoided the Cottian territory. He could not have avoided it : Ocelum bordered on the enemy's country, which stretched up from thence and down the Durance. What I urged was, that he would avoid Susa, the enemy's head-quarters, by going the other way. I find no reply : nor is there an attempt to twist the words of Strabo, who directs us from the Genève to Ocelum, into a signification of the Cenis.

Mr. Ellis uses this argument for the identity of Susa and Scingomagus : that they are found with the same reputation of distance from another place, Embrun. There are in the

* Notice de l'ancienne Gaule, in v. Ocelum.

Itineraries three routes ; which give severally the distance of 69, 70, and 71 miles, from Ebrodunum to Segusio ; and Strabo is construed to give 72 miles, that is 99 *minus* 27, from Ebrodunum to Scingomagus. This is no ground. If the figures were precisely the same in all, it would not suggest identity, unless the measurements were taken on one line of route. You cannot assume this : it is the very point in question,—was there always one and the same route of descent from the Genève? or was there an older line of descent, superseded by a later one? I must limit myself to saying, that there is nothing in Mr. Ellis's assertions or insinuations, which makes me doubt that Strabo's route, which is only detailed as far as Ocelum, belonged to a different line from that which is given in the Itineraries.

Another view, which has influenced some critics, is this—Strabo calls Scingomagus the beginning of Italy ; and the Itinerary makes Segusio the beginning of Italy. Again, Strabo makes Ocelum the boundary of the Province ; and the Itinerary seems to make Ad Fines the boundary of the Province. These similarities have suggested, that the two stations represent the two places of Strabo. A mere fallacy ! The four propositions may all be true. But what then ? If there were the two lines of descent, each would cross the Italian boundary at its own place, each would cross the Cottian boundary at its own place. In Strabo's route the points of crossing were Scingomagus and Ocelum : in the Imperial route they might be Segusio and Ad Fines. This line superseded the other in importance, and of course Strabo's two places do not appear in it. I fully believe the Roman line from Césanne,* through Oulx and Susa to Turin, to be the

* Césanne, in the valley below the Genève, is the place where the imperial road to Susa diverged from the old road to Ocelum. It appears in the Jerusalem Itinerary as Gesdaone, between Ad Martis and Brigantione. In one edition of Peutinger's Chart it is Gadaone.

new line made after the submission of Cottius, and to be recorded in the Itineraries. This, we may believe, was after the time of Strabo, who never mentions any one place which belongs to that line. There are both lines at the present moment. In Mr. Brockedon's *Passes of the Alps*, the ascent to the Genève which he selects for description, is that from Pinerolo and Fenestrelle.

It is always to be presumed, without evidence to the contrary, that places bearing different names were different places: but presumption grows into proof, when we find that they were existing at the same time by different names. Pliny, who speaks of Susa as Segusio, states a distance from Rome to the western bounds of Italy, denoting the terminus by "Alpes usque et Scingomagum vicum;" which I consider to confirm the reputation of an old boundary point, the Scingomagus of Strabo, and to prohibit the identification of it with Susa. I showed that the same writer, Pliny, knowing both, calls them by different names. Mr. Ellis attempts no proof in answer on this point itself: he evades it, and makes an useless expenditure of erudition in doing so. *Journ. of Philol.* iii. 21.

He informs us that Pliny referred to Artemidorus, who was nearly 150 years before him, and he thinks it uncandid in me not to have mentioned the fact. As the work of Artemidorus is lost, he brings forward one Agathemerus, who came three centuries later and reported his matter. And I am charged with misconstruing the words of Agathemerus. Now I had never heard of such a man in my life; and when I learn from Mr. Ellis what he said, I find that it agrees with my own notions.

Mr. Ellis thus proposes, in *Journ. of Philol.* iii. 21, to set us right on the position of Scingomagus—"The words of "Artemidorus, as preserved by Agathemerus (lib. i. c. 4) are: "ἀπὸ Ῥώμης ἐπὶ τὰς Ἄλπεις ἕως Σκινγομάγου κόμης, ὑπὸ

"ταῖς Ἀλπεσιν οὔσης, στάδια δρνβ'. According to Mr. Law, "this κώμη, ὑπὸ ταῖς Ἀλπεσιν οὔσα, stood almost on the summit "of the Col de Sestrières." This is a hasty misrepresentation. I did not construe those words at all—I had never heard of them—I was representing (*Crit.* p. 107) D'Anville's ideas on the two routes, of ascent: and the word "above" which my opponent renders "on the summit" means higher up in the country towards the range of Alps.—I spoke of Oulx and Exilles as *above* Susa-Ucello *above* Fenestrelle; Scinguin *above* the Col de Sestrières; meaning higher up the country, more towards Césanne—"Under the Alps" means under the chain of which the Genève is part—the term is fairly applicable to the position of Césanne, which is at the foot of the Genève.

D'Anville's article upon Scingomagus is as follows:—
 "Strabon fixe la position de ce lieu entre Brigantio et Ocelum.
 "Pline place ce lieu, qu'il appelle Vicum, au pied des Alpes,
 "et comme étant situé à l'extrémité de l'Italie en partant de
 "Rome. J'ai été dans l'opinion, que Scingomagus pouvoit
 "être l'une des portions de Sézanne, que la Doria partage en
 "deux, en même tems que l'autre convient au lieu nommé
 "Gesdao; Gadao dans la Table Théodosienne. Ces deux
 "quartiers de Sézanne m'ont été indiqués comme bien
 "distincts et séparés, par une carte topographique et manu-
 "scrite du pays. Mais actuellement, et sans m'écarter
 "beaucoup de cette position, je découvre dans une autre
 "représentation du local, et encore plus circonstanciée de la
 "vallée de Sézanne, des vestiges de Scingomagus dans un
 "lieu nommé Chamlat de Siguin, à l'entrée du Col de
 "Cestrières, qui de la vallée de Sézanne conduit dans celle
 "de Pra-gelas. La route directe, et la seule même que la
 "nature ait ouverte, pour se rendre de Briançon à Uxeau et
 "Fenestrelles, après avoir passé le Mont Genève, est par le
 "col mentionné ci-dessus, et c'est précisément au pied de ce

"col que nous retrouvons Scingomagus, marqué par Strabon
"entre Brigantio et Ocelum.—Il falloit faire attention, que
"Pline connoit Segusio par le nom qui lui est propre, et
"distinctement de Scingomagus." Whether Scingomagus is
better traced as close to Césanne, or a little more towards the
Col de Sestrières, its identity with Susa is equally disproved.

Mr. Ellis, evading, and diverting attention from the only
point between us, goes into numerous measurements of the
space between Rome and other places, not attempting to
meet the reasons which show Scingomagus and Susa to be
different places. He exercises his talents upon what he calls
"the useless absurdity of Mr. Law's theory of strides;" I had
no such theory: I used the word stride, because Pliny, having
begun with stepping from the Ganges to the Euphrates, is
still stepping largely when he puts his foot on Scingomagus:
his next stride is "per Galliam ad Pyrenæos montes Illiberim:"
and the next "ad Oceanum et Hispaniæ oram." He hits a
western extremity of Italy by one stride, a western end of
Narbonese Gaul by another, and goes clean over Spain with
a third. The strides are magnificent: and Mr. Ellis's depre-
ciation of them does not tend to identify the Scingomagus of
Strabo with Susa, nor to prevent its identity with the Scin-
gomagus of Pliny.

If any one has imagined a theory here, it must be Mr.
Ellis himself; who, for some reason not apparent, scrutinises
that list of large intervals, which he is pleased to call an
itinerary; and argues upon the distances between Rome and
the Atlantic. See the long notes p. 22, *Journ. of Phil.* iii.
These estimates are utterly irrelevant, and with as little
benefit has the inquiry been adorned with the names of
Artemidorus and Agathemerus. All serves to divert attention
from that which is the only point raised; whether Scingoma-
gus and Susa were two places or one. It is Pliny, who names
both, Segusio and Scingomagus, recognising them as distinct

places. He certainly lived late enough, to know the improvements under Augustus, through which the ascent by Ocelum was avoided: he would know the new route from Turin through Susa to the Genève, and would see that Ocelum had no existence in it. This it is, which, whether Scingomagus was part of Césanne, or somewhat removed from it, contradicts Mr. Ellis's proposition, p. 188, "that it is quite evident that Segusio and Scingomagus were the same place."

Centrones.

This people (from the Graian Alp) with the Caturiges and Garoceli are named as opposing Cæsar's march, "*locis superioribus occupatis*," and as beaten by him "*compluribus proeliis*." Whatever districts the bodies of men had come from, by whom his advance over the pass was resisted, one would think that his progress, "*in fines Vocontiorum, inde in Allobrogum fines*," is consistent only with his having descended by Briançon, upon the line of the Durance, or more direct to Bourg d'Oysans. If he had come down the Isère, whether from the Little St. Bernard or the Cenis, he would not have entered the Vocontian territory in order to arrive among the Allobroges.

Mr. Ellis takes a different view. He says: "Cæsar is his own historian, so that the character of his evidence is perfect. Yet he only alludes to two passes, the Mont Cenis, and the Great St. Bernard. He does not appear ever to have crossed the Mont Genève. The Little Mont Cenis was *thus*, it is probable, the most ancient pass of the two which led through the country of the Taurini"!! "Of the three tribes who opposed Cæsar's passage," Mr. Ellis says, "two lived in the Maurienne, and one in the Tarentaise. Cæsar must thus have crossed the Alps, either by the Mont Cenis, or the Little St. Bernard."—"The Centrones lived in the Tarentaise: the Caturiges in the Upper Maurienne: the Garoceli in the Lower Maurienne," pp. 177-8.

Now Cæsar does not say that he marched through the country of these three nations: but that bodies of them fought against him, having taken post on the higher parts of the pass. Mr. Ellis heeds the distinction to a certain extent. He cannot carry the Cenis route through the Tarentaise; so he excuses the lands of the Centrones from being the scene of these conflicts; but not the lands of the other two nations. He has to find a special excuse for the Centrones leaving their homes, and making part of the force engaged: so he conceives that Cæsar, on his way into Italy, must have given some cause of offence to that people. "This," he says, "may account for their joining in the attack upon him on his return." As this political fact rests upon no authority besides Mr. Ellis, I have nothing to remove me from the belief, that the troops of any nation which belonged to the Alpine confederacy organized against the tyrant republic, were liable to be on service away from their homes in aid of the general cause. We know that such combinations were made against Rome. In the account of the Allobrogian insurrection given by Dion Cassius, and which was not long before the time we speak of, Catugnatus, the general who invaded the Province beyond the Rhone, is said to have under him troops from various nations along the Isère.

It is by no means necessary, for satisfying Cæsar's text, to suppose that he marched through the countries of the three nations whom he so names. I agree with Mr. Ellis that he did not march through the Centrones. I think it very possible that he did march through the Garoceli, and highly probable that he did through the Caturiges. At the same time a contingent from each may have opposed him at the pass.

Caturiges.

This people is usually recognised near the Durance: the station Caturiges appears between Ebrodunum and Vapincum

in the Itineraries; also in Peutinger's chart we find Catorimagus. This historical notice of them, as opposing Cæsar, is consistent with their position near the Durance, though we may be unable to determine their length or breadth. Mr. Ellis does not dispute that there were Caturiges in those parts, and speaks of them as not far from the Vocontii: but he does not recognise them as the opponents of Cæsar. As he sends Cæsar over the Cenis, he has to find Caturiges for him on the Arc.

Accordingly the Caturiges of Mr. Ellis are in the Maurienne, and he desires to have them in the upper part of that valley. Now he intimated to us before, that that was occupied by the Medulli: for he exhibited Bramante as their station on the road over his Medullian pass, being at the foot of their 100 stades of ascent (*ante*, c. iii). However, for the argument on Cæsar, the Medulli are expected to be in the Lower Maurienne, the Upper being wanted for the Caturiges. Indeed in p. 132 he declares, "The Medulli were the inhabitants of the Lower Maurienne."

Mr. Ellis is used to appeal to two catalogues of names: the list of Cottian states inscribed on the Arch of Susa, and the list of "*gentes Alpinæ devictæ*," inscribed on the Tropæum Alpium* mentioned by Pliny. The geographical merit of such catalogues seems to be this: you find a people mentioned between two other peoples; and, when you have made a good guess on the position of the two outside ones, you infer that of the intermediate one. These catalogues are found as follows; quoted by Mr. Ellis.

The Arch has these names inscribed: Segovii, Segusini, Belaci, Caturiges, Medulli, Tebavii, Adanates, and a few more. See *Treatise*, p. 167.

The Trophy has forty-three names inscribed; among which

* The remains of this work are to be seen at Turbia, above Monaco.

are found, in this order, Salassi, Acitavones, Medulli, Uceni, Caturiges, Brigiani. See *Treatise*, p. 131.

Thus the Medulli appear on the Arch between Caturiges and Tebavii : in the Trophy they are between Acitavones and Uceni. The latter position is given to them by Mr. Ellis, when he places them in the Lower Maurienne, p. 132. But will the same mode of inference do for the Caturiges ?

What says the Trophy list here ? We read Uceni, Caturiges, Brigiani. This sequence brings the Caturiges towards the Durance in accordance with received opinion. The Trophy would fail for the Caturiges. The Arch is more favourable to Mr. Ellis : there he finds Belaci, Caturiges, Medulli. So, the Medulli having taken the Lower Maurienne, the Caturiges take the Upper : and it only remains to find a place near them for the Belaci. This is soon done : just go up straight from Susa on the Genève road : and, when you come to Oulx, bear away for Bardonnèche : you will come to a village, which in Chaix's map is called Beaulard, and in Bourcet's map Boulard. This fact proves the identity of the Belaci of the Arch, showing them not very remote from Mr. Ellis's Caturiges in the Maurienne. He says, "The Belaci are placed in the valley of Bardonnèche, where the village of Beaulard is supposed to preserve their name." *Treatise*, p. 167.

I see that Mr. Ellis seeks to strengthen his case for putting the Caturiges out of the way of Cæsar, by the evidence of Strabo. It happens that the word Caturiges appears where nobody can understand it, and for which it seems not to have been intended. It occurs, when Strabo, having mentioned the Salassi, says : "Beyond them in the mountain heights are the Centrones and the Caturiges and the Veragri and the Nantuatæ and the Leman lake, &c." Lib. iv. 204.

One should not have expected, that this position of the Caturiges, on the mountains above the Salassi, and between the Centrones and Veragri, would be acceptable to Mr. Ellis,

as in confirmation of their position in the Maurienne, either Upper or Lower. He appears, however, with singular facility to be as well satisfied with finding them between Centrones and Veragri, as he was with finding them between Medulli and Belaci: and as if he considered it to prove the same thing. He asserts it thus—"The Caturiges, or Catoriges, "who bordered on the Salassi, must have inhabited the "Upper Maurienne."

Then follows the proof,—“The three other tribes bordering on the Salassi, the Veragri, the Nantuates, and “the Centrones, occupied the Lower Vallais and Eastern “Savoy as far (inclusive) as the Tarentaise. The Caturiges “would *therefore* be sought either in the Upper Vallais, or else “in the Upper Maurienne, or the valley of Susa. But they “could not have dwelt in the Upper Vallais, for they are “never mentioned among the people inhabiting that district, “and were, besides, one of the Cottian tribes: and the only “parts of the Cottian territory which touched the country “of the Salassi were the Upper Maurienne and the valley of “Susa. But the valley of Susa was inhabited by the Segusini: “the Caturiges *therefore* should be sought in the Upper “Maurienne.” *Treatise*, p. 166.

Thus, without offering an interpretation of the words of the author, Mr. Ellis combats suggestions of his own: and, for proving where the Caturiges were, shows where they were not. He might at least quote his author accurately. Strabo does not say that the Caturiges, Veragri, Nantuates, and Centrones bordered on the Salassi: ὑπὲρ τῶν Σαλασσῶν means “above the Salassi,” and “beyond the Salassi;” not, “bordering on them.” If it had that meaning, the lake of Geneva would border on them as well as the Veragri; for ὑπὲρ τῶν Σαλασσῶν is predicated of that also. When applied to the occupiers of the Little and the Great St. Bernard, ὑπὲρ Σαλασσῶν means “above”—when the words are applied

to the Nantuates and the lake, *ὑπέρ* can only have the force of "beyond"—meaning beyond the Salassi and the Northern Alps.

Whatever pretension the word Catoriges in this passage may have to be genuine, which I should doubt altogether, it is somewhat surprising that one, who desires to have that people recognised in the Maurienne, should rejoice in this introduction of them so near to the Great St. Bernard. With all the elasticity of his geography, Mr. Ellis, who is searching for tribes to oppose Cæsar, cannot wish the Caturiges to go to the Salassi: so he makes the Salassi come to them; and we read in the next sentence, "The limit of the Salassi on the South seems to have been the Stura or the Dora Susina:" and further, p. 167, "The only parts of the Cottian territory " which touched the country of the Salassi were the Upper " Maurienne and the valley of Susa." These Salassian contiguities were not alluded to, when Mr. Ellis denoted the extremities of his Little Mont Cenis or Medullian pass as Bramans and Susa.*

Garoceli.

Those who think that the proper district of this people must have been traversed in Cæsar's line of march, ought to determine the line of march first, and find them a position afterwards: for it is only in this one sentence of Cæsar that they are ever described in ancient history. We must reason from his authority: and the only auxiliary idea that suggests itself is, that there may be a connexion between Garoceli and Ocelum. Mr. Ellis of course would have them also in the Maurienne, that they may be within call to defend the Cenis against Cæsar. But his Maurienne is full already with Caturiges and Medulli: there is no room left for Garoceli or any more. How then does he provide for them? He

* See *ante* this Part, c. iii.

incorporates them with one of those occupants: not of course with the Caturiges, for Cæsar was opposed both by Garoceli and Caturiges; he identifies them with the Medulli, whom Cæsar does not name.

The Arch and the Trophy have already been brought into play, for giving a position to those who are in their lists. The same memorials are now referred to by Mr. Ellis for placing a people which is not in the lists: in the *Journal of Phil.* No. vii. 17, he performs his identification thus: "It is not difficult to see why the Garoceli should be identified with the Medulli. We have, in Pliny and on the Arch of Susa, very complete lists of the Alpine tribes. In these lists the name of the Garoceli never appears. They would therefore probably be identical with another tribe, which we find must also be placed in the Garocellian country, the Lower Maurienne; *i. e.* they must be identical with the Medulli." This argument as expressed is not potent, for want of meaning in the word "therefore:" it amounts to this—"Garoceli must be Medulli, because Medulli must be Garoceli."

But Mr. Ellis reminds us to look to his first work for assistance: and in p. 178 of the *Treatise*, we find the identity thus enforced:—"The Garoceli appear to be identical with the Medulli, the city of St. Jean de Maurienne being mentioned in old documents as Sanctus Johannes Garocellius; a fact which seems to fix the Garoceli in the Lower Maurienne, the country of the Medulli." Now the authority to which Mr. Ellis refers, and which he quotes at length, does not treat the Lower Maurienne as the country of the Medulli, but denies it to be so. The words, as given by Mr. Ellis, are these:—"Incolas (Mauriennæ) quamvis nonnulli putent eos esse, quos Plinius ac Strabo Medullos appellaverunt, nos tamen in eâ sententiâ sumus, ut esse credamus Cæsaris Lib. i. Belli Gallici Garocellos: eoque magis huic sententiæ adhæremus,

"quo in antiquis tabulis ac monumentis, S. Joannis Garocelli vocabulo appellari legimus civitatis primariæ de qua agimus Ecclesiam Cathedralem." Blaev. *Theatrum Sabandiae*.

Thus the authority to which Mr. Ellis appeals in favour of the Medulli, informs us that, though some thought them to be the occupants of the Maurienne, he, with others, thought it to be inhabited by the Garoceli, and that the latter was the better opinion. This shows a competition between two different things, and does not forward their identity. The *Oxford Dissertation*, p. 21, referred to Sanctus Johannes long ago, quoting *Theatr. Saband.* vol. ii. p. 19: but there the suggestion was that John of Maurienne had been spoken of as Garocellius—not a word upon the Medulli. Perhaps Garocellius had nothing national in its signification. Johannes Garocellius might be Bishop of Maurienne, as John of Gaunt was Duke of Lancaster, without the name attaching to the district which was under his jurisdiction.

Mr. Ellis took his chance with the Garoceli, by placing them in partnership with the Medulli in the Lower Maurienne. That fails: and the Medulli themselves seem to hold a questionable title to that territory, trusting only to the contiguities of the Arch; and among other discouragements to it is this: that Mr. Ellis himself countenanced their holding the Upper, by having described them as occupiers from Bramante to the Cenis lake, when, with equal infelicity, he was exhibiting the Taurini as holding the base of the descent at Susa.

As there is no satisfactory evidence on the position of the Garoceli, the most reasonable clue to them seems to be in the word Ocelum, which contributes so largely to form their name. But they are not needed to complete the proof that Cæsar's pass was the Genève. It is unimportant from whence the battalions came, by whom he was resisted at the pass.

In Vocontiorum fines pervenit.

It only remains to be seen how Mr. Ellis, after his explanation of the previous incidents which belong to Cæsar's narrative of the seven days' march, introduces him into the Vocontii. His construction is that Cæsar never entered among them at all. He brings him towards the mouth of the Drac; and, without crossing that river into their territory, sends him over the Isère into the Allobroges. Now, Mr. Ellis has admitted that, if I should prove my point on the site of Ocelum, my conclusion against the Mont Cenis would be just. *Journ. of Phil.* iii. 19. Does he abide by that concession?

We do not agree in the construing of the words; which are these—"In fines Vocontiorum ulterioris provinciæ die septimo pervenit: inde in Allobrogum fines: ab Allobrogibus in Segusianos exercitum ducit." Being used to construe "in" *into*, when followed by an accusative, I understand "in fines" to mean "into the bounds:" and as Cæsar was a forward-going man, I apprehend that, having got into Vocontian land, he would go through till he got out again, which was into the Allobroges. Mr. Ellis does not recognise these notions: he says, *Journ. of Phil.* iii. 25: "The transit through the Vocontii is merely an assertion of Mr. Law's: the body of their country is not mentioned, but merely its 'fines:' the expression means no more than 'frontier:' 'inde' is equivalent to 'ab iisdem finibus.'" On this pretence, Mr. Ellis shirks the word "in" altogether. He would bring Cæsar opposite to Grenoble, by cutting across the mountains from St. Jean de Maurienne; would just take a look at the Vocontii across the Drac, and, without speaking to them, pass the Isère into the Allobroges. This fancy is not satisfactory: for, if the words "in fines Vocontiorum" do not carry Cæsar into the Vocontii, the words "in fines Allobrogum" will not carry him into the Allobroges.

As Mr. Ellis can manage Cæsar's geography so as to dispense with the Vocontii in this line of march, he very naturally charges me with blundering about them. He says in his defence—"Mr. Law must consider the right bank of the Drac, where the road to Grenoble runs, to have been in the possession of that people. . . . Mr. Law contravenes the supposition that the south bank of the Isère must have been Vocontian. . . . He has adopted the banishment of the Uceni from the Pays d'Oysans." *Journ. of Phil.* iii. 25, 26, 14. These statements have no foundation. I hold that, at a certain part, the Isère separated the Vocontii from the Allobroges; and that the Drac, which in old times ran into the Isère above Grenoble, separated the Vocontii from the Uceni; and that these, being the Iconii of Strabo, were above the Vocontii on the Isère, and owned Bourg d'Oysans on the Romanche. I no more pretend to know their precise dimensions than I do those of the Tricorii, whom I would suppose to be more south, in deference to Livy.

Our difference then is substantially this: Mr. Ellis thinks that the seven days' march was from Buttigliera on the minor Doria (*his* Ocelum), over the Little Cenis, and down the Arc to St. Jean de Maurienne, whence it cut across the mountains to the Col de la Coche, and across the Isère into the Allobroges, not crossing the Drac into the Vocontii: and that, as he went by "proximum iter," this short cut proves his celerity. Against this, I would further say that, if ever the five legions had got into the line of a descending river, Cæsar would not have been tempted to quit this advantage by encountering new Alps; and, in whichever line the march was made, "complura prœlia" might diminish the celerity of it. My belief is unshaken, that Cæsar, proceeding from Ocelum near Fenestrelles, and crossing the Genève, made his way to the territory of the Vocontii, which was part of the "ulterior provincia:" that he crossed the Isère from them into the Allobroges at Grenoble,

which appears soon afterwards as the place of crossing by the letters of Plancus to Cicero.

Such are the comments which I have thought right to make on the three matters of discussion which Mr. Ellis has brought forward, as auxiliary to his main point of contention, that Hannibal crossed the Little Mont Cenis. He conceives that this had been the accustomed pass in still earlier times; and relies on Roman practice for more recent times, to the writings of Julius Cæsar, to Ammianus Marcellinus, and to the chart or Table of Peutinger.

Dates of Alpine Passes.

At the close of his Treatise, Mr. Ellis gives a short epitome of the continuous use of the Cenis track as the favourite line between Gaul and Italy. It appears in p. 180, as a note; and in the exposition which is made of Roman roads in the lower valley of the Isère, there are statements to which I would call attention, in the purpose of giving a right seniority to events. Among other things it is said: "When the route "over the Chartreuse mountains was opened, the road of the "Mont Cenis was, as appears from the Peutingerian Table, "connected with that road, and the way by Grenoble and the "Graisivaudan no longer formed the line of approach to "Vienne."

I believe that when the route over the Chartreuse mountains was opened, there existed no Cenis road to be connected with it. As to such a fact appearing from the Peutingerian Table, I believe that that document had no existence till A.D. 393; whereas the Passage of the Mont du Chat, the only Roman road I ever heard of carried through those mountains, appears in the Antonine Itinerary, which was fully two hundred years earlier. As to finding the Cenis pass laid down in any ancient Roman documents, you might as well seek it in a map of Hindostan.

The term "no longer," in the latter part of the sentence quoted, implies that *before* that route through the mountains was opened, the way by Grenoble and the Graisivaudan *had* given the line of approach to Vienne. If any one supposes this, it is a great mistake. The two Itineraries, published by Wesseling, give no road along the Graisivaudan; and the only document which draws a route through Grenoble is the later one of A.D. 393, called the Table: that is carried straight on from Grenoble to Vienne. Mr. Ellis has avoided to show or mention this line, by making Orelle on the Arc to personate Grenoble, and not bringing out Vienne at all; and this line is omitted from his own map, though he calls it a "Map of Roman roads, deduced from the Itineraries and the "Table." The only correct sentence in his history of roads, in p. 180, is this: "No route up the Graisivaudan is given in the Itineraries, or traced in the Peutingerian Table." What is called the Grésivaudan is the valley above Grenoble.

The history of Roman Itinera through the Alps, if correctly attainable, would be an interesting branch of the history of civilization. As in all disputed progress of human art and usage, one looks for cause and consequence. It appears probable to me, that the Penine and Graian passes were in use at an earlier day than the Matrona, the Genève; and the use of the Cenis, not being traced to Roman times, seems to have been long posterior to that of the other three. Some may presume that, as Susa was so accessible from Turin, and as a great Iter in the direction to which the Cenis leads, must have been desirable after the conquests of Cæsar, not only the Little St. Bernard and the Genève would continue to be the accustomed passes for Roman use, but the Cenis also would become so.

The evidence is against even that. There is no route over the Cenis in the first extant Itinerary, nor in the second (that of Jerusalem), which was in a much later day. And in the

far later document called from Peutinger, there is evidence that, when a road was made to Grenoble, it was made, not over the Cenis, but by a new branch from Briançon, after crossing the Genève.

Accordingly, when Mr. Ellis mutilates that document for substituting one pass of Alps for another, he does not work without an object; and yet his success in that object would not much have furthered his views on Hannibal, whose expedition preceded the parchments of Peutinger by six hundred years. He must be content with the earliest date (A.D. 755), which he has found for the reputation of Mons Cenisius, which he tells us (p. 160) is in the Continuation of the Chronicle of Fredegar.

We believe that a Roman way was never made over the Cenis, from the utter want of evidence of its existence. Some memorial would have perpetuated its fame. Susa alone, from its position, might have occasioned some mention of such a track in ancient history. If Cæsar's seven days' march had been from Buttigliera, through St. Jean de Maurienne, either to Aiguebelle or to the Col de la Coche, some index to the exploit would survive in history more pregnant with conclusions than the spontaneous conjectures of Mr. Ellis.

The cause why the Romans should abstain from appointing the Cenis as a way for armies, when the Cottian obstruction to their jurisdiction was removed, and why, on their acquisition of Susa, a new approach to the Genève was preferred as the object of public care, we may well conceive to have been in the impracticable character of the former. It is of no avail to refer to the admirable state of the fine route which carries men over the Cenis at the present day. This is a creation within our own memories—the establishment of a line, not its improvement. The ascent from Susa, by Jaillon, St. Martin, Molaret, and Bard, established under Napoleon, is not adducible against our argument. The incompetency of

the Cenis, of which we speak, is to be accounted for by the character of the earlier ascent by the La Novalèse and La Ferrière, which was only superseded at the beginning of the present century ; and I apprehend that that route has always presented a more serious and appalling defiance than any which the art of man has subdued for contriving the great ways over the Alps ; and, while we speak of those difficulties, the obstacle continues to the present moment. That route only acquired a state which promised serious amelioration, under Emmanuel III. during the last century. Nevertheless, it was abandoned as hopeless by him who in the present century constructed a new ascent in a different part of the mass of mountains which tower behind the ancient Segusio. The Cenis, notwithstanding its partial use from the time of Charlemagne, cannot have been worthy to rank as a Roman way till the time of Napoleon.

For confirming the inference that is to be drawn from the silence of history, I think we may believe that, under the emperors, the natural difficulties of the known ascent from Susa were so great as to discourage the construction of a great Roman Way. Knowing how fearful those difficulties continued to be to the end of our eighteenth century, we must imagine what they must have been in the first century. Mr. Ellis forgets this aspect of the subject in applying his comment on facts. Speaking of the amount of imputed difficulty in ancient times, he says : " This cannot be concluded of a pass which, however difficult, must rank, relatively to Alpine passes generally, among the easiest known, — a pass which may be shown to have been always a thoroughfare through the Alps ; and which is now, what it seems to have been for some centuries, the great highway from France to Italy." *Treatise*, p. 149.

It is a great mistake thus to speak of the Cenis which is now together with the Cenis of past centuries. The eulogy,

as pronounced relatively to passes generally, is quite undeserved; and, when applied to remote times, unfounded. Mr. Ellis omits to point out the change from worst to best, which distinguishes the Cenis of our own times. In all that is said by him on the Cenis, the modern ascent from Susa is not alluded to. The road of Napoleon the First over the Cenis affords no sort of argument in favour of a Cenis of Hannibal, more than the road of Napoleon the Third under the Cenis will afford it hereafter.

The Great Highway of centuries which Mr. Ellis celebrates did not exist for De Saussure in 1786. It did not exist for Albanis Beaumont in 1793. Let all praise be given to it in the nineteenth century. But let not that which was in use before and which carried you another way, profit by the reflection of its merits. Mr. Ellis himself has helped us to know what were the demerits of the Cenis which flourished when he was born. Let the portrait be studied; and then let us picture to ourselves, what they must have been for centuries before. Mr. Ellis has himself, as he thinks, contemplated Hannibal's descent: and, in support of his ninth condition, invites us to follow his steps. He uses these words (*Treatise*, p. 119):—

“ A remarkable passage in a geographical work of the last century,* seems to indicate clearly the situation of this place, when Hannibal's path had been destroyed by a landslip. The passage runs thus—From the Inn, called La Grande Croix, on account of the wooden cross, which stands by its side, and which forms the boundary between Savoy and Piedmont, the descent begins. On descending, there is found a place enclosed by the mountains, called La Plaine de S. Nicola: this plain being passed, there is a descent which, at one time, the stones and rocks rendered impracticable to such a degree, that those who were accustomed to

* Busching's *Geography of Italy*. Venice, 1780. vol. i. p. 78.

“ transport travellers in chairs, were obliged to descend by
“ leaping from rock to rock, as it were down so many steps.
“ Upon this inevitable descent towards La Novalèse, there
“ were three or four places, where the path, flanked by very
“ lofty precipices, was exceedingly narrow, and the waters had
“ broken away the ground to such an extent, that the chair,
“ with the person carried in it, hung half in air, over the
“ precipice.

“ But under the reign of Emmanuel III. (1730—1773), a
“ new road was made, upon which there is no longer any
“ danger ; nevertheless there is a distance of about sixteen
“ miles where the traveller is obliged to be carried in a chair.’
Mr. Ellis adds—“ This part of the old road is again referred
“ to in the same work. It is said, in the description of La
“ Ferrière, that the path leading down to La Novalèse was
“ sometimes contracted by the precipices to a width of no
“ more than one foot.”

No advocate of a Hannibalian Cenis has proposed for scrutiny any descent but that by La Ferrière. In exhibiting this uninviting road 2,000 years after the march of Hannibal, Mr. Ellis is labouring to prove that it was bad enough to suit the story of Polybius. I apply his proofs to a different purpose ; to show that it was too bad to suit it. I have no materials on which to pronounce how far the passage was getting worse between Hannibal and our fifth century ; or between the fifth century and the eighteenth. Mr. Ellis’s own efforts of description, general and particular, disprove it as the scene recorded by Polybius : and the condemnation of the route as incurable by Napoleon, concurs with all other evidence, negative and affirmative, to show, that Hannibal and his Italian friends were never near it.

Of the detached questions which have lately arisen to us, the most interesting is the question, which was the pass of Cæsar, and I just receive (June, 1866) an important confirma-

tion of the views which I have been advocating, when my pen is hardly yet dry from the task of expressing them. In the second volume of "The History of Julius Cæsar," it is said (p. 67) that, when he went for reinforcements to oppose the Helvetii, he carried the legions *from Aquileia to Ocelum (Usseau) in 28 days, and thence to Grenoble in 7 days.* If I had a shade of doubt on his crossing the Genève, this would relieve it.

THE ALPS OF HANNIBAL.

PART IX.

INTERPRETATION OF LIVY.

CHAPTER I.

Introduction. Passage of the Rhone. March to the Island. Livy's hypothesis on the Pass. Usually interpreted as the Genève, latterly as the Cenis. Discordance of the Cenisians on the Island and the Allobroges. Larauza. Ukert. Ellis.

INTRODUCTION.

THE writings of Livy on the history of his country are more familiar to many than those of earlier date: and I need not preface the examination of his testimony with urging his claim to our respect. To know the rank which he holds among the sages of history, let any man observe the mature reflections of his greatest admirer and best eulogist. Niebuhr closes a commemoration of Livy with these remarks: "He enriches the literature of his countrymen with a colossal masterwork, with which the Greeks have nothing of the kind to compare: nor can any modern people place a similar work by its side. Of all the losses that have befallen us in Roman literature, the greatest is that which has left his history imperfect." Transl. by Hare and Thirlwall, i. 4.

An inquiry into the route which Livy imparted to Hannibal ought to be shorter than the inquiry into the route of Polybius: for many reasons. Much that has been said already is applicable to both narratives, being explanatory of facts on which there is no disagreement between them. The duration of the march, and the season in which it was performed, are the same in both. In explaining Livy, we have no measurements to deal with: he does not mark the progress by distances: the only distance asserted in his narrative is that of Hanno's movement by the Rhodæ: and this is the same as in Polybius. Livy himself has limited the scope of inquiry into his meaning, by declaring that Hannibal did not come over either the Great or the Little St. Bernard.

Our apprehension of the Pass which Livy intended to maintain will depend upon our rightly interpreting the few words which tell the progress of the army from the junction of the Rhodæ and Isère to the Alps: and almost exclusively on those: for in the details of progress through the Alps there is hardly an intimation of geography. The only further aid for understanding his track is in some comments made after the narrative of progress, and arising out of a discussion of the amount of time which survived in arriving into the plain of Italy. Livy there reasons controversially upon the way by which Hannibal had come there, touching the questions commonly held on the subject which were adverse to his own.

These things considered, one would not expect to find great difficulty in comprehending the route which Livy intended to describe. But as those who profess to be guided by him, have themselves found the utmost difficulty, as is apparent by the dissensus among themselves, their speculations require to be sorted.

When we shall be satisfied as to what his opinion was, we shall have to consider whether it is essentially different from that of Polybius: and, if it prove to be so, the grounds on

which he differed from him must be weighed, before we can decide for ourselves, on which narrative we should rest our belief.

The Passage of the Rhone.

Livy, while he had his own hypothesis on the Pass of Alps, had nothing new to suggest concerning the Passage of the Rhone, and did not intend to contradict preceding writers. The country on the lower Rhone with the towns belonging to it had, in his time, become familiar as an integral part of the Roman dominions: and it might be expected that his account of the Passage would contain some notices of locality. As it contains none, we may infer that there was nothing new which he desired to bring forward.

The place where the river was crossed by Hannibal was indeed not likely to be a subject of dispute. The site of his encampment on the Rhone had been viewed by Roman eyes, and become known to the Roman government without uncertainty. Nothing more of him was seen until he and Scipio met in the plain of the Po. Those termini were not to be mistaken. But of the track which he pursued from one to the other there was no official evidence: it remained liable to the speculations which Livy's history lays before us: and this is the more intelligible, when we remember the long continuing impotence of Rome against the Alps. The Carthaginian occupation of the mountains was no momentary matter. Livy shows that for a long period Hannibal maintained his communications with Spain through the Alps. In his account of the ill-fated expedition of Asdrubal, he says this—"Cæterum Hasdrubali et suâ et aliorum spe omnia " celeriora atque expeditiora fuere: non enim recepêrunt " modò Arverni eum, deincepsque, aliæ Gallicæ atque Alpinæ " gentes, sed etiam secutæ sunt ad bellum: et quum per " munita pleraque transitu fratris, quæ antea invia fuerant,

“ducebat, tum etiam duodecim annorum assuetudine perviis
“Alpibus factis, inter mitiora jam hominum transibat in-
“genia.”

It might be thought that such events would be so stamped on the scenes where they occurred, that those scenes would become recognised and unquestioned. But, when Hannibal was recalled from Italy, this channel of communication did not pass into the control of his enemy: the Romans were still excluded from the Alps. Macedon, Carthage, Greece, Spain, were brought to own the supremacy of the domineering republic, while the Alps remained untrodden by the Roman soldier. Histories of the march were published both in the Greek and Latin languages; of which one only, as far as we know, had defined by name the pass of the Carthaginians. It was long before there was official access to the country which they had traversed. The Gaulish and Ligurian nations of Italy still struggled for independence; and postponed to a late day the familiarity of Rome with the Alps. Hence an opening to doubt, and a temptation to the confounding of fiction with truth: and thus was the route of Hannibal, two centuries after the invasion, treated by the great historian of Rome, as a matter of argument and speculation.

From such cause of obscurity the Passage of the Rhone was free. A Roman consul saw the place three days after the enemy had marched onwards to the Isère: and up to this point there is not found in Livy's narrative of the track anything in contradiction of Polybius. He carries the march from the Pyrenees through Elne and Roussillon to the country of the Volcæ, whose capital was Nîmes. Before the passage is forced, Hanno is sent 25 miles up the river, and crosses it: and all the circumstances of the passage told by Livy are in accordance with the earlier history. Hannibal marches up the river on the day following that of the engagement of cavalry, and reaches the Island in four days: Scipio arrives

at the deserted entrenchments on the third day after the departure of the enemy. These conformities would not have been found, if the two historians had imagined different points for the passage of the Rhone. Further, as Livy had no cause, like his predecessor, to avoid the nomination of places, one would think that, if any well known town had been signalised by the passage of the Carthaginian armament, and question had been made on so interesting an incident, he would not have left it unnoticed. It may then be fairly inferred from his silence, that he had nothing to advance in opposition to prior writers: and I am entitled to say that, if I have shown the place of crossing intended by one historian, I have shown the place recognised by the other.

Four days' march to the Island.

All interpreters of Livy, save the accola of the Eygues, allow that he intended to describe the four days' march as up the Rhone from the passage of that river as far as a district called the Island. There is a difference of opinion on the site which Livy gives to it; also on the position of a people called Allobroges; but all understand that Hannibal found that people in a state of discord; that he interfered in favour of the elder brother; aided him in regaining the supremacy; and received substantial benefits in return. These are incidents on which every interpreter must pause, before he traces the further route into Italy.

When the progress is resumed, there is great difference of opinion on the direction which Livy meant to assign to it, among those who profess to rely on his story. And this is to be remembered; that he states Hannibal's movement to the Isère, after crossing the Rhone, to have been induced only by the desire to avoid present conflict with the Roman army.*

* D'Anville (Tricorii) speaks as if both historians imputed this to Hannibal: it is Livy only.

He would therefore consider that, on the motive to that deviation being removed by Scipio returning to his ships, Hannibal became free to pursue the route which he had first designed. We will inquire now, not into the merits of Livy's opinion, but which route did he intend to describe ?

What was Livy's hypothesis on the Pass.

Every disputant who denies the Graian Alps, whether his pass be the Simplon, the Great St. Bernard, the Cenis, the Genève, or the Viso, and whatever circuit he may make to reach it, seems to conceive his own hypothesis to be in accordance with the text of Livy as well as with that of Polybius. Accordingly in the early part of Livy's march they question the points which we deemed most important in Polybius: they deny the river to be the Rhone, and deprive our island of its inhabitants, the Allobroges. The Isère is found convenient for reaching the Cenis: neither river is convenient for reaching the Genève. I believe that none of our adversaries, following one history, profess to disregard the other. We, who deny the concurrence of the two, believe Livy to be mistaken: but we must inquire into his meaning, to justify our distrust of his conclusions. The adverse theories which claim from us the most attentive consideration, are those which favour the Mont Genève and those which favour the Mont Cenis. Other hypotheses may be noticed, but not as requiring a detailed effort of opposition.

The writers of highest name, who favour the Mont Genève, have been, D'Anville, who interprets Livy, but does not interpret Polybius, presuming that they must agree; and Letronne, who interprets both, and struggles to reconcile them. They are both right upon Livy's pass: but each commits great errors as to Livy's mode of arriving at it. D'Anville would carry Hannibal up the Val Godemar, from the head of which there is no escape at all for an army. He

was in partial, but excusable ignorance of that part of a country to which he devoted so much attention. Letronne contradicts the text of Livy in his endeavour to reconcile it with that of Polybius. We will hereafter examine the particular blemishes of these distinguished men, who judge rightly on the pass which Livy intended, and on nothing else.

The rival hypothesis of the Cenis I conceive to have no pretension to be in accordance with either history. The recent writers who have most strongly urged it, are M. Larauza, Dr. Ukert, and Mr. Ellis. Larauza published his clever book, *Histoire Critique*, in 1826. Dr. Ukert, in support of the same route, wrote in 1832: and Mr. Ellis, with some variety of line, in 1854. Ukert, though somewhat differing from Larauza on the Island and the Allobroges, follows him through the mountains almost without interfering; as if doubtfully approving the matter in which he seems to acquiesce. Indeed in the whole march through the Alps to the plain he is the obsequious attendant of the French critic, transcribing his Itinerary, but not confirming his interpretations with reasonings of his own.

The Insula and Allobroges of Larauza.

M. Larauza admits, that Livy intended the Island to be north of Isère: but insists on the fact that the Allobroges were south of Isère. On their position he says this—"Où a-t-on vu dans ces historiens qu'à cette époque les Allobroges habitassent l'Île? Bien loin de le laisser entendre, ne disent-ils pas tout le contraire? Nulle part Polybe ne donne le nom d'Allobroges aux habitans de l'Île. Tite-Live est encore plus formel: il reconnaît positivement, comme on l'a déjà pu voir, que les Allobroges habitaient près de l'Île." P. 35.

The words of the history are these—"Quartis castris ad

" Insulam pervenit: ibi Arar Rhodanusque amnes, diversi ex
 " Alpibus decurrentes, agri aliquantum amplexi, confluunt in
 " unum: mediis campis Insulæ nomen inditum: incolunt prope
 " Allobroges, gens jam inde nullâ Gallicâ gente opibus aut famâ
 " inferior." I object to the construction, though a common one,
 that "incolunt prope" means "dwell near the Island." "In-
 colunt" signifies "dwell in;" and we are to understand
 "campos" or "insulam" as following that word—We pre-
 sently read "incolentium ea loca Gallorum;" where the
 accusative is expressed. If the required idea had been
 "dwell" only, and not "dwell in;" "colunt prope" would
 have sufficed, as in chapter xxvi. where Livy says of the Volcæ,
 "colunt circâ utramque ripam Rhodani." As "incolunt" means
 "dwell in the Island," "prope" cannot mean "near the Island."
 The nearness which it imports is nearness to the point at
 which the story of Hannibal's progress has arrived, the point
 which in the preceding sentence is intended by "ibi," and
 which was reached by the four days' march.

Now no commentator has ever suggested a name other than
 Allobroges for those who dwelt in the island: Livy does not
 hint that Hannibal was among that people before he reached
 the Isère: and, when the army is put in motion again south
 of Isère, they are left behind, and we never hear of them
 again. If Livy's Allobroges were not beyond the Isère, where
 were they?

M. Larauza bestows the denomination Allobroges "aux
 " diverses tribus Gauloises occupant du tems d'Annibal tout
 " le pays qui s'étend depuis le Rhône au dessous de l'Isère,
 " jusqu'à l'entrée des Alpes et au delà." He first spreads
 them along the Rhone from the Durance to the Isère; and
 then along the south of Isère towards the Alps. He imagines
 that those who were just in the angle made by the rivers were
 specially Allobroges; in fact, Allobroges and nothing else.
 Thus, in his view, the march up the Rhone to the Island had

brought Hannibal into Allobroges without crossing the Isère : and the Tricastini succeed them, being along the Isère. Larauza says :—" Nous placerons avec Tite-Live dans ce " même pays, d'abord les Tricastini, à la suite de la nation " à laquelle il applique exclusivement le nom d'Allobroges, " et qui se trouvait habiter alors le pays occupé par les " Cavares du tems de Strabon, et par les Segalauni du tems " de Ptolomée." P. 84.

This notion, that the Allobroges had anciently been where Strabo places the Cavari, is utterly without foundation. Strabo speaks of Cavari and Allobroges as quite distinct : and he was precisely contemporary with Livy. He used the term Cavari as comprehending many peoples, who had names of their own, and bordered on the Rhone from the Durance to the Isère. He says, p. 185, that from the Durance to the mouth of the Isère belonged to the Cavari : in the next page he says that along those parts of the Rhone's bank the name Cavari prevails, so that all the barbarian nations are so called, though, in fact, no longer barbarians, but having for the most part assumed the character of Romans, with the language and habits of life, and some of their civil rights. One must believe that Tricastini and Segalauni were among the Cavari of Strabo. Having placed the Cavari upon the Rhone from the Durance to the Isère, he exhibits the Allobroges on the Rhone from the Isère to Lyons, stating the distances both by land and by water. He does not say that the term Allobroges embraces more peoples than one : he states that Vienne was formerly their metropolis when it was only a village ; but had now become a fine city. If it were true that Allobroges were the predecessors of Cavari south of Isère, Hannibal must have been in their country for six days before he reached the Island : and yet Livy does not mention that people till after Hannibal has reached the Island ; nor does he mention them again after he has made his way out of the Island.

Notwithstanding his attempt to show by ancient authority that in Hannibal's time the position of the Allobroges was in fact south of the Isère, M. Larauza is obliged to confess that their civil war told by Livy was in the Island. As the words "*sedatis certaminibus Allobrogum*" are too plain to be perverted, he admits that those Allobroges were spoken of as the combatants. But on the fact itself he differs from Livy, and contends that the notion of Allobrogian discord was a mere blunder on the part of the historian; whose ignorance he readily explains, by observing that he did not understand the Celtic language so well as the *savans* of modern times. "Ne connaissant la signification de la plupart de ces mots Celtes (Tricastins, Voconces et Tricoriens), et n'ayant pas vu que le nom d'Allobroges était une dénomination générale comprenant les diverses peuplades qui habitaient ce pays, il aura conclu que les Allobroges se trouvaient seulement vers les bords du Rhône, et que les Tricastins, les Voconces, et les Tricoriens étaient des peuples distincts des premiers, et placés après eux; tandis qu'au contraire il aurait pu voir qu'en allant des Allobroges chez les Tricastins, Annibal se trouvait toujours chez les Allobroges, et que c'étaient encore des Allobroges qu'il devait rencontrer à son passage dans les Alpes."

M. Larauza heads a chapter thus:—"Comment Tite-Live aura été induit à placer près de l'Île la nation que Polybe place dans l'Île." In tenderness to the memory of Livy, he invents for him an excuse, and a queer excuse it is: namely, that the ejected elder brother, who claimed the sovereignty of the nameless nation that dwelt in the Island, had been driven out of it at the time when Hannibal came up the Rhone, and was thereby a trespasser on the opposite bank of the Isère among the Allobroges: that Livy mistook the involuntary position of this chief for the position of his nation, and so called them Allobroges. "Le roi dépossédé lors de

“ l’arrivée d’Annibal, pouvait se trouver en deçà du fleuve :
 “ voyant donc là le chef légitime de cette nation, l’historien
 “ aura pu supposer qu’elle habitait cette partie de la Gaule,
 “ et comme d’autre part il trouvait dans Polybe que l’armée
 “ Carthaginoise, à partir du Rhône, eut à traverser le terri-
 “ toire des Allobroges, il en aura conclu que ce fut cette
 “ nation, placée au-deçà de l’Ile, qui fit intervenir Annibal
 “ dans sa querelle, quoique Polybe dise le contraire.” P. 86.

The Insula and Allobroges of Ukert.

Dr. Ukert’s notions upon the Allobroges have claimed our attention before in discussing the *ἀναβολή* of Polybius. We now inquire what are his notions upon the Allobroges as treated by Livy, and in their relation to Livy’s Island : and those notions are by no means clear. Unhappily not able to study Dr. Ukert myself, I refer to the learned reviewer, who, in the *Philological Museum* of 1833, stated the opinions of the Professor in English, as he considered them to be.

Dr. Thirlwall, expounding Ukert’s views, says—“ With respect to the position of the Island, Ukert admits it to be
 “ the tract which is bounded by the Rhone, the Isère, and the
 “ intervening mountains, but on almost every other point he
 “ is at variance with the partisans of General Melville. He
 “ does not allow that any alteration is required in the text
 “ either of Polybius or Livy, where they describe the Island.” P. 680.

In p. 681 he continues his exposition :—“ The Allobriges,
 “ or Allobroges, appear to have been driven northward from
 “ their original seats, in which they were known to Apollo-
 “ dorus as a most powerful nation (Steph. Byz. Ἀλλόβρυγες),
 “ and in the time of Livy to have been confined to the country
 “ north of the Isère. This state of things he has transferred
 “ to the time of Hannibal. *His* Allobroges inhabit the *Island*
 “ of the Barbarians of Polybius, which is south of his own

“ *Island: incolunt prope Allobroges.* Livy’s *Island*, formed
 “ by the Rhone and the Saône (Arar), is described in a manner
 “ which will not apply to that of Polybius, even if the name
 “ Arar is altered to Isara. It is not a tract resembling the
 “ Delta of the Nile, but only a considerable district (*agri*
 “ *aliquantum*). But the kingdom about which the contest
 “ decided by Hannibal has arisen, is that of the Allobroges:
 “ they become Hannibal’s friends and allies. It is not, how-
 “ ever, said that he marches through their territory: after he
 “ has composed their dissensions, he turns to the left through
 “ the Tricastini, and meets with no obstacle till he reaches the
 “ Druentia: a description which, except with regard to the
 “ Druentia, agrees with that of Polybius, on the supposition
 “ that Hannibal did not cross the Isère, and that Polybius
 “ took this river for the Rhone.”

Further, in p. 682, it seems to be Dr. Ukert’s opinion that
 “ in the direction of the march, Livy coincides with Polybius,
 “ when he makes Hannibal bend his course to the left towards
 “ the Tricastini, and then skirt the borders of the Vocontii
 “ toward the Tricorii. It is the same road as Bellovesus and
 “ his Gauls had formerly taken. (Liv. v. 34.) The expression
 “ *ad lacum* must be understood with reference to the pre-
 “ vious words, *cum jam Alpes peteret*, when Hannibal had
 “ turned his front toward the Alps, the Tricastini and the
 “ Isère lay on his left. We have therefore only to measure
 “ the 300 stadia along the Isère: they will bring us to Mont-
 “ meilian, and here we enter the mountains. But, if this is
 “ the road by which Livy also leads us, how do we come to
 “ the Durance! It is the mention of this river which has
 “ subjected Livy to the charge of ignorance and carelessness
 “ from those who believed that he led Hannibal across the
 “ Mont Genève, and yet adopted a description from Polybius,
 “ which is only applicable to a different part of the Alps.”

Ukert thinks (says the Reviewer), that this imputation is unfounded, and that Livy's Druentia is not the Durance.

Ukert himself escapes the Durance by going over the Cenis. But he does not succeed in making Livy do so. Livy leads Hannibal to the Durance in order to take him over the Genève. I am more disposed to relieve him of the suspicion under which he labours, of making the city of Lyons the island of the Allobroges. When it is asked, "If Rhone and Arar are two sides, what is the third side?" there is no rational answer.

I apprehend it to be true, that in most extant manuscripts the rivers named are the Saône and the Rhone. The words are these:—"Quartis castris ad Insulam pervenit: ibi Arar" "Rhodanusque diversi ex Alpibus decurrentes, agri aliquantum amplexi, confluunt in unum." One manuscript, in Trinity College, Cambridge, has, not "ibi Arar," but "bisarar," which is reasonably thought to be a mistake for "ibi Isara:" and this aids the common notion that Isara must have been the original reading.

It seems to me unimportant, whether Isara has the support of one or two manuscripts, or of none. Let us even believe that Livy's own pen wrote Arar, the Saône: his mind intended the Isère. The definition in which the word occurs is nonsense, if you accept the Saône; sound and just, if you understand the Isère: in the former case there is no chain of Alps ranging between the two rivers; in the latter, that feature is distinctly evident. The fact related by Livy could not occur at the confluence of the Rhone and Saône; and could only occur at the confluence of the Rhone and Isère. He says that Hannibal came to the island in four days' march from the place of crossing the Rhone. Four days could not have brought the army to Lyons, even from Roquemaure; it is a distance of 135 miles: and the Tarascon passage makes the case more perverse; for from that, as the place of crossing,

the distance is 165 miles. This wonderful feat we are by some asked to suppose that Livy intended to relate. Why should he be charged with such credulity? Or why should he impose upon others, by so exaggerating the marching powers of the Carthaginians? If Livy took no heed of distances, it would still be difficult to suggest a purpose, military or political, for which Hannibal should consume time and strength in pushing up with continuous haste, away from the Alps, into that corner of the Island at Lyons. If the object were to watch Scipio, it was wiser to maintain himself for a time on the Isère.

If the manuscripts had exhibited both rivers under strange or equivocal names, the context of facts would compel us to accept them as the Rhone and the Isère; the first duty of construction being to make sense in our author. It is a disease to care only for words, and not for ideas which words are to represent. Dr. Ukert said, when discussing the *Scarus* of Polybius, "We dare not alter a name." And yet he himself was at the same time doing the greatest alteration, turning *Rhone* into *Scarus*, and *Scarus* into *Rhone*. Why are we not to dare? Are Greek and Latin manuscripts necessarily exempt from error? They are not; and, like other human efforts, they claim correction. If all argument shows that Livy had in mind the Isère, it matters not which name his pen described; and if the *Numid* was not his own, but has arisen in the carelessness or wilfulness of transcribers, it is still less worthy to disturb us.

Whatever Livy's own geography might be, I think that he adopted the name *Iusula* from Polybius; and meant to apply it to the same thing. Dr. Ukert thinks that the description of it denotes too small a surface of territory. This observation would be an answer to Mr. Whitaker who is satisfied with the old Lyons; and to Menetrier and Reval who would find an old canal for a chain of Alps: but Livy's

boundaries are rivers "diversi ex Alpibus decurrentes." "Aliquantum" is certainly a loose term, indicating a very indefinite quantity. But "ager" imports an extensive district, according to the use of the word by Livy : as "ager Vocontiorum," "ager Insubrium," "ager Gallicus:" so Cæsar, "ager Helveticus." "Aliquantum agri" indicates with the context a considerable extent of country : for a range of Alps was spread between the courses of two great rivers as the completing line of the insular region. Dr. Ukert, when particularly insisting that Livy was warranted in representing it a smaller space than was said by Polybius, adds—"ibi Arar Rhodanusque, agri aliquantum amplexi, confluent in unum;" omitting the words which bespeak distance, "diversi ex Alpibus decurrentes." ii. 591. But elsewhere he fully quotes the passage.

The Insula and Allobroges of Mr. Ellis.

In the *Treatise*, p. 133, we read this—"Livy calls the inhabitants of the island Allobroges. They were such in his time, but not in that of Hannibal; as is perfectly clear from the narrative of Polybius. Livy indeed says at first, with respect to the island, that the Allobroges live near it. He should have said that they lived near it in the time of Hannibal. It was subsequent to that period that the island was comprised in the territory of the Allobroges, their name being probably applied in the course of time to all the tribes they absorbed in succession." In these words there are three ideas, and a fair amount of error.

As to the first idea, "perfectly clear from Polybius," I had ventured, in my *Criticism*, to think that the contrary was clear; on which Mr. Ellis imputed (*Journal of Phil.* ii. 316) that I substituted the expression "Allobroges" for "men of the island," and that I so made the passages of the history *absolute nonsense*. "Men of the Island" is the phrase of Mr. Ellis, not of Polybius : I could not substitute anything for a term which

is not in the history: it is not even in Mr Ellis's translation of the history. I hope, however, that although Mr Ellis treats his own rash statement as a *reductio ad absurdum*, it has appeared in these pages that the Allobroges were in fact the inhabitants of the island. See *supra* Part IV. ch. ii.

The second idea in "insolent people" is borrowed from Livy and has lately been under observation.

In the third idea, on the Allobroges having not within the island in Livy's time, it is an error borrowed from Usher. But Mr Ellis does not improve upon it. The Professor thought that that people had been reduced and driven northward: Mr Ellis discovers that they had swallowed up the other tribes. I believe there is no truth either in one notion or the other.

CHAPTER II.

March from the Isère. The march is the best, as far as generally agreed upon, by HANNA, Winkler, Lacombe, Larousse, Usher, the Cambridge anonymous, Varobianus, St. Simon, St. Cyr, Nipper, the Oxford Dissertation, &c. The text wants no mending for telling the author's meaning.

LIVY, having related that Hannibal was appealed to to settle some disputes on the government of the Allobroges, and that he did so, and received substantial benefits in return, sets the expedition in movement again with these words: "Sedatis certaminibus Allobrogum, quum jam Alpes peteret, non rectè regnum iter instituit, sed ad levam in Tricastinos flexit: inde per extremam oram Vocontiorum agri retendit in Tricastos, hinc usquam impediti viâ priusquam ad Iruentiam fumen pervenit." In these few words a march is described with five incidents of the course pursued—ad levam,

Tricastini, Vocontii, Tricorii, Druentia. After crossing this river, the march is carried to the Alps: "Hannibal ab "Druentiâ campestri maximè itinere cum bonâ pace ad "Alpes incolentium ea loca Gallorum pervenit."

The first idea in this progress, which requires to be understood, is a turn to the left towards the Tricastini; and there have been numerous contrivances for interpreting or correcting the words of the historian. These shall be noticed, with my own view of the meaning of the passage.

The turn to the left.

D'Anville does not help us here; for he misquotes the author. He says under the word Tricastini: "On trouve le "nom des Tricastini dans la marche d'Annibal, qui ayant "passé le Rhône plus bas que dans la position de ce peuple, "prit sur la gauche; 'ad lævam in Tricastinos flexit.'" Again, under the word Tricorii, he says: "On lit dans Tite-Live, "qu'ayant passé le Rhône, Annibal prit sa route sur la gauche "par le pays des Tricastini." He forgot that the turn to the left was made, not on crossing the Rhone, but in the resumed march, after settling the disputes of the Allobroges. This was an unhappy beginning of an erroneous line of march published by this distinguished geographer in 1739. D'Anville traced this march under another false impression, namely, that both historians had told Hannibal's deviation to the Isère as made for the purpose of avoiding present conflict. (See *Notice de la Gaule*, in *v. Tricorii*.) Polybius never hints at such a thing.

Mr. Whitaker (vol. i. p. 126) understood from Livy's narrative that, when Hannibal's march up the Rhone has brought him to Lyons, he turned to the left; and he is much displeased that the historian just mistook his right hand for his left, through "an indistinctness of geographical vision which perplexes his historical views." He says: "A turning to

“ the left should have been intimated when Hannibal marched
 “ up the Rhone, after crossing it ; then the observation would
 “ have been precisely just—now it is unjust and imper-
 “ tinent.”

M. Letronne believed that Hannibal was intended to turn to the left, after marching up the Isère to the Drac ; not, however, that he turned to his own left, but to the left of the historian, as he sat in his study at Rome, with his face bent towards the Alps : “ La ligne directe eût été de traverser le Drac—mais il ne prit point la ligne directe ; il tourna sur sa gauche (par rapport à l'historien) : ainsi il traversa ni l'Isère ni le Drac ; il remonta ce torrent, que sa largeur dut lui faire prendre pour la même rivière que l'Isère.”—*Journal des Savans*, Janvier, 1819, p. 32. Now, if it was Livy's practice so to speak of right and left, we must apprehend him by it. But nothing less than that practice can vindicate the suspicion of anything so unreasonable. We have the fancy of M. Letronne, but no practice of Livy. M. Larauza says justly, that if Livy had meant “ lævam ” to be his own left hand, and not that of Hannibal, he would have so expressed local relation in other instances—that is, in relation to himself ; so that “ adversâ ripâ,” which in c. xxxi. means the opposite bank of the Rhone, should be construed “ opposite to the author,” namely, on the right bank. So, in c. xxvi, “ citerior,” and “ ulterior ripâ Rhodani,” should be understood in relation to Rome : but these terms are used in relation to Hannibal before he has crossed the Rhone.

M. Larauza has his own plan : he supposes Hannibal in position south of Isère, with his back to the angle of the rivers, and his face to the east ; and he sends him up the Isère (p. 69) with this explanation : “ Annibal, se dirigeant vers les Alpes, ne prend pas le droit chemin, c'est-à-dire celui qui était plus court pour aller des Gaules en Italie, et qui passait par Valence, Die, Gap, etc., mais il se détourne

“sur sa gauche.” Thus M. Larauza contrives a position from whence Hannibal might retrace the Rhone by his right, or ascend the Isère by his left; and points out that he adopted the latter course. He verifies “non rectâ regione,” by saying that the other course, by Valence and Die, is the shorter line; but he is mistaken in this matter of fact. If from the mouth of the Isère you measure his Cenis route, and the other by Valence and Die, the point at which the two will meet is Susa; and the shorter distance to that point is by the Cenis track. Moreover, that is not the question: Livy did not by “rectâ regione” mean a shorter line from the place of turning; such was not the contrast which he had in mind.

Dr. Ukert, who follows M. Larauza up the Isère and the Arc to the Cenis, also takes a position with a view of turning to the left; but not in the same place. His plan is, to halt the army beyond the Drome after the four days' march from Tarascon; and he says, p. 594: “Let us picture to ourselves, as has been shown, Hannibal's army between the Drome and the Isère, facing the Alps and ready to decamp: he has two roads before him, one on the right hand going up the Drome into the mountains, the other on the left following the Isère: he chose the latter.” Now why should we, without instruction from the author, picture to ourselves the Carthaginian army halting after crossing the Drome, and then turning their back to the Rhone and their face to the Alps? The march did not end with the Drome: “Hannibal ad Insulam pervenit.” Let him do this: and what becomes of the exploit of the critic? He it is, not Hannibal, who, having before him the straightforward line “ad insulam,” changes his front, faces to the right for a moment, and then, under the name of turning to the left, resumes the very line in which he was marching before.

The author who wrote in 1830 as a member of the University of Cambridge, also interprets Livy. His geography is only to be conveyed in his own words, p. 93: “Hannibal

"is now supposed to be in the Island, the contest over, his army fronting the great chain of the Alps, and commencing their march : how then can he bend to the left 'in Tricastinos'?" The passage of Strabo is then quoted, who says nothing of Tricastini, but speaks of Cavares in p. 185 (referred to above) : and the critic's inference is this : "The Tricastini *therefore*, according to the present passage of Livy, might be placed between the Romanche and Grenoble, and the difficulty *would* then be done away." Having thus shifted the Tricastini to the Romanche, he becomes more obscure by this explanation : "Hannibal, then, from the spot where he had decided the contest between the brothers, turns to the left, and marching through Moirans, crosses the Isère at Grenoble, into the northern limits of the Vocontii. He then enters the country of the Tricorii, his course along the Drac being quite unimpeded till his arrival at the Durance."

The military critics are as discordant as the rest on the manœuvre in question. General Vaudoncourt pronounces that there must be fault in the manuscripts ; that "ad lævam" is a mistake for "ad dextram : " an opinion which he enforces thus : "Cela est si clair, que je me dispenserai de m'étendre davantage là-dessus." Tom. i. p. 56.

M. Le Marquis de St. Simon (*La Guerre des Alpes, ou Campagne de 1744*) makes Hannibal to retrace his steps from Vienne down the Rhone as far as St. Paul-trois-châteaux before he strikes off for the Alps. He seems to perform the "ad lævam" in this way :—he had crossed the Isère and taken a sweep by St. Marcellin, which brought him from east to west upon the Rhone at Vienne : so that his face being to that river, "ad lævam" necessarily takes him down the river. I am not aware that this critic states his conception of "rectâ regione : " it ought to have been disclosed ; for "ad lævam" is contrasted with "rectâ regione," as an "iter ad Alpes." As the

facts are arranged for making "ad lævam" to take Hannibal down the Rhone, it might be thought that "rectâ regione" would have carried him into the Atlantic.

General St. Cyr Nugues satisfies the "ad lævam" of Livy on a different principle. Hannibal's army on the march to the Isère had a centre, a right wing, and a left wing. He retreated from Scipio: but an army is supposed to retreat with face to the enemy: so that the natural right hand is the military left hand. Thus Hannibal, marching to the Island, had always the Rhone on his right: consequently, when he took the road to the Alps, he turned to his left. The general is at least consistent with himself: "recta regio" finds its place in the rear—"L'armée laisse derrière elle le chemin de Grenoble, 'rectum iter.'"

Wickham and Cramer, in their chapter on Livy, p. 132, fail to discern a meaning in the turn to the left, as a means of arriving at the Mont Genève from the north of the Isère. They say: "It will surely not be by returning to the Tricastini; that is, nearly to the very point from which they had set out from the very passage of the Rhone. Nor is it possible to conceive how the Tricastini, the people of St. Paul-trois-châteaux, could have been to the left of the Carthaginian army as it moved from the Isère. There is sufficient reason, therefore, for supposing the passage to be corrupt; and, if a conjecture might be allowed, in a difficulty which seems scarcely to admit of a more reasonable explanation, we should be inclined to suppose that these words 'ad lævam in Tricastinos flexit' were in their wrong place, and ought to have formed part of the passage quoted from the beginning of the same chapter. This passage might then stand thus—'Postero die profectus adversâ ripâ Rhodani, ad lævam in Tricastinos flectit et mediterranea Galliæ petit.' This will at least enable us to obviate what is so repugnant to reason and common sense."

In this suggestion for improving a sentence, five words are lifted into it from another sentence. The change damages both: a hole is made in one, and not being mended, the mutilation is uncomfortable. "*Ad lævam flectit*" would be much missed after "*sed:*" and "*inde*" loses its sense, when the reference to *Tricastinos* is lost. And what is the advantage to the sentence which receives the words? *Livy* does not say, as my friends suppose, that *Hannibal* turned to *St. Paul-trois-châteaux*, but into the *Tricastini*: and this he would do, if, after marching a little way down the *Rhone*, he had turned to the left at *Valence*, and proceeded by *Aoste*, which is the *Augusta Tricastinorum* of *Pliny*. It is thus by no means impossible to conceive how the *Tricastini* could be on the left in marching down the *Rhone*: it is far more difficult to conceive them on the left in marching up the *Rhone*. The proposed change, of applying "*profectus ad lævam flectit*" to the march up the river, is unhappy in itself: the words import that *Hannibal*, being in march, turned to the left: so that, if he had been marching up the *Rhone*, a turn to the left would have carried him into the *Rhone*.

Mr. Ellis readily assents to the same transposition of words: it particularly suits his theory, that the *Tricastini* should have been visited before the transactions in the *Island*. He sanctions the improvement; not as the emendation of a corrupt text, but as the correction of a blundering historian: he has been instructing us, that "*Livy* is careless, extravagant, "glaringly incorrect, loving the marvellous, aiming to produce "effect rather than secure accuracy and truth." Seeing an obstacle in "*ad lævam*," he says p. 130, "On examining his "account, it will be necessary partly to undo what he has "done."—And pp. 134-5, "A single correction grounded on the "conclusion previously drawn from *Livy's* character, seems "to remove the difficulty." The correction is that of the *Oxford Dissertation*, though provoked by a different cause:

and Mr. Ellis, having first visited the Tricastini, is at liberty, after pacifying the Allobroges, to go at once into the Vocontii, construing inde "from the confluence of the two rivers."

I differ from all these writers. It appears to me that there is no difficulty to be solved; that Livy's words are quite intelligible; that they are consistent with his theory and need no alteration. If, like many of these interpreters, you set the face of the Carthaginian army according to your fancy, as you would fix a direction post, you can make the left hand incline to any point of the compass. But the position ought to be taken on the authority of the writer who is to be construed: it should accord with the context of the history. Livy said before, that Hannibal's movement to the Isère was not as his way to the Alps, but to get out of the way of the enemy: that motive ceasing to operate, he is on his way to the Alps. He begins by retracing his steps, and as he is doing so, the first turn to the left is at Valence. Hence a Roman road known to Livy turns to the Tricastini, and, if you pursue it, you will come by Die, Luc, Gap, and Embrun, to the Mont Genève.

This is the turn which Livy conceives Hannibal to have made, and the words "*quum jam Alpes peteret*" (when he was now in march for the Alps), plainly show, that he considered Hannibal to have made some progress when he did turn. "*Peto*" imports action, not speculation; "*quæro*," not "*cupio*," as, in a prior passage, "*mediterranea petit*." At the same time another idea is introduced in contrast, "*non rectâ regione, sed ad lævam*." Accordingly it has been inquired, what route would have been "*rectâ regione*?" It might be enough to say that he did not go straight on, but turned to the left. Or it may be said that Livy in "*recta regio*" adverts to the regular route from the Lower Rhone up the Durance to the Genève as Hannibal's original object, having in mind the bearing of such a course in his own day to that well-

known pass. His story is, that Hannibal deviated from that course, and afterwards sought it again ; that he began a retrograde march, but presently turned from the line by which he had sought the Isère, and made a cross cut which took him into a more advanced part of the line originally intended.

I apprehend that many have failed to estimate the expressions, "*peto*," "*non rector via*," "*recta regio*." In the march to the Isère we read, "*Mediterranea petit*," and "*non rector ad Alpes via*;" in the resumed march we read, "*quum jam Alpes peteret*," and "*non rectâ regione*." The historian supposes Hannibal now to direct his march to the line of the Durance, but by a route which was most convenient to him after retiring from the Isère.

It may possibly be objected that, if Livy assented to the passage of the Rhone above Avignon, he could not consider Hannibal to have come to it in the line which, in his own time, became the great Roman Way from Nîmes, for that Way crossed the Rhone at Arles, and the Durance at Cavaillon. But Livy's mind, impressed with the general bearing of the Spanish track to the Cottian Alps, need not have considered how much or how little of the new military way had been anticipated by Hannibal, whose enterprise was nearly 150 years before the Genève was first forced by a Roman army under Pompey: indeed, we cannot tell that Pompey's route from the Genève to the Rhone tallied throughout with the "*iter in Hispanias*" of the Itinerary. Even if Livy had had a perfect knowledge of rivers and roads as existing in his own time, which his great admirers do not claim for him, he would not have studied a coincidence with their minutiae in the plans of Hannibal.

The brief way in which he indicates the whole route pursued from the Pyrenees to the Alps, and the brief way in which he relates the progress from the Isère to the Durance, show that he spoke from general impressions, not from par-

ticular research on the tracks established in Provence and Dauphiné. He need not have cared to notice whether a crossing of the Rhone above Avignon would be favourable or not for a progress to the Cottian Alp, nor is it easy to pronounce with confidence how that would have been in the time of Hannibal. Bridges there were none at any part of the stream; the place of crossing was chosen for its own natural merits; indeed, Livy does not notice the resolution to deviate towards the Isère, till he has brought the armament safe over the Rhone, and it is plain to me that the first thing which that historian did, in his search for the track, was to acquire an impression on the pass. More will be said on this hereafter.

A few words may be said now in support of the proposition, that Livy viewed the Genève Pass, or Cottian Alp, as that which Hannibal had designed to reach, and that he imagined a reason why the accomplishment of that design should be for a time suspended. He writes consistently with such an impression; there are statements in his narrative which show Hannibal not to have intended the more southern route by the Maritime Alps; and there are statements which show him not to have intended a more northern route by the Isère. The one medium which is not absurd is the Genève. After telling the engagement of cavalry, Livy speaks of Hannibal as undecided whether he should at once persevere in his march for Italy, "*utrum cœptum in Italiam intenderet iter,*" or come into conflict with Scipio. "*Cœptum iter*" implies that he was intending a particular route. This could not be to the Maritime Alp, for when he is said to hesitate between persisting in his course and risking an engagement, we must understand him to hesitate between two different things; but if that intended course was to the Maritime Alp, the two things were not different: a march to the enemy and a march to the Maritime were the same; whether for one or the other, he

must have moved southward from his camp on the Rhone. Equally clear is it that "cceptum iter" cannot denote a march to the Isère, for Livy expressly says, that this was forced upon Hannibal by circumstances, in the policy of avoiding an engagement. The result is, that unless Livy supposed Hannibal to have come without any plan at all, he deemed his premeditated course to be the intermediate one; that which would carry him to the pass of Alps afterwards known as Cottian, the "rectior via" for one coming from Spain.

CHAPTER III.

The march continued. Tricastini. Vocontii. Tricorii. D'Anville and Letronne are both right in thinking that Livy, in naming these peoples, intended an ascent by Briançon to the Genève. But each commits great mistake on the mode of reaching that town.

WE must now consider the four geographical indicia by which Livy marks the progress after turning to the left. The object still is, to determine the track which that historian intended. It was not over the Cenis, but over the Genève, marching by Die, Luc, Gap, Embrun, and Briançon. Of those who have written in favour of the Genève, the two most eminent men have adopted the most erroneous ways of reaching it; and those ways must be separately canvassed.

Tricastini.

WE do not read of the Tricastini as taking part in the events of history: they are named only in notices of geography; by Livy, Pliny, and Ptolemy. Their territory was clearly south of Isère, and below that of the Segalauni. In a story told by Livy, v. 34, about the inroad of a host of

Gauls into Italy under one Bellovesus, in the reign of Tarquinius Priscus, he says that they arrived among the Tricastini, and, while they were perplexed with the aspect of the Alps, were called away to help the Phoceans, who had landed at Marseille. These Gauls under Bellovesus having assisted the strangers to gain a footing there, "*ipsi per Taurinos saltusque invios Alpes transcenderunt.*"

If this story has been exploded as fabulous, it may still be taken as an aid to geography. The way of these Gauls to Marseille would take them down the Rhone: and thence to the Mont Genève their way would be up the Durance: and so they would at last come to the Taurini. From this short tale, one would expect the Tricastini to be farther down the Rhone than the mouth of the Isère: and this fact becomes plainer by the passage of the 21st book now before us; in which Hannibal is said to turn into the Tricastini, when on his way to the Druentia, after settling the disputes of the Allobroges.

Pliny in his chapter on the province of Narbo, iii. 5, names Augusta Tricastinorum among the Latin towns. When Augustus acquired the supremacy, Augusta became the name of many towns. Some appear to us called simply Augusta, as Aoste on the Guiers in the north of Dauphiné: some with a national or other mark added, as Augusta Prætoria, or Augusta Taurinorum, where the latter idea survives in Torino. Two places claim to represent Augusta Tricastinorum, both being in the region ascribed to that people: Aoste on the Drome, which is in the Itineraries as Augustum and Mansio Augusta; and St. Paul-trois-châteaux, which is known near the Rhone and the Lez. One who is going down the Rhone would, by bending his steps to the left for either of these places, turn into the Tricastini. But I think that the former is to be accepted as the Augusta Tricastinorum in this inquiry, because it lies in the route which accords with the progress

that Livy was describing, from the Tricastini to the Vocontii, and eventually to the Druentia. In both Itineraries this line of road is drawn from Valence through Aoste to Die, Dea Vocontiorum: it is, in fact, the Roman road to Luc, Gap, Embrun, and Briançon.

There is another place, the Næomagus of Ptolemy, by whose latitude Larauza would give the position of the Tricastini; saying, p. 76: "Cette latitude nous montrant ce peuple sur les bords de l'Isère." This "civitas" of the Tricastini is pleasing to him, not because he can suggest its identity with any place that he ever heard of, but because Ptolemy appends to it a longitude and latitude, which he deems suitable to a progress to the Mont Cenis, and which D'Anville calls "une position fort étrange."

Larauza calls attention to Ptolemy, who, after placing the Allobryges on the eastern "side of the Rhone, having Vienna" as their civitas, places under them more to the west the Segalauni, whose civitas is Valentia: and more to the east "the Tricastini, whose city is Næomagus." Now, for appreciating the value of Ptolemy's enumeration, we should continue the quotation, and this immediately follows: "Then, below the Segalauni, the Cavari; and below them, the Salices:—But below the Tricasteni are the Mimeni, below whom are the Vocontii and their city Vasio." Now it is not easy to suppose the Tricasteni east of the Segalauni along the Isère, especially with the Mimeni south of them, and the Vocontii south of the Mimeni.

On referring to the map of Celtogalatia Narbonesia belonging to this same folio edition of Ptolemy by Bertius (*Europæ tabula tertia*), I do not find all the innovations portrayed which the text might lead us to expect. The great nation of Vocontii is not banished from its position: it still extends from the Durance to the Isère, as we collect from Cicero, Cæsar, and Strabo. The Mimeni, however, surprise us by

displaying themselves north of Isère: and the Tricasteni, with their town Neomagus, appear to flourish at the western part of the lake of Geneva. I think we may safely construe Livy as introducing Hannibal into the Tricastini in the early part of a march from the Isère down the Rhone.

Vocontii.

The Vocontii were a powerful people, who made head against the Romans on their first invasion of Gaul beyond the Alps. We know from the best writers that their most northern part touched the Isère opposite to Grenoble. On the east, they seemed to have been confined for some way by the Drac, whose stream in early times sought the Isère above Grenoble, dividing them from the Uceni. On the west, they probably joined the Segalauni: Die was Dea Vocontiorum. As to their southern and south-western frontier, whether the 99 miles of their ground, through which Strabo carries the travelling road towards Embrun, be correct or not, one cannot doubt that they owned a very extended frontier along the Durance, and must have been in contiguity with other peoples besides those mentioned.

Tricorii.

I conceive the Drac to have flowed along the borders of the Tricorii before it came to touch the Uceni (Iconii). The general position of Iconii and Tricorii seems marked by Livy's contemporary Strabo. After speaking of Cavari, as a denomination of many peoples, who border the Rhone from the Durance to the Isère, he says (p. 185)—“Above the Cavari lie the Vocontii; and the Tricorii and Iconii.” Again, in p. 203—“After the Vocontii are the Siconii and Tricorii.”

Thus the Cavari of Strabo lay along the Rhone, having behind or above them the Vocontii: and behind or above the Vocontii lay the Tricorii and Iconii: the Tricorii, as I appre-

hend, more south towards the Durance ; the Iconii more north towards the Isère. The Iconii are commonly identified with the Uceni of Pliny. Some advocates of the Cenis, who altogether disown the Durance of Livy, are driven to place his Tricorii, as well as the Tricastini and Vocontii, along the Isère. D'Anville, though he would not acknowledge them to be so far south as to include Vapincum (Gap), still places their country wholly south of the Iconii or Uceni, though on the right bank of the Drac. In his map of Gallia Antiqua, the Uceni are to the north, with Bourg d'Oysans belonging to them : and south of them are the Tricorii, but not reaching to Gap or Embrun. He writes (under Iconii)—“ Les Tricorii, “ selon la marche d'Annibal, doivent avoir occupé les bords “ du Drac vers le haut de son cours.”

In interpreting Livy, the position of the Tricorii becomes important, because he brings the march through them to the Druentia, and soon after into the Alps. We know that while those who conceive the march to be tending to the Cenis, imagine all three nations along the Isère, those who believe him to have crossed the Genève, approach this pass from the Durance. I may now say of the two most eminent authors among those who favour the Genève, D'Anville and Letronne, that they are right in their decision of the pass of Livy ; in their methods of arriving at it they differ greatly from one another, and are both grievously in error. D'Anville made an unhappy guess for interpreting the text. Letronne contradicts the text.

D'Anville.

The map of D'Anville, for illustrating the march of Hannibal, which I never saw till after Christmas, 1863, was published in April, 1739. The line of march begins south of St. Paul-trois-châteaux ; is carried up the Rhone to the junction of the rivers ; and, without crossing the Isère, is drawn some way up the left bank : it then cuts away to the position

of Corps; and soon strikes away from the Drac in a direct line to Briançon, as if by the Val Godemar: then over the Genève to Césanne, and over the Sestrières to the Po above Turin. From Turin it keeps the left bank of the Po till near the Ticinus, then crosses the Po and comes to some point on the Trebia: then to Placentia: thence to Parma and Mutina, and crosses the Arno above Florence.

The peculiarities which belong to the visible tracing of this line might have been in parts varied in the author's description of places that occur in his subsequent writings: he might have discovered errors in that track during the twenty-one years which had elapsed when he published his Dictionary called *Notice de l'Ancienne Gaule* in 1760: but we find no contradiction or inconsistency; the peculiarities are confirmed as the fruit of his deliberations. Now the track evidently shuns the angle formed by the Isère with the Drac, and therefore did not tend to the vale of Grésivaudan: and, when we see it to reach Briançon by a direct track from the nearest point of the Drac to that place, we are sure that he imagined a route up the Val Godemar, without any misgiving on the perviousness of such a line. Under the word Geminæ, he recognises the route from Luc to the Genève, which is drawn in the Theodosian Table (as he always calls the Carte de Peutinger), by noticing the two places which occur in it. "Je crois retrouver le nom de Geminæ dans celui de Mens, et Gerainæ * dans le nom de Jarain, que conserve un petit lieu du Val Godemar, sur la direction de la route qui rend vers Briançon." He repeats this under the word Gerainæ; adding, "Il est situé à la gauche du cours d'une rivière nommée Severesse, qui tombe dans le Drac vis-à-vis de Lesdiguières. En avançant au-delà, pour arriver au Mont

* In the later edition of *Tabula Peutingeriana* (Vindobonæ, 1753), which D'Anville may not have seen in 1760, both places seem to be printed Geminæ.

"Genève, la disposition du local exige que l'on se rende "par le Val Louise à Briançon." Thus, though the Val Godemar is blockaded by the highest mountains between Mont Blanc and the Mediterranean, prohibiting an advance to Briançon, yet it is quite evident that D'Anville, being unacquainted with the group of Mont Pelvoux, did conceive that line as the course of the Carthaginian march. He professes to desire the shortest line from the mouth of the Isère to the Genève; and argues that Hannibal did not come so far south as Gap, inasmuch as he would in that case have touched the Caturiges, whom Livy does not mention. What then? Many things are not mentioned by Livy. Strabo has given in much more detail the traveller's route up the Durance, in which that people could not be avoided; but he does not mention them.

When D'Anville in his later work recognises the route from the Drac up the Severaisse, as leading to Briançon and the Genève, not saying a word to show it impracticable, he is abiding by his map: and he had found this impossible track, from Luc to the Cottian Alps, in the Theodosian Table which he names; accordingly he treats the names of the places in it as he would search for stations in an Itinerary, endeavouring to find modern places which correspond with them. I believed this to be the case before ever I saw D'Anville's own map, from the entries in his *Ancienne Gaule*, which show that he did not reject the line direct from Luc to the Genève as an impossible thing; but when it appeared that he had himself delineated the same route from Corps, it was plain that his mind had been deluded by an error which took place 1300 years before.

I refer the reader to the articles in D'Anville's *Notice de l'Ancienne Gaule*—Tricastini—Tricorii—Geminæ—Gerainæ—Lucus—Vapincum, &c.

His map of 1739 is in a book at the British Museum,

which was bought at the sale of M. Letronne's books after his death, about 1847. The book contains *Atlas de Géographie Ancienne pour servir à l'intelligence des Œuvres de M. Rollin*. Paris, 1818. Among which is D'Anville's *Carte pour l'expédition d'Annibal*—and there is also, bound up with it, an early copy of this same map, having the date *Avril 1739*. M. Letronne's answers to De Luc came out in January and December 1819, which might be soon after he acquired the atlas.

Letronne.

M. Letronne, a man of great distinction, has also maintained the Genève as the pass of Hannibal. Unlike D'Anville, he struggled to ascribe to both histories the merit of giving the true track; and persuaded himself that there was consistency between them without altering a word of either. He must have been intimate with all that D'Anville had written; and must have seen the great difference between himself and his distinguished predecessor: but as they travelled to the same point, though by different ways, he never mentions him. D'Anville is not noticed either in January 1819, or in December 1819. Letronne could not be silent on Polybius: he wrote under special excitement. He had to contend with one who had just challenged public attention with the new light of the Graian Alp; and he was driven to the effort of making Polybius his witness, and could make no allusion to D'Anville, who rested on Livy.

On Letronne fell the task of answering De Luc, whose proofs were in Polybius: he had to make every sacrifice to conciliation; and his facility in doing it is marvellous. We saw before, how he shifted the river from Rhone to Isère by his translation of a Greek verb *πορεύομαι*; and how he then made Hannibal transfer himself from Isère to Drac without knowing it. So now, dealing with Livy, he avoids "recta

regio" by not going forward up the vale of Grésivaudan ; and satisfies "ad lævam" by using the left hand of Livy instead of that of Hannibal.

M. Letronne says (p. 32), that the words of Livy "présentent" "deux difficultés, contre lesquels ont échoués tous les critiques" —La première consiste dans les mots, *ad lævam*—la seconde "difficulté tient en mot *in Tricastinos* : au tems de Tite-Live, "et même de l'expédition d'Annibal, les Tricastini pouvaient "s'être étendus davantage vers le nord, et dominer les "Segalauni." Then he adduces an earlier history of Livy, lib. v. c. 34, and assumes that he meant to conduct Bellovesus and Hannibal by the same route, as each is said to touch the Tricastini in Gaul and the Taurini in Italy. This tends to show that Livy meant both their movements to have been made over the Mont Genève : but it does not help M. Letronne to the position of the Tricastini. M. Letronne works out his ideas thus:—"On reconnoit beaucoup de con-
sistance dans les idées de cet historien, relativement à la
position des Tricastini : et l'on ne peut ainsi douter que
leur territoire, au moins dans son opinion, ne s'étendit
jusque sur les bords de ces deux rivières (l'Isère et le Drac).
Voilà l'explication naturelle de ce passage de Tite-Live, qui
est la principale cause de la diversité des opinions sur la
route d'Annibal!" M. Letronne's identity of the two
tracks pursued at some centuries' interval is not promoted by
his quotation of what concerns Bellovesus, for he happens to
omit the extra "*viam*" to Marseille.

M. Letronne quite breaks down before he gets to *Druentia flumen*. Though he rightly construes it to be the Durance, the truth of that one proposition does not vindicate his exposition of Livy's route. Livy's notion was that Hannibal, after bending to the left, passed through the three Gaulish nations, and reached the *Druentia* without interruption of the march, "*nusquam impeditâ viâ* ;" and that, after crossing

that river, he still proceeded onward quietly through Gauls for some distance more or less, before he reached the Alps: he was then set at defiance by those whom Livy calls, not Galli, but Montani.

M. Letronne comes to his Alps and fights the first battle at St. Bonnet, which is far short of the Durance. At St. Bonnet he expressly exhausts his distance, and encounters his Alps; "à l'entrée du Département des Hautes Alpes: alors l'armée commença à gravir les Alpes—là commence la montée des Alpes." M. Letronne submits the Carthaginian progress to a great interruption by a severe mountain conflict and a serious loss of men, horses, and cattle, long before they approach the Durance. As an interpreter of Livy, he was pledged to bring Hannibal to the Druentia "nusquam impeditâ viâ," and then to give him a "campestre iter" to the Alps. Livy marches from the passage of the Druentia to the first Alps: M. Letronne marches from the first Alps to the Druentia.

CHAPTER IV.

Druentia flumen. The Durance—Rival pretensions of the Arve, the Dranse, and the Drac.

THIS is the last object named by Livy in narrating the march to the Alps, with only the addition of "iter campestre" before the Carthaginian force arrives at those mountains. It was to be expected that there would be some difference of opinion among his interpreters on the territorial boundaries of nations; but one would hardly have expected, that the river which is said to have been reached after visiting the three specified peoples would be called in question; and that the Druentia of Livy would not be accepted as the Druentia of Strabo and Pliny, that is, as the Durance. This river is

always called Druentia : and no other river of Gaul is ever called Druentia.

They who believe the Genève to be the pass of Hannibal, cannot be sceptical on the identity of the Druentia : but they may misconstrue Livy in the way of getting to it. D'Anville imagined a way that is not possible. Letronne also, though he shows a way to the Durance, contradicts the geography of Livy's march. Other theories for interpreting Livy have had a Druentia invented for them. To Mr. Whitaker it was the Arve : to Mr. Tytler it was the Dranse : to M. Larauza it was the Drac ; which is adopted by the other Cenisians, Dr. Ukert and Mr. Ellis. Let us consider the merits of these.

The Arve, the Druentia of Mr. Whitaker.

Those who hear of the Druentia of this writer, will expect to be told how he got to it. Having brought Hannibal to Lyons, Mr. Whitaker, in p. 137, thus describes the march to Geneva :—"He went through the country of the Tricastini, "from the grand angle of the Rhone at Lyons to the deep "indent of it at St. Genis. He ranged along the limits of "Vocontian dominions, from this indent to the Sier. He "passed also through the region of the Tricorii, up to the "town and lake of Geneva. He met with only one diffi- "culty : this arose from a river, which Livy calls the "Druentia ; which the critical world has therefore, with a "simplicity of faith that is founded only on a delusive "symphony of names, believed to be the Durance of Avignon, "Embrun and Briançon ; and which will appear demon- "strably, from what I shall allege, to be merely the Arve "of Geneva."

The three peoples of Livy are described by Mr. Whitaker in the following manner (pp. 129 to 133) :—

"The Tricastini owned the lands from the Guier at St. "Genis and Pont Beauvoisin to Lyons. They inhabited from

" the Rhone on the north, along the back of the Allobroges of Vienne and of the Segalauni of Valence, to St. Paul on the south—in a long and narrow portion of land."

" The Vocontii possessed the country from the Sier at Seyssel to the Guier at St. Genis and Pont Beauvoisin :— they lay in a long narrow braid, stretching at the back of the Tricastini, having the Rhone for their boundary on the north, and their capital Vaison low to the south."

" The Tricorii possessed the region, probably, between the Arve of Geneva and the Sier at Seyssel. They appear to have lain with their heads to the Rhone, at the back of the Vocontii, extending in length towards Cavaillon and Orange in the south.

" All lay, extending from these their respective possessions on the north, in three long waves as it were, one behind the other, down the narrow length of Dauphiny."

Let any one take a map, and slice out Mr. Whitaker's three waves, flowing one from Lyons and St. Genis to St. Paul, one from Seyssel to Vaison, and one from Geneva to Cavaillon. He will see, in the originality of the arrangements, a fair sample of the author's power—of the boldness, and respect for evidence, which distinguish his whole work. In performing this exploit, Mr. Whitaker remarks, " D'Anville was singularly puzzled and perplexed in settling these tribes." D'Anville was, indeed, another sort of man—a sound and honest inquirer. His aim was truth; he could acknowledge a difficulty, though he could not always master one.

The bold blunder of making the Arve the Druentius of Strabo, which belongs to Mr. Whitaker alone, has an affinity to the error of D'Anville, already noticed, in making his Doria the minor Doria, which has obtained so much currency. Both are founded on the same passage of that geographer. In the fourth book, p. 203, Strabo names, among other things, the Doria and the Druentius as rising from one spring in the

heights of Medulli; the former running to join the Po, the latter running the other way to join the Rhone. The erroneous assertion of the identity of the sources was accepted as a fact by D'Anville in 1760, and by Whitaker in 1794; and it caused to each his particular error. Strabo was not warranted in asserting that identity. He knew whence the Doria came, but blundered on the source of the Druentia. Recent occurrences of Roman warfare had made him to know well the source of the Salassian Doria, but he had no means of knowing the vast mountainous regions which lay spread from north to south between the source of that river and the source of the Druentia; and he spoke rashly without evidence when he pronounced one source for the two, if ever he did pronounce it.

Whitaker, assuming the proximity, and knowing that the Doria flowed from the Col de la Seigne to Italy, made the Druentia flow to Gaul from the other side of the same ridge, and so identified it with the Arve. D'Anville had before assumed a similar proximity on the two sides of a ridge; and, apprehending the source of the Durance to be in the Mont Genève, conceived Strabo's Doria to spring on the other side of that mountain, and to be the river called Doria Minor. Both writers blundered from the same cause; one making the Doria to rise where it does not, the other making the Druentia to rise where it does not. These two rivers, which Strabo alleges to spring in the same region, do not spring in the same region; and if you find the source of one, it is no guide to the source of the other. The introduction of the Druentia as a river whose source was near to those of the Po and the Doria, is the blemish in Strabo's description of the rivers; and it is right to bring to view modern errors which are founded upon his error. I hope that I succeeded in showing, against D'Anville and his followers, that Strabo's Doria is not the river of Susa; and I think it will be acknowledged, against Whitaker, that Strabo's Durentius is not the Arve.

The Dranse, the Druentia of Mr. Tytler (Lord Woodhouselee).

It was the happy fortune of Mr. Whitaker to receive the applause of a good-natured critic, who promptly composed a pamphlet expressly in praise of his discoveries. It was published in London, 1795, without a name, and called "A Critical Examination of Mr. Whitaker's Course of Hannibal over the Alps ascertained." The noble editor of Gibbon and the authors of the *Oxford Dissertation* ascribe it to Mr. Tytler (Lord Woodhouselee).

I may give a sample of the complaisance of the reviewer. He says (p. 32), and I conceive not ironically : " From Lyons Hannibal passed through the country of the Tricastini to the deep indent of the Rhone at St. Genis. He ranged along the limits of the Vocontii and Tricorii, up to the Lake of Geneva, without interruption till he came to the river Druentia." Here, he says, " The river Druentia has, from a similarity of appellation, misled most of our authors. They have neglected the local descriptions, and childishly trusted to a delusive similarity of names." Reading this, one expected to find a commendation of Mr. Whitaker's Druentia, the Arve ; but not so. As if it were necessary, for the credit of a reviewer, to find some little error in the author whom he patronises, Mr. Tytler repudiates the Arve, goes the whole length of the lake, and still ascends the Rhone. At last, forgetting the delusiveness of similarity, he discovers Livy's Druentia in the Dranse, which falls into the Rhone near Martigny.

The Drac, the Druentia of the Cenisians.

M. Larauza professes to identify the Druentia of Livy as being the river now well known as the Drac. He is, I believe, the inventor of this notion ; and he numbers among his disciples Dr. Ukert and Mr. Ellis. Arguing against Letronne,

he objects that Livy's description does not agree with the character of the Durance in the part of its course where Letronne assumed Hannibal to have crossed it, namely, between Chorges and Embrun. This argument against Letronne is made on the assumption that Livy's local description must be accurate. It appears from what all the French writers say, that no part of the stream near to Embrun, whether above or below that place, accords with the character given to it by Livy. Letronne himself admitted it, as an error on the part of the historian:—"Il se livre en cet endroit à quelques exagérations, en faisant de la Durance une peinture qui ne convient qu'à ce qu'est cette rivière au-dessus de Cavaillon."

Larauza dwells on this point, and even thinks it expedient to show that the breadth of stream, with the many channels and the whirlpools of Livy, do not belong to the Durance near Briançon—a superfluous effort, which rather indicates a sense of weakness. He says (p. 55): "Je l'ai vu et avant et après Briançon: lorsqu'on va de cette ville au Mont Genève, on la passe sur un petit pont d'une arche, au sortir du village de la Vachette, situé au pied du Mont Genève; elle a peut-être là de dix à douze toises de large sur deux à trois pieds de profondeur. A Embrun (et ces détails je les tiens de gens ayant vu et connaissant bien le pays), elle est beaucoup plus large, quoiqu'encore très peu profonde. Mais ni à la Vachette, ni à Briançon, ni à Embrun, elle ne présente aucune des particularités que signale la description de Tite-Live. Depuis la Vachette et Briançon jusqu'à Embrun et au-delà, elle est encaissée dans un lit régulier: son cours ne varie jamais et n'offre aucun de ces accidens dont parle l'historien latin—Ce n'est guère que vers Sisteron qu'elle commence à se présenter avec les caractères qui lui donne Tite-Live, et qu'elle conserve à son embouchure."

We saw (*ante*, Part IV. c. iv.) how M. Larauza criticised the

roughness of the Drac valley ; and the honest rebuke which he got from M. Bandé de Lavalette, reminding him of the Lower Isère. When now, in his advance up the Isère, he at last finds himself in plain, he exults for a short time in the vale of Grésivaudan as "*iter campestre*." It does in itself deserve that character. But M. Larauza takes credit for it as "*iter campestre ab Druentiâ*," not allowing that a march towards the Alps near the Durance could be "*ab Druentiâ*." I do not see that Livy, by the word "*ab*," need have intended that the march, after crossing the river, was directed straight away from it, *quasi* at right angles with its course ; but on this notion is rested the claim of the Drac. Do we not read in ch. xxxii. "*ab ripâ Rhodani movit*" ? and yet the march in that case was a march up the Rhone. In both instances the preposition imports a progress from that part on a river where it had just been crossed.

The objections which Larauza has taken against Letronne, have no force to divert us from construing Druentia the Durance. An exaggeration in the painting of this notorious mountain stream does not disprove that Livy intended the river which he names. His information on its features may have been inaccurate in itself, or apprehended erroneously by him : he may have heard of the Druentia as possessing the features which he pourtrays, and have introduced them to give effect to his story, not reflecting that one part of that river's course might greatly differ from another.

And now what are the affirmative arguments of M. Larauza, by which he construes Druentia to be the Drac ? He undertakes to show, that the four landmarks of Livy suit his own order of march : but he rather shows that they do not : for he misplaces them. Having spread the Tricastini along the Isère nearly to the Drac, he says, "*Après eux viendront les Vocontii, occupant les vallées que parcourt le Drac jusqu'à son embouchure : enfin après les Vocontii nous placerons*

"les Tricorii." Thus M. Larauza's Druentia running through Vocontian valleys, has been left behind before Hannibal gets into the Tricorii. In Livy the sequence is Tricastini, Vocontii, Tricorii, Druentia.

That the Drac should be called Druentia, was a difficulty worthy of M. Larauza's powers of solution: and he makes his effort. After telling us (p. 90) that Druentia and Dracus must have the same root, he writes thus:—"Quand on observe enfin que, du tems de Tite-Live, le dernier de ces deux fleuves n'avait pas encore de nom dans la géographie, puisqu'on ne le trouve pas, même plus tard, dans Strabon, ni dans Ptolomée, ne conçoit on pas facilement comment cet historien, rencontrant ce fleuve décrit dans les mémoires d'après lesquels il travaillait, et désigné sous un nom qu'il ne retrouvait dans aucun géographe; voyant d'ailleurs le rapport qu'il avait et par lui-même, et par son nom avec la Durance, rivière alors très connue, aura pu prendre sur lui-même, tout en conservant la description de substituer à la dénomination inconnue celle de la Druentia qui est restée. Si l'on veut que ce mot, par cela seul qu'il se trouve dans la narration de Tite-Live ait dû se trouver dans les mémoires qu'il consultait, ne pourrait-on pas alors voir là une seule et même dénomination appliquée à deux rivières différentes, et penser que les auteurs de ces mémoires reconnaissaient deux Durances, comme depuis on a reconnu deux Doires, la Doria major ou Doria Baltea, et la Doria minor ou Doria riparia? Ou bien enfin ne pourrait-on pas encore supposer que la rivière en question se trouvait décrite seulement sans être nommée dans les anciens mémoires, et que Tite-Live, d'après les analogies qu'elle avait avec la Durance, aura cru reconnaître en elle ce dernier fleuve dont il lui aura imposé le nom?" Larauza, pp. 90, 91.

Thus, M. Larauza offers us the choice of three views of the matter. 1. Livy had found the Drac mentioned under some

name which he did not know, and thought it might be the Durance which he did know. 2. There may have been two Druentias, like two Dorias, and the Drac might be one of them. 3. He found it without a name, and called it Druentia from its likeness to the Durance. Two of these notions show that Livy intended to speak of the Durance: as to the third, on which Larauza says, "Peut-être le Drac était-il appelé Druentia minor, ou Druentius?" p. 91, it is enough to say that Pliny has named two Dorias, and has not named two Druentias. Moreover, the notion of a Druentia minor is itself unfortunate: Livy is not telling of a second-rate river: he gives it distinction among the rivers of the Alps—"Druentia flumen: Alpinus amnis, longè omnium Galliæ fluminum difficillimus transitu." It is not incredible, that Livy should exaggerate the characteristics of a torrent river; or that he should be without safe information on a particular part of its stream. But it is incredible, without better solutions than those here imagined, that he should have introduced into this portion of his story a river other than that which he names, being a river well known, as he names it, to all his contemporaries, and which had become familiar in Roman warfare, as belonging to their great line of communication with Spain through the Western Alps.

Dr. Ukert subscribing to the theory of the Cenis, accepts the Drac of Larauza, as being the Druentia of Livy; and Mr. Ellis follows them, saying (p. 136), "The Drac and the Druentia of Livy have been concluded to be identical by M. Larauza—see Ukert's *Géographie*." The French critic has exhausted all his ingenuity on the matter, and, I hope to have shown, without success. The others do not try to strengthen his dogma by ideas of their own. If we can bring ourselves to reject the Arve, the Dranse and the Drac, and admit the Durance to be the Druentia of Livy, it follows that his pass is the Genève.

CHAPTER V.

Durance being conclusive of Livy's intention, identity of the two tracks is disproved. Livy diverged from Polybius at the Isère. From thence to the Durance utter dissonance both in topography and incidents. Subsequent incidents are largely copied from Polybius: topography there is none. Ascent; Summit, with Mr. Ellis's explanations; Descent. Livy's argument will belong to the ultimate question.

THOUGH we have not traced the progress told by Livy beyond the crossing of the Durance, the fact of reaching the Durance determines one essential point; that Livy's track is not the same as that of Polybius. That fact shows that to him the pass of Hannibal was the Mont Genève: for to that pass only could the Durance lead. It cannot be requisite to give further consideration to the Viso: and the pretensions of the Cenis must be withdrawn, if the Druentia be the Durance. One who from the Lower Isère is tending to the Mont Cenis, can never come upon the Durance at any part of its course: and Livy's track, which did not touch the Durance, cannot have been directed to the Cenis.

The track of Livy has diverged from that of Polybius at the Isère; for, when it crosses the Durance, the Genève is indicated as the pass of his hypothesis. It was meant by him to be reached, not by the approach which D'Anville conceived, nor by the route contrived by Letronne, but through Valence, Die, Luc, Gap, Embrun and Briançon: and, when we say that the notion of identity of the two tracks must be abandoned, it is also to be remembered, that the opponents of our Graian theory are pledged, as conciliators, to accommodate the tale of Polybius to the landmarks of Livy, and the tale of Livy to

the landmarks of Polybius. Let us then lay all the materials of accommodation concisely before the reader : for, unless the two are ascertained to differ, the question of preference will not arise.

It is necessary to make a complete comparison of Livy's narrative with the other, from the mouth of Isère to the plain. I speak not now of his own subsequent argument growing out of speculations on the amount of the surviving force. By narrative, I mean the tale of progress, which ends with "inde ad planum descensum," "hoc modo in Italiam perventum est," "quinto decimo die Alpibus superatis." Livy's story may be briefly compared with the other in regard to two subjects: topography and incidents. The question throughout is on localities: but, if the routes intended are identical, there will also be similarity in the facts stated to have occurred: for the facts which did occur, occurred only once. Accordingly the identity will appear most strongly, if there is similarity both in topography and incidents: if there is no similarity in either one or the other, it fails; and one story only can be true.

In treating this matter, it will be convenient to consider the whole line of march from near the mouth of Isère in two parts: 1. to the Alps; 2. through the Alps. We shall find, in the first, an utter incongruity between the two narratives, both in respect to topography and incidents. In the latter part, we find, on the part of Livy, great similarity in facts, and no topography at all: Livy copies the facts of Polybius; but says nothing whereby we can say where they occurred.

To the Alps.

In the march from the Isère to the Druentia, there is an absolute and irreconcilable dissonance between the two narratives, both in the geography and the incidents. In telling of the country traversed, there is not one idea common to the

two histories. In Polybius the march from the point of the Island to the mountain barrier is through the Allobroges : in Livy it is through three nations, of whom the Allobroges are not one. In Polybius it is along a river : in Livy it is not along a river ; but it crosses a river after the march has been carried through the three nations. In Polybius it is over plain country, favourable to cavalry : in Livy it is mostly mountainous, ending with an "*iter agreste*" for a short way.

As to the facts belonging to this march, the incidents told by Polybius are these : that the friendly prince accompanied the march with his force as an ally, the enemy hovering about them : that this ally returned home, when the plain country came to an end and the mountains were approached. These things have no place in Livy : the only incidents of any kind in his story of this march, are the turning to the left, and the "*tumultus*" and "*trepidatio*" in crossing a great river after visiting three specified peoples : incidents which have no parallels in Polybius. In Polybius this march has a specified time and a specified distance : in Livy there is neither time nor distance.

If any should contradict this by pointing to the Allobroges as an incident belonging to both narratives, I would answer, that in that feature there is the most affirmative disagreement. In Polybius, Hannibal, after entering the Island and striking a blow in favour of one of two litigants, continues his march for ten days along the river to the Alps, during which he is menaced by the Allobroges ; he then storms those first Alps against the resistance of the Allobroges, and occupies the town of the Allobroges beyond those first Alps. According to Livy, Hannibal marches to the Island, promptly settles the disputes of the Allobroges by arbitration, having gone towards them only in the purpose of a short delay, then turns his march away from them to the Alps, never seeing them again ; but marching through three other nations, whom he

names, to the Druentia, and then to the Alps, where he is obstructed by a people to whom he gives no name.

Through the Alps.

Advancing with Livy from the passage of the Druentia to the first Alps, wherever that point should be, and proceeding thence across the mountains to the plain, we have in his story no aid to the geography of the line which he is dealing with. He relates incidents similar to the incidents of Polybius : so similar, that he must have had the Greek history before him. He copies the events of that history in succession, occasionally adding things not derived from it. Still there is nothing that enables us to apply the incidents which he relates to the identification of his route. Even those who see that Livy meant Hannibal to cross the Mont Genève, and therefore think that Hannibal had done so, do not found this belief upon anything which that historian says in telling the march in the Alps. They read that Hannibal came to the Durance ; and see that, if he did so, he was of necessity tending to the Genève.

A better use has been made of the narrative of Polybius. He copied nature : and by his incidents we identify the places where he describes them to have occurred. As we recognised them by his account of the march to the Alps through the Allobroges till Hannibal forced the mountain boundary of the Island : so in the Alps his instructions enabled us to trace the scenes of events and circumstances which occurred at the foot of the main pass, and also the place of the casualties in the descent. Livy, in the Alps, though sometimes almost transcribing the facts of Polybius, furnishes no memorial by which his greatest admirers have been able to point out in the map the places where they may be supposed to have taken place : he adds occasionally a new feature, such as the vinegar, the combustion, and the pre-

apice : but, from whatever sources he obtained his materials for things done in the Alps, his followers have not professed to recognise the scenes of action from the Druentia to the plain of Italy. Even M. Letronne never gave the site of *λευκόπετρον*.

It is expedient to speak separately of Livy's ascent, summit, and descent. We shall see that, though the events are the events of Polybius, the geography is none. You only know Livy's track in the Alps, by his track to the Alps.

The Ascent.

Here Livy's incidents are those which had already appeared in the history of Polybius ; the halt in front of the first mountain heights ; the report of the spies that the pass was left unguarded in the night ; the lighting of the camp fires ; the occupation of the pass by Hannibal with his light troops in the night ; the astonishment of the enemy in the morning ; the assault upon the column in its embarrassments ; Hannibal charging down upon them, and the results ; his occupation of their town ; the supply of three days' provisions ; the march unimpeded till they came among a new people ; the conference with these ; their insidious designs ; Hannibal's caution ; his order of march, himself with the heavy infantry in the rear ; the attack made in a narrow pass ; the pressure from the rear ; his separation for the night from the cavalry and baggage ; the dispersion of the enemy ; the summit gained on the ninth day ; the encampment for two days ; the beginning of snow ; the season of the setting of the Pleiades. These are similarities, whereby the later history may be looked upon as in effect a translation of the former.

Notwithstanding this almost unqualified similarity of the incidents in the ascent, Livy's tale of them speaks nothing to fix their sites. We only see that he adopted the incidents themselves from another writer. In that other writer we do

find aid to the localities : he had described them on an experience of the country where they had occurred. Accordingly we who trust him are led to the first mountains by the Rhone and the country along the Rhone : and that same writer, having brought us to understand Hannibal's combat with the Allobroges on reaching the Alps by a march up the Rhone, shows us the scene of the second engagement by a visible memorial eight days afterwards. No such marks of locality are offered to us by the explainers of Livy's ascent to the Mont Genève.

The Summit.

One incident, which was discussed in vindicating Polybius from the Mont Cenis, must again be noticed for the purpose on which we are now engaged, of pointing out those things which do, and those things which do not, constitute a discrepancy between the two historians. It is related by Livy that Hannibal when proceeding on his march in descent, halted his troops upon a certain promontory, whence there was a view far and wide over the expanse of the Italian plain, and that he there made an address to them to revive their drooping courage : and Mr. Ellis, now interpreting Livy, declares this topic to be in the list of congruities between the two historians.

Polybius records an address made by Hannibal to the troops, on the day of pure rest when encamped on the summit—that he administered consolation to his men, not pending the most frightful day's work that belonged to their whole five months' expedition, but during that one day of undisturbed quietness * which they so much required, and which also had the purpose of waiting for stragglers to come

* They only reached the summit early in the morning of the first day.

up ; a purpose which was answered. Mr. Ellis ventures to maintain that, in spite of this, the two stories coincide. He was pledged to such an attempt, as is every critic, to whom we of the Graian Alp are opposed. All but ourselves are conciliators of the histories, though not all make the effort.

Deeming the Mont Cenis to illustrate both the histories, Mr. Ellis exhibits his powers of conciliation in the following manner—he admits (p. 140), that “*at first sight* there appears a direct contradiction between the two authors.” He reconciles them by supposing, that this incident took place not at the encampment on the plateau of the summit, but somewhere out of the road and west of La Grande Croix. He makes it out by presuming both historians to mean what neither has said ; namely, that Hannibal encamped on the summit for one night ; and shifted his camp a few miles down for the second ; also, that the imagined view was not to be had in the track of the march ; so he made an excursion for the enjoyment of it, in travelling from one point to the other. The philosophy of the conciliation is this—Hannibal made a speech : the three authors, Polybius, Livy, and Ellis, all assign the speech to the summit : therefore all must mean the same thing. They all assign it to the summit, because the whole seven miles are summit, from the Col of the Little Mont Cenis down to La Grande Croix. Polybius introduces the speech at the camp on the top ; Livy introduces it *en route*, halting his troops to hear it : Ellis gives it somewhere on one side, making an excursion for the purpose : therefore all three had it on the summit, and all three tell the same tale.

The argument is thus expressed by its author—“The descent from this pass into Italy is considered to begin from La Grande Croix, all the ground above, though varying considerably in level, being included in the plateaux which form the summit of the Mont Cenis. Hannibal therefore,

“ when on the promontory, or at La Grande Croix, would still
 “ be correctly spoken of by Polybius as being on the summit
 “ of the pass. Yet he might *naturally* be mentioned by
 “ another author, as having begun his descent, when on his
 “ way from the plateau of the Little Mont Cenis to La Grande
 “ Croix.”

I fear that Mr. Ellis's edition, which pretends to agree with the two others, is as palpably opposed to both, as they are to one another: for it attributes to a day of rest a movement of some miles for the whole armament, aggravated by a senseless and laborious “*extra viam*.” The text of both histories, though differing as to the scene of Hannibal's address, require that the time on the summit was a time of actual rest—*αυτοῦ κατεστρατοπέδευσε, καὶ δύο ἡμέρας προσέμεινε*. Livy's story is, if possible, still plainer on the unqualified rest from labour: Polybius interrupts it in some degree by the very fact of the soldiers assembling to listen to their chief. No such incident breaks the second day of Livy—“*Biduum in jugo stativa habita; fessisque labore ac pugnando quies data militibus*.” Livy relates, concerning the renewal of the march, on the morning that followed the two days of rest, that, as it proceeded, “*cum signis primâ luce motis segniter agmen incederet*”—sluggish despair in every countenance, a halt was ordered: the general addressed them to revive their courage, showing the plains of the Po spreading wide beneath, and pointing to Rome the citadel of Italy, which, if they made the effort, would soon fall into their hands. The protracted calamities of that day's march are then strongly painted, before we read, “*castra in jugo posita, ægerrimè ad id ipsum loco purgato*.”

Mr. Ellis relieves what he justly calls “the direct contradiction apparent between the two authors,” by giving from himself a new version of Hannibal's proceedings discordant from the narrative of either. Presently, conscious of his

infirmity, he gently censures Livy, for not having done that which he would without scruple have done himself; namely, thrown away one of the two days of summit: and, as if time were the only obstacle to his improvements, he draws this consolatory hypothesis:—"By these means he would have made his narrative of the events at the summit of the pass quite consistent in itself, and completely in accordance, though at first sight apparently at variance, with the account of the Greek historian."

An English tourist, full of fresh vigour, and in a season not threatening a grave of snow, may bound rapidly from one point of interest to another in regions which spread from Bramante to Susa. Mr. Ellis seems to have as great personal experience of the district of Mont Cenis as any but the late Mr. Brockedon and the Sardinian engineers: he with his carpet-bag might pass a night at the Granges de Dervieux, and after touching at the Lac Blanc or other point of interest, and staying successively at La Poste and La Grande Croix, might fairly write home that he had spent a few days on the Mont Cenis. But the texts that we are studying and comparing are not to be explained by Punic wanderings over Mr. Ellis's constructive summit. Hannibal had not time which he could so trifle with: he desired remission of toil for the shattered multitude: he sought rest to the weary: Mr. Ellis gives none: his specula, if it deserve the name, may be somewhat less offensive than the Balbotet of Folard; but it is not less peremptorily to be repudiated, as a vain conjecture, and repugnant to authority. The episode of an excursion, as he fondly calls it, is incredible either for a marching day or for a resting day. Hannibal, always husbanding the strength of his men, would not, in his terrible descent, purposely deviate from the line, incurring superfluous danger, and courting an increase of labour, to prove the diminution of it. Not a yard of that blind and bitter march gave security

against the destruction of man and beast : and he did not, in pursuit of evidence, devote them to fresh calamity over ground still more unpractised and therefore still more dangerous. Mr. Ellis, of all men, should not be insensible to unnecessary risks : it is he who records a loss of 10,000 men in that descent without an enemy.

The Descent.

In the residue of Livy's march to the plain, he must still have had the story of Polybius in view ; but he does not try much to adhere to it. He has a *mauvais pas* of his own in the early descent ; and one of a very serious kind : four days are spent in vanquishing it ; and three in resting after it. Still there is nothing to suggest the locality. No one can tell us where to find his precipice of 1,000 feet ; whereas we do give site to the impediment described in the other history ; we find a place where to this day the same peculiar causes still produce the same effects.

As the identity of the two routes is at present our subject, it is to be observed, that the obstructions given to the march in the first day of descent are so differently related by the two historians, that the stories can hardly be applied to the same locality. The three half stades is in Polybius a measure of length ; the same estimate with Livy is a measure of height. Niebuhr is rather severe on Livy's precipice. We read this in his ninth Lecture, i. 173 :—"Livy says, that the mountain "formed a precipice of one thousand feet, and that the new "road was built down that precipice. This is nonsense, as "every one must see."

There appears also a difference between the two historians in the estimate of climate, which does not aid the identity of place. Livy seems to depict a climate too mild for the story of Polybius, as Dr. Arnold depicts one too severe. They who suggest that the Carthaginians of Polybius were for some

days above the snow-line, will probably think that the Carthaginians of Livy were not. His story, like the other, has no snow till it has reached the summit; but further, when the *mauvais pas* is come to in the descent, there is not only vegetation enough for twigs, stumps, and roots for them to cling to, but trees of vast size are at hand for combustion of the precipice.

Livy's story of the vinegar is supposed by Niebuhr to have been derived from Cælius Antipater; but no reason appears why, in the absence of authority, it should be fathered on him. Cælius knew that the Carthaginians came over the Little St. Bernard, and must have known that he was agreeing with Polybius. Livy, who is silent on Polybius, must have been conscious that he did not agree with him.

If we pretend to trace the Carthaginian track of Livy from what he has written, we fail in the want of materials. We know the pass which he intended by the line which he draws from the Isère to the Durance. As to the march in the Alps, his events are chiefly taken from Polybius, but with nothing of locality to aid us: and if we seek to know by which of the two descents from the Genève he conceived Hannibal to have come down to the plain, there is nothing in his narrative of progress that enables us to answer such a question. We have had occasion to show the two routes used by the Romans in later times to descend to the Cisalpine province. But nothing shows that Livy had knowledge of the distinction. His extant works are silent on Susa, which is in one road, and on Ocelum, which is in the other; as much so as those of Polybius.

But after Livy's narrative of the march, concluding with 'ad planum descensum,' he makes some comments on the question of the pass, which arise out of a discussion into which he had entered on the amount of force which survived to the invaders after their arrival in the plain; and when

they were restored to condition for commencing warlike operations. This argumentative matter will show the grounds on which he had conceived the Cottian, and not the Penine or Cremo, to be the pass of Hannibal; and it will be most conveniently treated when we deal with our final question; whether we shall accept that opinion of Livy in preference to that which results from the study of Polybius.

THE ALPS OF HANNIBAL.

PART X.

TWO PECULIAR THEORIES.

CHAPTER I.

BEFORE I bring this inquiry to a close with a comparison of the stories of Polybius and Livy, two peculiar theories should be mentioned, which are not among those whose merits have been discussed under the arrangement of tracks made above in Part IV.

In one of them the Carthaginian army never bends its course towards the Isère at all: Hannibal takes leave of the Rhone as soon as he has crossed it, and makes his way direct to the Genève as by Nions and Serres. I will exhibit a few samples of this scheme, for inviting attention to the originality of the author.

I. Theory of M. le Comte de Fortia D'Urban.

This respectable gentleman, author of "Antiquités et Monuments du Département de Vaucluse," has disclosed his views on our subject in a volume entitled "Dissertation sur le Passage du Rhône et des Alpes par Annibal. *Troisième édition.* Paris, 1821." He concurs in the usually recognised place of crossing the Rhone: but he runs out of the course almost as soon as he has crossed it. His track is from Orange

up the Eygues to Nions : then by Remusat and Rozans to Serres, Gap, Embrun, &c. He is a sceptic *sui generis* : and his notions are so original, that the best way of exhibiting them will be by quoting some of his own words.

From page 19, showing how Hannibal's anxiety to avoid an engagement caused him to move as slowly as possible.

"Mandajors place-t-il son île après le passage de l'Isère, c'est-à-dire à cinquante six mille cinq cents toises, environ six cents stades de distance. Mais peut-on véritablement croire que Polibe a prétendu peindre la frayeur d'Annibal telle, qu'aussitôt après le passage très pénible d'un fleuve aussi rapide, il ait fait une course forcée avec une armée aussi nombreuse ? On sait qu'il avait cinquante mille hommes d'infanterie, neuf mille de cavalerie, et trente sept éléphants. Cela n'est nullement vraisemblable ; et je crois que cela n'est pas vrai. C'est surtout au commencement de sa marche vers les Alpes, que craignant peut-être encore d'être attaqué par les Romains, qu'il ne voulait pas combattre alors, il dut marcher avec beaucoup de précaution."

From page 21, showing that Hannibal did not begin to push forward till after the retreat of Scipio.

"Le troisième jour depuis le passage du fleuve, le second depuis l'arrivée d'Annibal à l'île, Scipion vint à Roquemaure, à l'endroit où les Carthaginois avaient passé le fleuve, lorsque ce général romain eut pris le parti de retourner dans la Tirrhénie, croyant que les Barbares des Alpes leur opposeraient assez d'obstacles. Ce fut seulement le cinquième jour, c'est-à-dire le lendemain du départ de Scipion, qu'Annibal, prenant sa route de la mer vers l'orient, comme le dit Polibe, et cette observation est très-importante, traversa Orange et les deux branches de l'Eygues, et tourna à droite, après avoir traversé la seconde branche, ainsi que le font encore aujourd'hui ceux qui veulent aller d'Orange à Nions."

From page 23, showing in what manner Hannibal consumed the four days mentioned by Polybius.

“ La phrase, Ἀννίβας δὲ ποιησάμενος ἐξῆς ἐπὶ τέτταρας ἡμέρας τὴν πορείαν, doit être rendue mot à mot, ‘ Mais Annibal ayant ordonné à son armée une marche de quatre jours de suite.’ En réfléchissant sur ce passage et sur la situation d’Annibal, on sentira que ce général, qui s’était fait rendre compte du local et qui avait un chef des Tauriniens pour le guider, savait que son armée ne pouvait marcher de front le long de l’Eygues : il la partagea donc en quatre portions, qui exigeaient quatre journées pour qu’elle fût déplacée toute entière. C’est ce qu’expriment les mots ‘ pendant quatre jours de suite.’ On comprend aisément que les premières portions étaient composées chacune de vingt-cinq mille hommes d’infanterie ; les deux dernières de sa cavalerie et de ses éléphants, comme l’a dit Polibe lui-même un peu plus haut.”

From page 29, showing further that Scipio marched away from Hannibal, not Hannibal from Scipio.

“ C’est à l’original qu’il faut s’en tenir, et Polibe, en énonçant que Scipion s’était retiré le troisième jour après le passage du fleuve, et qu’Annibal avait ensuite continué sa route, a suffisamment exprimé que le général carthaginois ne s’est éloigné du Rhône qu’après la retraite du général romain, et conséquemment qu’il a pu l’attendre, ce qu’il est très naturel de penser.”

From page 40, showing the boundaries of the Island or Delta.

“ L’Eygues prend sa source dans le sein même des Hautes-Alpes, comme on peut le voir dans la carte de Cassini, où il est très-bien décrit, et qui lui donne le nom d’Aigues, ou de la Vigne. Il naît au-dessus de Saint-André-de-Rozans,

“ où il se joint à un autre torrent appelé Lidane. Il reçoit,
 “ au-dessus de Rémusat, une petite rivière aussi considérable
 “ que lui, dont la source est au-dessus de Chalançon, et qui
 “ se nomme l'Oulle. Une autre petite rivière, connue sous le
 “ nom de Legnuées, s'unit à lui à Curnier, un peu au-dessus
 “ des Piles. Ces quatre torrens, réunis à beaucoup d'autres,
 “ forment une petite rivière pendant un cours que ses détours
 “ peuvent faire évaluer à près de trente lieues, jusqu'à son
 “ embouchure dans le Rhône. C'est environ à trois lieues au-
 “ dessus de cette embouchure, qu'il est subdivisé en deux
 “ branches, dont l'une va se joindre à une petite rivière,
 “ connue sous le nom de la Meyne, et tombe avec elle dans le
 “ Rhône à plus de deux lieues de l'autre. Il en résulte une
 “ petite île de deux lieues de base sur trois lieues de hauteur,
 “ et plus exactement de six mille romains sur dix, qui occupe
 “ environ quatre lieues carrées d'un terrain très-fertile en
 “ blé, où se trouvent renfermées les villes d'Orange et de
 “ Caderousse.”

*From page 46, showing how far the Delta of the critic resembles
 the Delta of the Nile.*

“ Mon île, surtout dans la carte du comté Venaissin, faite par
 “ D'Anville en 1745, a la forme du Delta, sans en avoir
 “ l'étendue.”

*From page 47, showing that Livy did not flatly contradict
 Polybius, through a feeling of respect for his memory.*

“ Tite-Live, au tems duquel ce Delta des Celtes était
 “ beaucoup mieux connu, a eu soin d'observer que cette île
 “ ne renfermait qu'un territoire tres-borné. Il a seulement
 “ ménagé Polibe, en ne le critiquant pas comme il aurait pu
 “ le faire, et cette attention pour un historien aussi respectable
 “ ne peut que lui faire honneur, sans rien diminuer de la
 “ force de son témoignage.”

Extracts showing the true causes of topographical accuracy in military matters.

From page 16.

"Ce second historien (Tite-Live) né lui-même à Padoue
" dans la Gaule cisalpine, n'avait pas besoin de venir chercher
" les habitans du pays comme l'Arcadien Polibe."

From page 11.

"Troque Pompée, né à Vaison, aurait levé tous nos doutes,
" si nous avions conservé son histoire malheureusement
" perdue."

From pages 47, 8.

"Je crois avoir étudié la marche d'Annibal, autant que la
" connaissance parfaite des lieux permettait de le faire—J'étais
" propriétaire du Lampourdier, sur la Meyne, avant M. le
" général Chabran."

Thus we learn that the faculty of interpreting historical notices of Celtic topography comes by birth and by property. If Polybius had in his cradle breathed the air of Padua instead of that of Megalopolis, and in his maturity had been possessed of the estate of Lampourdier, he would not have so failed in his account of the Island. He would have set before us a piece of ground surrounded by water, having two leagues of Rhone for its base, three leagues of Eygues for each side.

From page 31, showing the claim of the author to the gratitude of the literary world.

"Les amateurs de l'antiquité me sauront gré d'avoir mis
" d'accord Polibe et Tite-Live autant qu'il était possible. Ce
" que je dirai dans les articles suivans achèvera de lever tous
" les doutes qui peuvent rester dans l'esprit du lecteur même
" le plus prévenu contre mon opinion."

The author has indeed brought the two historians to a level, and, as the amateurs here spoken of will probably agree with him in deeming his commentary to furnish, as he announces, "une explication entièrement nouvelle," curiosity may tempt them to proceed in the study of it. If they are startled by the few samples which I have exhibited, their surprise will not be diminished, when they come to learn that the last section of the march defined by Polybius, 1200 stadia, was from Briançon to the Ticino. "Polibe compte 1200 stades "ou 150 milles Romains du passage des Alpes aux plaines "de l'Italie, qui sont le long du Pô, chez les Insubriens, "comme le dit Polibe, c'est à dire de Briançon à l'extrémité "de la Gaule que les Romains appelaient Cisalpine, lorsqu' "après avoir franchi le Tesin, Annibal fut entré dans les "plaines du Pô: c'est encore la vérité"!

The author accounts for his own accuracy in this way, p. 14. "J'adopte la traduction de Dom Thuillier, qui est en général "d'autant plus exacte, que ce savant bénédictin a eu pour "guide la version latine de Casaubon." If the Count had himself followed that guide, he would never have marched up the Eygues: for Casaubon, telling the march, "along the "river to the Alps," translates *ποταμόν* Rhodanum: and, if Hannibal's entry into the plain had, as the Count says, been deferred till he crossed the Tesin, he would never have entered it at all.

CHAPTER II.

The Theory of M. Replat.

THIS commentator published a pamphlet of 87 pages in 1851, entitled "Note sur le Passage d'Annibal"—*Chambéry. Imprimerie, Bachet, Rue du Chateau*. In the course of the march he proposes this question:—"Par ce mot (*λευκόπετρον*)

“ Polybe n'aurait il point indiqué le Mont-Blanc ? On découvre le Mont-Blanc depuis quelques points de la vallée de Beaufort : c'est une roche blanche un peu plus merveilleuse que celle assise au pied du Petit-Saint-Bernard ; et le roi des Alpes meritoit une mention speciale de la part de Polybe, “ le doyen des touristes.”

As said in my preface, I found this pamphlet on my arrival at Aix-les-Bains in August 1854, and forthwith published a comment upon it, also at Chambéry ; *Imprimerie, Puthod.*—The whole of it was given in my Criticism published in London, April 1855, which was chiefly directed against the new theory of the Little Mont Cenis : and I did intend to give here also the whole 20 pages. But it would be thought an unnecessary incumbrance ; and it is enough to show, by my first few pages, which were on that occasion the opposing passes.

Observations sur L'Ouvrage de M. Replat.

Aix-les-Bains, 4 septembre 1854.

Je suis venu dans ce charmant lieu pour ma santé au commencement du mois d'août. Parmi les amusements que j'y ai rencontrés, je trouve un ouvrage sur le passage d'Annibal, publié à Chambéry par M. Replat, jurisconsulte à Annecy : je voudrais qu'on me permît aussi le plaisir de le critiquer. Je veux dédier les observations suivantes aux habitants et aux visiteurs d'Aix-les-Bains, qui s'intéresseront toujours vivement, j'en suis sûr, à l'événement qui, plus que tout autre, donne la célébrité à leur Mont-du-Chat. Quant à moi, la seule partie de la route entière des Carthaginois, de l'Espagne à la plaine d'Italie, que j'ai pu parcourir jusqu'à présent, est peut-être de six kilomètres, depuis le col de cette montagne jusqu'au village du Bourget. Jamais je ne me suis approché de la chaîne principale des Alpes.

Il est fort évident que M. Replat s'est bien instruit des auteurs classiques. Il avance ses opinions avec vivacité ; son

style est agréable, et ses nouvelles idées sont déployées d'une manière modeste. L'examen que je veux faire de ses opinions n'a pour objet que ceci seul : la vérité sur un fait historique. Maintenant cet examen sera court par nécessité. Je suis sans livres,—sans Polybe,—sans Tite-Live ; et, ce qui est encore plus désastreux pour celui qui fait un premier essai en français, je suis sans dictionnaire. Si je ne résiste pas à aborder un sujet aussi intéressant, je m'y mêle seulement dans le but de corriger des erreurs singulières, sans prétendre en cette occasion établir en détail les conclusions les plus positives, auxquelles chacun peut arriver à force de lire l'historien grec.

Voici l'hypothèse de M. Replat : "Le col de la Seigne est "incontestablement le col du Cramont, le *Jugum Cremonis* de "Cælius Antipater."

Je puis bien concéder, puisque je l'ai toujours cru, que le mot Cramont représente le mot *Crema*, mentionné par Tite-Live. C'est lui qui dit que l'historien Cælius avait raconté qu'Annibal traversa le *Cremonis Jugum*. J'ai cru aussi qu'Annibal a traversé la montagne ainsi indiquée par Tite-Live ; mais pourquoi le Col de la Seigne ?

Le Cramont est une montagne qui s'élève à droite quand on va de Pré-St-Didier vers le Petit-St-Bernard. On peut en faire l'ascension en partant par cette route, soit après une demi-heure de Pré-Saint-Didier, soit du village d'Eléva, qui est plus avancé sur le chemin et plus près du village de la Thuile, qui ne se trouve pas loin du pied du passage du Petit-Saint-Bernard. Le Cramont, au nord, est un précipice qui borde l'Allée-Blanche, par laquelle on voyage de Courmayeur au Col de la Seigne, cotoyant à droite les glaciers du Mont-Blanc. De Saussure dit : "La cime du Cramont ne domine "pas immédiatement sur l'Allée-Blanche. Elle en est séparée "par des chaînes de montagnes plus basses, qui empêchent "que les yeux ne plongent jusqu'au fond de cette vallée."

Je ne doute pas que Cælius, rapportant *Cremonis Jugum*,

a parlé de la véritable route d'Annibal; et j'accepte son témoignage comme le témoignage d'un historien qui suivit Polybe sur un sujet dont il n'était alors pas question. Maintenant il me semble que, pour comprendre ce que c'était que *Cremonis Jugum*, il faut penser à l'autorité dont nous recevons ces idées, c'est-à-dire à Tite-Live. Sans adopter son opinion, il faut écouter sa narration. Il ne croyait pas que ce que Cælius avait rapporté fût vrai. Il a prononcé qu'Annibal ne traversa pas le *Cremonis Jugum*. Il parle de ce passage-là comme d'un passage qu'il connaissait bien; il dit que c'est un passage qui conduit au pays des Salasses, et que, selon son opinion, il était très improbable qu'un tel passage fût ouvert du temps d'Annibal. Il prononce de même sur le passage Penine, qui conduit aussi dans le pays des Salasses. En effet, il déclare que ces deux passages, qui de son temps étaient bien connus comme routes militaires, ne pouvaient être praticables dans un temps aussi ancien.

Il est nécessaire donc que M. Replat maintienne que Tite-Live, quand il fait mention du *Cremonis Jugum*, parle du Col de la Seigne. La raison en faveur d'une telle théorie, que je trouve dans ses observations, est la même qu'on a trouvée quelquefois en faveur des autres, c'est-à-dire qu'elle est incontestable. S'il y a d'autres raisons, je ne m'en aperçois pas. Il me semble qu'il y a de meilleures raisons pour soutenir que l'historien parle du Petit-Saint-Bernard.

So began my pamphlet, written at Aix in August, 1854. It ended thus:—Les idées curieuses de M. Replat, au sujet du Bonhomme et du Mont-Blanc, ne sont pas les plus recentes, ni, peut-être, les plus étonnantes, auxquelles on se soit livré sur le passage d'Annibal. Cette année même, 1854, un savant de Cambridge a publié un ouvrage pour démontrer qu'Annibal traversa le Petit-Mont-Cenis; et, pour soutenir cette opinion, il declare positivement que la route par ce mont-là est marquée (*laid down*) sur la carte de Peutinger!!



THE ALPS OF HANNIBAL.

PART XI.

CONCILIATION FAILS. QUESTION OF PREFERENCE.

CHAPTER I.

We must elect between the two historians. Their general reputation. Polybius had better access to facts. Livy's facts bear against his hypothesis. We learn from him that the prevailing belief was in a descent by the valley of Aosta ; and that an early writer of celebrity named the Pass of Cremo. He avoids to mention Polybius.

I HAVE, as at first proposed, interpreted separately the narratives of the two historians, for ascertaining the track of march intended by each : and I have endeavoured to deal fairly with the conflicting theories by which they are explained. The result of the inquiry is, that the story of Polybius denotes the Little St. Bernard ; and that the story of Livy denotes the Mont Genève. I have fairly encountered the question of identity ; can the same track have been intended by both historians ? Two sorts may lean to the affirmative : those who began with minds warped to the presumption that they meant the same ; and those who, deeming both narratives to be doubtful, are willing to bend that which they deem the more doubtful into an accordance with the other.

I am too far removed from a sympathy with either of these, that I should affect the task of conciliation. A geographical conformity between Polybius and Livy was not anticipated as necessary: nor need we strain for it, in relief of doubt: careful and patient investigation has in my view made clear the meaning of both writers: and I find no doubt that vindicates so desperate an attempt. I have not the pliancy of construction with which to say, after M. Letronne, *Janv.* 1819, p. 24: "Dans Tite-Live il n'y a pas un seul mot à changer pour faire coïncider son texte avec celui de Polybe." On the contrary, I do not discover a word which justifies the suspicion, that their lines of progress coincide for the length of a kilomètre from the mouth of the Isère to the plain of Italy. If my reasonings have been just, the Polybian march by a necessity of construction moves from the Isère up the Rhone: the Livian march by an equal necessity moves from the Isère down the Rhone. In one, the progress from the Isère to the first Alps, is altogether through the Allobroges: the other takes leave of them at the Isère and never meets with them again. By one statement the army arrives among the friendly Insubres: by the other among the hostile Taurini.

Both tracks being made evident on ample scrutiny, I cannot bend either of them into accommodation with the language that describes the other: nor can I bring myself to a compromise in that unhappy medium, the Cenis theory, which has the merit of impartially disregarding the language of both historians. I leave the effort of conciliation to those, who prescribe it as the chief or only duty belonging to this inquiry, and have so zealously devoted themselves to the performance of it.

The question of preference.

Which then were the Alps of Hannibal? On which of the two histories shall we rely, as instructing us to the track of the great invader?—Before we examine the particular grounds

on which one story is preferable to the other, some notice may be expected of the estimation in which these authors are generally held : and of their opportunities of knowledge on the facts which they relate.

Reputation.

I have no desire to dwell on their comparative claims to the merits of truth and accuracy : no wish to exalt the pretensions of one, or depress those of the other. They who are at a loss on this subject may be referred to the sentiments of Niebuhr. His enthusiasm on the splendid work of Livy has been duly mentioned : yet he did not hesitate to confess the blemishes of the author whom he most admired. "Often," he says, speaking of the defeat at Candium, "have I been obliged to fulfil the odious duty of exposing Livy's falsifications or negligences : but nowhere does he deserve severer censure than in this part of his history, one of the most brilliant in masterly clearness."* The same eminent man points to the value of both historians as recorders of fact, when contrasting their accounts of the same portion of history. After speaking disparagingly of the statements of one, he thus expresses himself concerning the other. "In the account of Polybius, on the other hand, there is not one feature which is not correct, and founded upon accurate observation.†" In a previous lecture he has said of Polybius : "As far as we possess his work, we cannot wish for anything further or better : his third book is a master-work, and there is nothing in it, which leaves the mind of the reader unsatisfied."‡

I ought in fairness to say, that all do not make the same estimate. Dr. Arnold held a very different opinion on the

* Transl. by Smith and Schmitz, iii. 213.

† Niebuhr's Lectures, edited by Dr. Leonhard Schmitz, vol. i. Lect. 9.

‡ Ibid. Lect. 8.

third book of Polybius. He wrote on 28th January, 1841—
 “ I have been working at my history pretty steadily, and have
 “ just finished Cannæ.—The text of Polybius appears to me
 “ in a very unsatisfactory state, and the reading of the names
 “ of places in Italy worth next to nothing. I am sorry to
 “ say, that my sense of his merit as an historian becomes
 “ less and less continually.—I should like to know what
 “ Niebuhr thought of him.”* This is followed by more
 severe comments on Livy; of which there is another strong
 specimen in the following September.

A strong testimony to the solid reputation of Polybius is
 found in the 20th volume of the great work of M. Thiers.
 Speaking of the later days of Napoleon, he says (p. 683), “ Il
 “ demandait des livres, et surtout Polybe, qu’il n’avait pas, ce
 “ qui le contrariait beaucoup, car il voulait puiser aux sources
 “ mêmes des notions exactes sur Annibal, pour lequel il
 “ éprouvait la plus profonde admiration.” Again, p. 700, “ Il
 “ se faisait lire Homère, et les guerres d’Annibal dans Tite-
 “ Live, ne pouvant se les faire lire dans Polybe, qu’il n’avait
 “ pu se procurer.”

If our most diligent and ingenious adversary, M. Larauza,
 had survived to defend or surrender his arguments for con-
 ciliating the two narratives, he would not have desired to rest
 on a comparison of historical credit: his words are (p. 29),
 “ Certes nous conviendrons bien avec M. De Luc, que, dans
 “ cette question, le témoignage de Tite-Live ne saurait avoir
 “ la même autorité que celui de Polybe, et que dans le cas où
 “ il y aurait impossibilité évidente de les concilier, on ne
 “ devrait plus balancer à sacrifier l’historien latin à l’historien
 “ grec.”

There is a practical confirmation of M. Larauza’s remark in
 this circumstance: among the interpreters of the march,
 many profess to follow both Polybius and Livy as intending

* Niebuhr’s Lectures were not published till 1844.

the same line : a few follow Polybius, rejecting Livy : there might have been a third class, professing to follow Livy and to reject Polybius. There are none such : though there is the utmost disregard of what Polybius has written, none avow it : the persuasion is universal, that he knew the truth and related the truth ; and that, if we can apprehend his meaning, we are to accept his authority.

Polybius had the advantage of better knowledge.

If any should suppose that the claims of the two historians to influence our belief are, generally speaking, equal, I would point out that on this subject they are not equal. There are cogent grounds of preference, founded on the superior strength of one, available to the particular question which we desire to solve. Polybius claims a higher credit, from the nature of the evidence which he had the opportunity to give, being such as Livy was not enabled to give. The geographical evidence of Polybius is that of a man who made a careful inspection of the country in which the events recorded had taken place, and who in his daily life listened deliberately to competent witnesses. The evidence of Livy is that of one telling things not conveyed to his mind by direct testimony, but which had been subject to the variations of successive relators, and liable to the infusion of their conjectures. Polybius knew the scenes of action : Livy knew them not. Polybius saw and conversed with performers of the exploits told : Livy flourished among their remote descendants.

These distinctions give to the earlier historian a superiority of credit, even for the campaigns in Italy : but for the first invasion, and, most of all, for the march from the Rhone to the plain, his advantage is still greater ; while to his successors this subject was the most open to scepticism. The place where Hannibal crossed the Rhone was inspected by a Roman consul : it was not likely to become a subject of disputation, and we do not trace that it was so. But, from the spot where

Scipio saw the deserted entrenchments to that where in the plain of the Po he saw the living enemy, there was no official knowledge of the Carthaginian track to the Roman government. I have noticed their ignorance of the Alps prior to these events, and their long state of non-intercourse with those mountains, which succeeded. Whatever was the information which they first received on the particulars of that march, it would not, though true, be stamped with an authority that defied question, or that would in after times disarm the scruples of those who were inclined to doubt. But see the difference between a new publication of Livy's day, and one that was produced a hundred and seventy years earlier. While facts were fresh, Polybius was the plain unbiassed narrator of things which he had safe means to ascertain, and on which there was no dispute, no doubt engendered by conflicting speculations. After a lapse of many generations, Livy came forth as a theorist in a matter which could not defy controversy.

Some, thinking that the theory did not originate with him, urge that he cites the authority of Cincius and others, as agreeing with his own on Hannibal's passage of the Alps. This is a mistake: he refers to Cincius only on the amount of loss between his crossing the Rhone and his being in the Taurini: and the just observation is this; that, as in the sentence which follows, he argues the question of the pass, he would on that subject also have brought forward Cincius, if he had been an authority in his favour. On that question, however, Livy expresses his surprise that the world did not agree with himself: he does not intimate that any one did agree with him. We understand from his protesting against the Penine and the Graian, that he was espousing some other way, which led to the Taurini: and this could only be the Cottian: but no modern writer has brought much to his support. Livy himself is more intelligible on the routes which he denies, than on that to which he inclines.

The Statement of Livy bears against his own hypothesis.

When Livy's narrative has brought the invaders into the plain, he discusses the amount of force which survived : and expresses his surprise that there should be doubt on the pass by which they had crossed, and gives an argument upon it. Here I shall contend that the hypothesis of Livy is to be condemned on his own evidence ; that his comment on the track is unfavourable to his own theory, and bears strongly in favour of that which it is the purpose of these pages to maintain. In short, that those things which we learn from him preponderate in favour of the Little St. Bernard, though his particular impression was in favour of the Mont Genève.

I will quote all his words—as far as I know them, which is from Drakenborch's Edition, Baxter, *Oxford*, 1825 :—
“ Quantæ copiae transgresso in Italiam Hannibali fuerint,
“ nequaquam inter auctores constat : qui plurima, centum
“ millia peditum, viginti equitum fuisse, scribunt : qui mini-
“ mum, viginti millia peditum, sex equitum. L. Cincius
“ Alimentus, qui captum se ab Hannibale scribit, maxime
“ auctor me moveret, nisi confunderet numerum, Gallis Ligu-
“ ribusque additis : cum his octaginta millia peditum, decem
“ equitum, adducta in Italiam (magis adfluxisse verisimile
“ est, et ita quidem auctores sunt) : ex ipso autem audisse
“ Hannibale, postquam Rhodanum transierit, triginta sex
“ millia hominum, ingentemque numerum equorum et aliorum
“ jumentorum amisisse in Taurinis, quæ Gallis proxima gens
“ erat in Italiam degresso.

“ Id quum inter omnes constet, eo magis miror ambigi,
“ quam Alpes transierit : et vulgo credere, Penino, atque
“ inde nomen et jugo Alpium inditum, transgressum. Cælius
“ per Cremonis jugum dicit transisse : qui ambo saltus eum
“ non in Taurinos, sed per Salassos montanos ad Libuos Gallos
“ deduxissent. Nec verisimile est, ea tum ad Galliam patuisse

“ itinera : utique quæ ad Peninum ferunt, obsepta gentibus
 “ semigermanis fuissent. Neque, Hercule, montibus his (si
 “ quem forte id movet) ab transitu Pœnorum ullo Veragri,
 “ incolæ jugi ejus, nôrunt nomen inditum ; sed ab eo, quem, in
 “ summo sacratum vertice, Peninum montani adpellant.

“ Peropportune ad principia rerum Taurinis, proximæ genti,
 “ adversus Insubres motum bellum erat. Sed armare exer-
 “ citum Hannibal, ut parti alteri auxilio esset (in reficiendo
 “ maxime sentientem contracta ante mala), non poterat.
 “ Otium etenim ex labore, copia ex inopia, cultus ex inlue-
 “ tabeque, squalida et prope efferata corpora varie movebant.
 “ Ea P. Cornelio consuli caussa fuit, quum Pisas navibus
 “ venisset, exercitu a Manlio Atilioque accepto tirone, et in
 “ novis ignominiis trepido, ad Padum festinandi ; ut cum
 “ hoste nondum refecto manum consereret. Sed cum Placen-
 “ tiam consul venit, jam ex stativis moverat Hannibal ; Tauri-
 “ norumque unam urbem, caput gentis ejus, quia volentes in
 “ amicitiam non veniebant, vi expugnarat : junxissetque sibi,
 “ non metu solum, sed etiam voluntate, Gallos adcolas Padi ;
 “ ni eos, circumspectantes defectionis tempus, subito adventus
 “ consulis obpressisset. Et Hannibal movit ex Taurinis, in-
 “ certos, quæ pars sequenda esset, Gallos præsentem se
 “ secuturos ratus.”

What do we learn from this disquisition of Livy ? We learn two facts :—1. That in his day the prevalent belief was, that Hannibal crossed the Penine Alp, seeking the plain of Italy by the valley of Aosta. 2. That in the history of Cælius Antipater, he was said to have come by the Cremonis jugum, which also leads to the plain down that same valley. Both these statements are unfavourable to Livy’s theory. And, on scrutinising his reasons for coming to a conclusion adverse to the Cremonis jugum, we shall find that he rests it upon feeble and erroneous grounds.

Livy states the prevailing belief to be in favour of the Penine.

This appears in the latter part of the comment—"Vulgo credere Penino transgressum:" this prevailing belief involves a persuasion that Hannibal came down the valley of Aosta: and it is hostile to Livy's hypothesis, which imports an approach to the Po by the valley of Susa, or that of the Clusona. Now that prevailing opinion, as it involves an approach through Aosta, avails to aid our theory of the Graian. A descent from the Penine, the Great St. Bernard, brings you into the plain through the Salassi down the valley of the Doria. But a descent from the Graian, the Little St. Bernard, also brings you into the plain through the Salassi down that same valley. Aosta (Augusta Prætorica) was built in the mountains where the former track falls into the latter, which has come into the Dorian valley at a higher point. Where these two approaches to Italy fall into one line, the Roman general, employed by Augustus to reduce the Salassians, had his head-quarters; and, after the successes of the war, a Roman colony was founded on the site of his camp. From hence the Doria continues its course in the mountains, for, I believe, fifty miles more, before it reaches the plain. Thus, while the tradition of an invasion of Italy from the Penine involves the tradition of an invasion from the valley of the Doria, it may be that the latter only had a just foundation, though the former became engrafted upon it. And such I conceive, was the case: we see our way to the truth of one and the error of the other.

When we estimate a simple tradition that the invaders poured themselves into the plain from this valley, it is reasonable to suppose that it was founded in truth: it would be preserved among those who dwelt on the stream above and below its outlet into the plain: it would live among the descendants of eye-witnesses: from them it would be caught by the Romans, whose more habitual contact and communication

with those descendants had been rather at the skirts of the Italian plain than in the higher valleys or steepes of the Alps. There is not the same probability, that the name, which some were appending to the tradition, was founded in truth; and that the Dorian valley had been itself invaded from the Penine Summit. Livy bears witness against this: he declares that such a notion had sprung from the fancy of etymologists, and asserts distinctly that it did not stand upon tradition among the natives—"neque montibus his ab transitu "Pœnorum ullo Veragri, incolæ jugi ejus, nōrunt nomen "inditum." The denial of the tradition is applied to the Penine, and to the Veragri who occupied the Penine: these were not inhabitants of the valley of the Doria, or owners of the approach to it from the Little St. Bernard: they owned of the summit of the Great St. Bernard, and their capital was Martigny upon the Rhone. Livy, controverting a Veragrian reputation, adverts rather to the Helvetian than the Italian side of the Alps, and establishes a negative which is consistent with and auxiliary to the route which I maintain.

He is of course sceptical on both these passes, and states both to be improbable. But his argument attaches itself only to one of them. He disproves a descent from the Penine Alp, but leaves untouched a descent from the Graian, into the valley which is the conduit to the plain from both. He succeeds in exposing one error. That error, I conceive, had been engrafted upon truth. Separating one from the other, we discover the real force of a tradition which in his day was distorted to a popular belief of the Penine pass. Rome had received the truth from the Salassian valley, but had given her a false name.

The name Penine, and the blunder about it, were probably novelties when Livy wrote, as well as his own conception of a Taurine pass. He was about thirty-five years old, getting up his materials, when Terentius Varro reduced the brave

inhabitants of the Salassian valley, on which the colony was planted at Aosta. Speculations on the Carthaginian march may have been induced on the improved opening of that valley after the pacification. Augustus at that time assigned names to the several parts of the Alpine chain: Penine no doubt was one of them; Julius Cæsar had spoken particularly of that same pass, but without a name: he gives account of protecting the merchants who travelled it from the exactions of the natives: but there is no Penine in the Commentaries.

Livy informs us that the historian Cælius Antipater related Hannibal's passage over the Cremonis jugum.

The reputation of the Salassian valley, as explained, prepares us for another matter of evidence, which Livy has furnished against himself, and in favour of our opinion; namely, that Cælius Antipater, who wrote a history of the second Punic war in the Latin language, and preceded Livy by a century, had recorded the Cremonis jugum as the Carthaginian pass.

In Cremo we trace Cramont, a mountain which ranges on your right hand, as you go up to the Little St. Bernard, from the valley of the Doire. Not that this similarity of names is wanted, for showing that Cælius intended this pass. Livy identifies it in saying, that the route by that "saltus," so recorded by Cælius, brings you, like that by the Penine, through the Salassi into the Gauls of Italy: which is applicable only to the Little St. Bernard. So Strabo, 208, when he tells of two routes to Lyons diverging out of the valley of the Salassi, speaks unquestionably of the Great and Little St. Bernard. As to the word not occurring in other writers, this need not surprise us. Cælius in using it may not have been intelligible to all: Livy clearly recognises it: some might

better know the term Graian. Cremona may have designated one particular mountain, as known to the natives rather than to the rest of the world. How many now can talk of the Great and Little St. Bernard, who know not the Cramont ?

And yet, on reference to the best modern works, this mountain claims an interest in our studies ; we sympathise with the disappointment of philosophers, who, on reaching its summit, have perceived an intervening ridge, that eclipsed the base of Mont Blanc. Professor Forbes, in his *Travels through the Alps of Savoy*, p. 114, having reached the top of the Cramont from the mule-path of the Little St. Bernard, says :—
 “ I was so fully imbued with De Saussure’s enthusiastic picture of the grandeur of the station, that I was a little disappointed to find it, not only equalled in height by some others in the neighbourhood, but overtopped by one, which stands between the Cramont and the Allée Blanche, effectually preventing the eye from diving into its depths, and thus measuring Mont Blanc at once from top to bottom, as is the case in the view from the Breven, above the valley of Chamouni.” But De Saussure had himself said seventy years before, “ La cime du Cramont ne domine pas immédiatement sur l’Allée Blanche : elle en est séparée par des chaînes de montagnes plus basses, qui empêchent que les yeux ne plongent jusqu’au fond de cette vallée.” § 915. The charms of the Cramont are effectively described in a recent work by the Rev. S. W. King.

Mr. Ellis, in his *Treatise*, p. 146, says of the Cremonis jugum, “ It is probably the Little St. Bernard, the ancient name being apparently preserved in the neighbouring peak of the Cramont.” In his *Defence, Journal of Philol.* III. 5. he again admits the probability : but, unwilling to concede the plainest fact without some struggle, expresses a doubt, saying, “ If this (Alpis Graia, Little St. Bernard) were the Cremonis jugum of Cælius, he was undoubtedly in error.

"Yet it must be remembered that in the time of Cælius there "were no Alpes Cottiae." Be it so. But the identity is quite independent of the terms Cottian, Graian or Penine. When Livy quotes Cælius as naming "Cremonis jugum," he proves it to have been the Little St. Bernard, by saying, that it was one of the two "saltus," which bring you down through Salassi into Galli.

It is then extremely important that Cælius, being of an age long prior to the obscurity of this matter of history, names the pass for which we contend. The works of Cælius are lost: but there is no reason to doubt his good faith in narrating a fact like this. Livy adopted much matter from Cælius; and refers to him here, as giving a name to the pass of Hannibal.

Those who hesitate to recognise the Alps of Polybius, and who, in the absence of a name, desire confirmation, may accept through Livy this confirmation by Cælius, and be satisfied. There is no reason to suppose, that that early historian, who flourished between Polybius and Livy, differed from his predecessor; or that in his time any dispute on the question had begun. He must have known that he spoke in accordance with the experience of Polybius, whose acquaintance he may in his youth have had the good fortune to enjoy.

Livy does not name Polybius.

It is reasonable to inquire why, as he names Cælius, he did not name Polybius. Polybius was a writer whom he knew well and greatly respected: to whose authority he often refers; * as in book xxxiii. c. 10, "Nos, Polybium secuti sumus, "non incertum auctorem, quum omnium Romanorum rerum, "tum præcipuè in Græciâ gestarum." It might have been

* See Livy, book xxx. 45; xxxiii. 10; xxxiv. 50; xxxvi. 19; xxxix. 52; xlv. 45.

that Livy did not know him as a writer on Hannibal, or was not aware which pass was favoured by him. But he knew it all; and did not deem it expedient to call public attention to so formidable an authority.

Livy, studying other authors on this subject, must have studied Polybius: for he talks of something on which all writers were agreed: Polybius could not fail to be one of them. In fact, he was especially under his notice. It has been pointed out that in one part of the march Livy is an attentive copier of the incidents of Polybius, though not assigning to them a perceptible locality: in another part we have seen his utter discordance from Polybius, in incidents, localities, and everything. Is it possible that Livy should himself have been unconscious of the disagreement; or, while he perceived the track of Polybius to be hostile to his own, could he fail to perceive which track it was? Was it not one of the two which he recognises as the rivals of his own?

There is no question but this—when Livy in one part of his line takes his facts from Polybius, and in another part varies from him in everything, which did he suppose to be the track intended by the other, Mons Peninus or Cremonis jugum? He shows his own knowledge of both. And are we to attribute his silence to accident or design? A writer of to-day may excuse himself for not understanding Polybius, because he finds no name to his pass. Livy could not have so excused himself. He was more acute than his followers; he knew that he differed from Polybius: they think, or without thinking presume, that the two tracks were the same.

CHAPTER II.

Livy grounds his hypothesis on the words of Cincius, inferring that the Taurini lay in the line of Hannibal's march to the Cisalpine Gauls. The inference is unsound. Salassi. Libui. Explanation by Gibbon. Version of Ukert. Version of Ellis. On the notion of placing Turin in the line of march.

THUS it is Livy, who tells us of the general persuasion prevailing in his day, that the invaders came down the valley of Aosta. It is he who, though avoiding to speak of Polybius, tells us that Cælius named the track over the Little St. Bernard. Let us now examine the ground of his own dissentient opinion.

He reasons as offering his opinion in opposition to existing opinions. If he had told the story without argument, it might be supposed that, in naming Tricastini, Vocontii, Tricorii, Druentia, he expressed what was offered to him in prior narratives of the march; we might give to those ideas the credit of an earlier date, and say: "Why should he invent them?" But Livy does argue the question of the pass, and those ideas have no part in his argument, though they stand in his narrative. We may believe, therefore, that he first introduced them into the story; and in this we make no forced construction, nor one that derogates from his veracity. Having, on certain grounds, imbibed an opinion on the mountain pass of Hannibal, he supplies his readers with a clue for reaching it. Being persuaded that from the Isère the march must have proceeded to the Mont Genève, he names four objects which in such a march could hardly be avoided, and this is done in a single sentence. But he is not reasoning from those objects: when he wrote, this transalpine

district had come fully under the dominion of Rome, and it was fit that he should at least provide his reader with such general brief instruction. It is, indeed, of the most meagre kind; for, in getting across to the Druentia, which, as has been shown, could only lead to the Genève, not a town or resting-place is named, nor a single incident reported. The inference is, that he derived no information from other writings concerning that progress. In his details of the mountain march which follow, we recognise much fact of the Greek history, but no geography—his geography is given only from the Isère to the Druentia, a space which he fills up by naming three peoples, whom he would find in his map. He had read Polybius and Cælius Antipater, and he certainly did not find the four objects in their narratives: why in any others?

His impression on the pass of Hannibal had been acquired without regard to those objects: it was founded on the march in Italy, not on the march in the Transalpine; and having the belief that that pass was the Cottian, he roughly intimates the way of getting to it by a few intelligible signs; a way very simple and probable for him to think of.

His opinion on the pass was founded on the incident of the Taurini: he conceived that Hannibal had from the first intended the Genève pass; for he says that he turned up the Rhone to the Isère, not as being his way to Italy, but that he might avoid the enemy for a time, and postpone hostile encounter till he arrived in Italy. The cause of the deviation having ceased, "*quum jam Alpes peteret*," Livy tells the march to the Druentia: having in view the Cottian Alp, he gives his readers in few words the way for getting to it from the Isère. As far as the Durance, there is a short local instruction, but from thence to the plain of the Po the narrative has no local instruction at all, not even stating into what people Hannibal came down, unless it appears in an

argument which follows the narrative. After saying "ad planum descensum," and "hoc modo in Italiam perventum est Alpibus superatis," Livy enters into a discussion upon the amount of force which Hannibal then had left to him, out of which have arisen remarks in which the Taurini are mentioned, and from which it has been inferred that Hannibal first came down into that people from the Alps.

On Hannibal's losses, Livy quotes the historian Cincius Alimentus, who had at some time in the war been Hannibal's prisoner, and had heard him speak on the subject. Livy refers to his writings thus. After saying that different numbers were believed to have come over into Italy with him, some saying 100,000 foot, 20,000 horse, others only 20,000 foot, 6,000 horse, writes thus :—" L. Cincius Alimentus, " qui captum se ab Annibale scribit, maximè auctor moveret " me, nisi confunderet numerum, Gallis Ligaribusque additis : " cum his scribit octoginta millia peditum, decem equitum, " adducta in Italiam (magis affluxisse verisimile est, et ita " quidem auctores sunt) : ex ipso autem audiisse Annibale, " postquam Rhodanum transierit, triginta sex millia hominum " ingentemque numerum equorum et aliorum jumentorum " amisisse in Taurinis, quæ Gallis proxima gens erat, in " Italiam degresso. Id quum inter omnes constet, eo magis " miror ambigi," &c. *See this all quoted before.*

Id quum inter omnes constet.

Here we inquire what is referred to by "id," as concurred in by all: for whatever Livy meant by "id," it seems given as the foundation of his own hypothesis on the pass: "id" must mean something, and if we ask what it is, the question claims a very specific answer. The answer cannot be in the amount of men saved or the amount of men lost (*both are given*); whether the former, including Gauls and Ligurians, were 80,000 and 10,000, or the latter 36,000 and a vast

number of horses. Such is not the answer; the answer ought to be by some proposition, which is plainly expressed in the previous sentence. No proposition has been plainly expressed, except the amount of lost or saved which one or other person had reported, with a special ambiguity in the report of Cincius; and the fact that the Taurini adjoined the Cisalpine Gauls.

It is not there alleged that Hannibal descended from the Alps into the Taurini; and yet this is treated as the fact which Livy says was universally agreed upon.* Interpreters may choose to infer this from the text, but this has not been said in the text, and it ought to have been said, in order that it should represent "id."† So far is Livy from saying what is imputed, that his statement is the reverse: he states the common belief to be opposed to his own, and in favour of those passes which would have brought Hannibal out, not into the Taurini, but through the Salassi and then into the Libui Galli. And so would the Penine and Graian have done. As the Taurini and the Galli were contiguous, it is reasonable that the country of Taurini should be taken as the point up to which he may have counted his troops, estimating those who survived, or those whom he had lost; and this is consistent with my geography as well as that of my adversaries, whatever it be. I contend that Hannibal renovated his troops among his friends the Gauls, and then turned aside from them over the Po against the Taurini, who had offended him by spurning his alliance, while he lay encamped, occupied with the reparation of his army. My opponents who never trace the march, do not give the point of contiguity between Taurini and Galli. To that point he may have

* Mr. Ellis's *Treatise*, p. 146.

† This is confessed, when the prior words are altered, so that "id" may fit that fact.

calculated his reverses. I think it requisite to call attention to the position of both these peoples. The text invites us to the subject.

Gens Gallis proxima.

Galli here are the Cisalpine Gauls, who began in the plains of the Salassian Doria, near the Po in the region of Chivasso, a place between the Orca and the Doria, and the Gauls spread east to Sena on the Adriatic. The Taurini were a Ligurian people, beginning some distance below Susa ; their territory succeeding that of the Segusini along the minor Doria at about sixteen miles above the site of Augusta Taurinorum : it was continued to the site of that place, and a short way down the Po to where the great river bends to the east.

What then may we understand by the proximity of Taurini to Galli ? Was it at one end of their narrow territory or at the other ? At Avillano, or near Chivasso ? They adjoined the Cisalpine Gauls at the latter extremity. The Orca or the Doria separated them from Gauls : and Hannibal, when his army had been renovated among his friends, passed into the country of the enemy, and punished them. At the other extremity of the Taurini, these were not "*gens proxima Gallis.*" There were no Galli, therefore no proximity.

I know no better mode of speculating on the words which Livy has used on this subject. Perhaps Mr. Ellis will hardly think they deserve so much consideration. He says of Livy : "He loses himself among the Alps, a region of which he "appears not only personally ignorant, but also to have failed "in forming a tolerably accurate conception." *Treatise*, p. 137. After reading both histories, I am led to believe that Hannibal, having marched down the Salassian valley directly into Cisalpine Gaul, and there thoroughly established the efficiency

of his troops, turned aside to strike a blow against an enemy.* The solution of Livy's mistake, if he made one, may be this : he learned from Cincius, that Hannibal's march brought him to a point where Galli and Taurini were contiguous ; he neglected the fact that the Taurini were accessible through the Gauls, and hastily assumed that the march had come to the Taurini first. Knowing, moreover, that the first act of warfare in the plain was against the Taurini, he adhered to his error on their position as corresponding with that fact, though not asserted ; and imagined the aggression by Hannibal to have preceded his arrival among his allies, instead of being his first enterprise after devoting himself to renovate his army among them. A careful reader will not doubt that the hospital quarters of the Carthaginians were established among friendly Gauls, and not among Taurini, and that the work of repairing the army was performed before he invaded the neighbouring people, who had dared to spurn his alliance. His primary duty, a necessity on escaping from the Alps, had been to restore life to his army, whose shattered state both historians so painfully describe. The offending people, who invited his vengeance, were near at hand ; but, notwithstanding the proximity, Hannibal would have pursued his course without contact with them, but for the special provocation. They brought the visitation upon themselves : their contumacy alone diverted Hannibal from his route, and has made their name to belong to the tale of the Carthaginian progress.

Having ventured to speak of these Gauls as Cisalpines, I would observe that all do not recognise Livy's distinction

* Dr. Arnold writes : " Hannibal remained in the country of the Insubrians, till rest, a more temperate climate, and wholesome food, with which the Gauls plentifully supplied him, restored the bodies and spirits of his soldiers, and made them again ready for action. The first movement was against the Taurinians, a Ligurian people, who were constant enemies of the Insubrians," &c. p. 92.

between Transalpines, Alpines, and Cisalpines. He speaks of Galli in France; Galli in Italy; and Alpini or Montani in the Alps. When he is bringing the march to the Alps, he speaks of the natives as Galli, "cum bonâ pace incolentium ea loca Gallorum, in Alpes pervenit." When the march is in the Alps, we read, "apparuerunt montani; montani jam pauciores concursabant; montani viam insedère." When he has brought Hannibal into the plain of Italy, we read of Gauls again: these are Cisalpines, and they extend to the Adriatic. But the mountaineers are named distinctly: as, when Hannibal speaks of himself to his soldiers in c. xliii., "*domitor Hispaniæ Galliæque, victor Alpinarum gentium.*" So, "*Galliciæ atque Alpinæ gentes.*"

In observing this distinction, there is some variety among commentators, and one specimen happens to call my attention. In the *Cambridge Journal of Philology*, vol. iii. p. 34, Mr. Ellis, after pronouncing a strong censure on Mr. Law for impeaching Hannibal's veracity (an escapade which needs no answer), sets forth, as from Livy, these words:—" *Taurinis, quæ Gallis proxima gens erat, in Italiam degressum;*" and says of them, "*Gallis* is plainly contrasted with *Italiam*, "the one expression indicating the Transalpine, and the other "the Cisalpine country." I understand no such contrast, and I believe that the Gauls of whom Livy here speaks are all Cisalpines; and as Mr. Ellis seems to have conceived a special respect for one tribe of them—the Libui—he ought to be correct on the point, and it is well to notice what he says of them.

Livy happened to name Libuos Gallos, and not wrongly: though he might have said Laos, or Lebecios, or Libicos, or Lævios, or Gallos only; perhaps there were not the five distinct tribes; though all varieties are found in Polybius, or Livy, or Pliny, or Ptolemy; and all may have been higher up in the plain than the Insubres who founded Milan. No writer

speaks of so many, or tells their relative situations ; it would be difficult to show these Libui closer to Salassi than other petty tribes. But Mr. Ellis seems to think that they were closer, and may think that Polybius ought to have written *κατῆρε εἰς τὸ τῶν Λιβύων ἔθνος*, instead of *Ἰσόμβρων*.

I have before justified the narrative of Polybius for the descent into Insubres. He mentioned them by reason of history, not for geographical controversy. It would have been a great mistake if he had put forward an unimportant tribe, if he had named, Lai, Lebecii, Libui, or Libici, when Hannibal is said to come from the Alps among his friends in the plain. He is received by the Insubres, the great leading power, under whom the minor tribes are serving. From the time when Polybius brought the march through the Allobroges on the other side, no people has yet been named, and who so worthy now to be named as the Insubres ? Among the Gauls of Italy they had always held the highest rank. At the time of an early irruption of the Gauls, Pol. ii. 17, we read of the Insubres as "the chief nation among them : " and now, on the approach of Hannibal, they are heading the confederacy against Rome, and welcome the arrival of their illustrious ally. Even they are not named again during the campaign ; and no other Gauls are named at all. As to the Libui, whatever degree of independence they ever had (there is no trace of any), none can doubt that they were subordinate to the greater power, which had in older times settled near them in the plain.

Livy, too, recognises the superior rank of the Insubrian state, when he resumes the narrative in c. xxxix. Telling the state of war in which Hannibal found that country involved against Rome, he names no Gauls but the Insubres, because they were the chief belligerents. "*Peropportunè ad principia rerum, Taurinis proximæ genti adversus Insubres motum bellum erat.*" Though it is not essential to contend

that in this passage the proximity is to the Insubres, my opinion is to that effect : for which I am complimented by Mr. Ellis with the want of reason and syntax. As he offers no reason or syntax of his own in opposition, it still strikes me, that Livy's nomination of Insubres as the party to the war is in congruity with Polybius, who treats them as the great allies of Hannibal, among whom he came down from the Alps.

In answer to my views on these Cisalpine Gauls, Mr. Ellis takes the Libui under his special protection, and charges me with "an utter disregard of ancient authorities." (*Journ. of Phil.* ii. 312.) He is shocked by my comment on the inferior rank of that people, and, as the champion of the oppressed, writes thus : "My object is to prove the continued existence of the Libui. It is sufficient for my purpose that Livy asserts the presence of the Libui in the plains of which Mr. Law seeks to dispossess them." Not content with the evidence of Polybius and Livy, he appeals to later testimony, and exclaims—"My third witness to the existence of the Libui will be Ptolemy, who assigns to them the towns of Vercelli and Lomello. We have thus satisfactory evidence of the continued presence for some centuries of the Libui in the same district. All Mr. Law's efforts to annihilate them at the time of Hannibal's passage will be perfectly vain in the face of such testimony."

So far am I from dispossessing or annihilating that people, Libui, that I am content to let them be where Livy's argument places them. I believe that, two centuries before Hannibal came that way, some such tribe or tribes settled between the Salassi of the mountains and the Insubres of Milan. My words, which raised this storm on the part of Mr. Ellis, were these : "We are not to infer from the words of Livy, that the obscure tribe Libui held the territory in question so that Hannibal's friends, the Insubres, could not be masters of

"it." I say so still. Other tribes—whether called Lai, Lebecii, Libici, Lævi, Libui, whichever be the fit names—would be serving under the Insubrian banner in that memorable war; and Mr. Ellis might have been satisfied with my admitting their occupancy without contending for their importance. I was willing to suppose that they remained where Polybius settled them, Lai and Lebecii, notwithstanding their doubtful substance as a nation. I only object to a few of *the centuries of their continued presence*, on which Mr. Ellis makes so touching an appeal to his third witness, Ptolemy. Whatever degree of independence such a state retained at the outbreak of Hannibal's war, when we may presume them to have served against Rome, I cannot believe that any independence survived that few years' struggle. On the contrary, I believe that they then came under the Roman yoke. In 218 B. C. the Boii would be friendly to that little people: after the war, they were not.

Livy, speaking of a time very soon after Hannibal quitted Italy, about 200 B. C., relates (lib. xxxiii. c. 37) that a Roman army, having attacked the Boii, and compelled the surrender of Bologna, turned into Liguria; that the Boii then moved with a force to harass their rear. Missing the Romans, they crossed the Po, and plundered the Lævi and Libui. Coming back by the Ligurian border, they fell in with the Romans, and were themselves cut to pieces. If this is, as it may be, the latest memorial of Libui, we need not estimate their importance in succeeding centuries, even if Mr. Ellis calls his third witness.

So long as these Libui or Libici existed as a distinct people, they may have been near the Salassian valley: being in the plain, they would be crushed sooner than those mountaineer neighbours. Strabo gives copious details of the extermination of the Salassi, without a word of the others, who must have vanished sooner. The Salassi themselves had been annihi-

lated before Livy wrote his lost book to tell of it. The great nation of Boii had been quite expelled from Italy long before Livy's time; and Ptolemy was nearly two centuries later still. If the appearance of the Libici in his catalogue bespeak their existence in his day, by parity of reasoning their appearance in the catalogues of D'Anville and Walckenner would prove their existence at the present day. Ptolemy could only have any knowledge of the Libui, as we have, from the writings of his predecessors, such as Polybius and Livy. If Mr. Ellis should call his third witness, he could only say to him, "Now, Ptolemy, recollect yourself; did not you publish two towns of the Libici, Vercellæ and Laumellum; and did not you publish two towns of the Salassi, Augusta Prætorica and Eporedia?" The answer would be: "To be sure I did; and what then? I picked up names as I could. As for Libici, I found them in Polybius, and their towns somewhere else. I know nothing of them myself, more than you do. When I entered Augusta as πόλις Σαλασσίων, the country may or may not have still been called from the Salassians. But those poor fellows never saw Augusta: they were exterminated first, and their destroyer made that place afterwards; and it is called Augusta still."

Such is the claim to celebrity which Mr. Ellis puts forth on behalf of the Libui as next-door neighbours to the Salassi montani. We concede to them all that he claims for them, save a few centuries of existence as a nation. A particular region seems once to have retained their name for a considerable time, before the second Punic war, and, for anything I know, they may give name to a parish at the present day. It is not true that I have denied their existence. I believe that we have a correct idea of their original location by rightly interpreting the words of Polybius in his second book.* None of these small tribes appear as independent

* See *ante*, Part VIII. ch. iv.

regions and the few houses where their names are seen are consistent with their having been in Hannibal's way and testimony to a more powerful state. History tells the achievements of the Romans and the Gaul, telling with little reserve. The names, the numbers, the command, the numbers, and others are recorded alike in the story of history. In the performance of the Latin history is shown. The lesson from the present and select historical that the Romans wanted Hannibal to be driven from the Alps, and that that is not to be rejected because he did not introduce the other party into the story.

Notes of Gibbon on the text

Gibbon, on reading Livy understood that though Hannibal's first act of warfare in Italy was in the Taurini, he did not enter their territory directly from the Alps. In his miscellaneous works, v. 376, &c., he discusses at some length the purport of those words: and his conclusion is this. "Hannibal wished to give an idea of the losses which he had sustained in passing the mountains, in consequence of battle, cold, and fatigue. He begins therefore from his crossing the Rhone, and ends at his arrival in the territory of the Taurini: since it was really in their country, and by taking their capital that he began his operations in Italy. Their territory, therefore, formed the limit between two things totally distinct—his losses in Italy, and those in the Alps. It is not necessary that the country of the Taurini should be the first of Italy into which he descended from the Alps; it sufficed that it was the first where he fought a battle. The former explanation is adopted by Livy, but the latter appears to me very capable of being defended. It deprives the Latin historian of what appears to him a decisive proof. It even turns this alleged proof against him, by laying open the source of his mistake."

Presently Gibbon hesitates, and says this—"I confess indeed that the sense of this famous passage is rather guessed at than explained: so perplexed, defective, and faulty is its construction. Critics have endeavoured to correct it; but it should seem more natural to say that Livy copied Cincius, and that the latter had preserved the very words of the Carthaginian general, who spoke Latin like a foreigner."

This whimsical conjecture does not aid to solve difficulty. It may be, that Hannibal was not quite fluent in Latin conversation: but he and his prisoner need not have conversed in Latin: Cincius wrote his history in Greek. The whole of the discussion is confused. The perplexity is from Livy's own words, which are meant to give the grounds of his opinion, but which fail to do so, not telling us what it was that had met with universal assent: only that his own theory did not.

If Mr. Gibbon were living and should continue to suspect the conversation of Hannibal, Dr. Ukert and Mr. Ellis might tempt him to enlarge his comments on the latinity. These advocates of the *Cenis* have each used versions of the text, which show an effort to remove the word "*Taurinis*" from its proper use in the sentence, and bring it into connexion with "*degressum*."

Version of Dr. Ukert.

In the 2d volume of the Professor's *Géographie*, p. 604, his version places a full stop after "*amisisse*"; closing the reference to Cincius without the idea of *Taurini*. Livy is made to say on his own account, "In *Taurinis*, quæ Gallis proxima gens est, in *Italiam degressum* quum inter omnes constet, eo magis miror," &c. The word "*id*" is omitted; and those ten words, being cut off from the previous sentence, make the nominative to "*constet*." By this modelling of sentences, Livy's statement on Hannibal's losses loses all its point: for the losses were those which occurred between crossing the Rhone

and coming into the Taurini. This version also damages the Latin: "in Taurinis" being a clumsy addition to "degressum in Italiam."

Version of Mr. Ellis.

In Vol. III. of the *Cambridge Journal of Philology*, p. 32. the version of Mr. Ellis has a comma inserted after "amisisse" and omits "in" before "Taurinis:" so that it stands thus:—"amisisse, Taurinis, quæ Gallis proxima gens erat, in Italiam *"degressum.* Id quum inter omnes constet, eo magis miror." &c. This also diverts the idea of Taurini from the statement of losses, and attaches it to the descent from the Alps: and here again, "Taurinis" is a clumsy addition to "degressum in Italiam."

If Gibbon could have seen these later attempts to express Livy's thoughts, he might have been more indulgently inclined to what he thought was the Latin of Hannibal. Let these learned Cenisiens settle their punctuation as they will; and determine the comparative merits of "degressum in Italiam Taurinis" and "degressum in Italiam in Taurinis."

On the notion that Turin stood in the line of march.

Many critics think that, as Hannibal chastised the Taurini before he moved forward to meet Scipio, he must have chosen that course through the Alps, by which Turin would lie in his way. They reason thus—"If Hannibal had entered Italy from the Graian or the Penine pass, what business had he in the Taurini? Those passes would have brought him down into Gaul: the Cottian Alp sent him straight on to the Ligurian Taurini, a people whom all admit him to have attacked after his arrival in Italy." We admit that he attacked them; but not that he thought of doing so till the necessity arose; which was while he lay encamped among his friends the Gauls. Some there are, who presume that he

must have contrived the nearest road from the Isère to Turin ; and therefore would not have approached them by the valley of the Doria : and that, if he had come down that valley, he would not have strayed from line of operations by turning against the Taurini. Both arguments are unfounded.

Ukert's comment on behalf of the Cenis is thus exhibited by Dr. Thirlwall in the *Philological Museum*, iii. p. 683 :—
“The motive for quitting the Isère at Montmeillan is sufficiently indicated by the map, which shows that the road from hence to Turin, compared with that by the Little St. Bernard, is the chord of a great curve.” A similar conception was indulged by Mr. Whitaker, in conceding the apparent probability of the Mont Genève, i. 19. “Over this mountain, Mont Genève, is the natural line of Hannibal's march at present, Turin being his grand object.”

I know not how it has been discovered, that Hannibal was providing for a Taurine war before he directed his march to the Alps. Livy's story, “*peropportune ad principia rerum*,” &c., gives no countenance to such a notion : on the contrary, it imports that the opportunity of chastising an enemy came unlooked for. It is one of the many futile fancies which this controversy has called forth, to imagine Hannibal on the Isère, studying the most direct line to Turin. If Turin existed, and a Taurine war had then occupied a chief place in his thoughts instead of none at all, it would not have influenced his course through the Alps. Their importance was in themselves : whatever was his best way through the Alps, was also his best way to attain a town on the other side. A few miles saved in the plain were as nothing, compared with an advantage gained in the mountains.

Some who cannot believe in the deviation of a few miles to the hostile town, wherever it was, by reason of the time that it would consume, contend with an appropriate inconsistency, that this very object was of sufficient importance to decide

the course by which the invaders should attempt the Alps. But, if we could suppose that the anticipation of a Taurine enemy could have swayed the election of a pass, the Cottian pass is just that which he would not have elected. He was one, who could appreciate the severity of the great mountain enterprise, and foresee the consequences. On reaching the plain, his men were unfit for conflict: "*squalida et propè efferata corpora—armare exercitum non poterat.*" The repose which was to precede action would be better enjoyed among acknowledged friends who bordered on the enemy's country than among the enemies themselves. There is a just comment made by Dr. Arnold, which favours the Little St. Bernard; namely, that it led more directly into the country of the expected allies, than the shorter passage into Italy by the Cottian Alps.* The fact is true: and it is an important one: but if the mountain dangers had been greater than in other routes, even the arrival among friends in the plain might not alone have been a cause of preference.

The other argument is urged in recent opinions, civil and military. M. Letronne, speaking of the reduction of the Taurine town, says: "*Cet événement achève de prouver que le Mont Genève fût le lieu du passage: Turin, placé au confluent de la Doria et du Pô, opposoit aux Carthaginois une barrière qu'il falloit renverser pour passer outre. La prise de cette ville étoit donc nécessaire: dans l'hypothèse de M. De Luc, elle est inexplicable.*"† M. Baudé de Lavallette writes, p. 108: "*Si on le fait descendre du petit St. Bernard, ce siège de trois jours devient inexplicable: c'est un long détour, un écart inutile, où s'amortit l'élan de sa marche rapide: c'est un véritable hors d'œuvre dans ses opérations. Rien ne saurait excuser la supposition ni faire admettre l'idée d'une excursion si étrange.*" General St. Cyr Nugues

* Note L to page 84.

† Journal des Savans. Janv. 1819, p. 34.

expresses the same notions (p. 22), insisting that Hannibal would only have lost ground and wasted time by attacking the Taurini, "dans la vue de forcer un passage qu'ils lui ferment et dont il n'a pas besoin."

If the Taurine town was on the site of Turin, which I see no reason to assume, Hannibal's policy was to seize the first opportunity of encouraging his troops by a successful effort on Italian ground; of crushing those who dared to declare against him and reject his friendship; of assuring his allies. Livy's remark is, that the occasion of striking such a blow at the outset of the campaign was offered to him most opportunely. It is true that the line of his operations was down the Po: but it was his principle not to leave an efficient enemy in his rear. Among the urgent motives to the reduction of Saguntum, we read, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, οὐδὲν ἀπολιπὼν ὀπισθεν πολέμιον, ἀσφαλῶς ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν πορείαν.* The same wisdom belonged to another invader, "quod neque post tergum hostem relinquere volebat."†

Such motive was cogent to justify the delay which the operation of chastising the Taurini might cause; and wisely did Hannibal turn aside for it. The end was commensurate. Polybius tells us (iii. 60), that he struck so great a terror into the barbarians around, that all, not under present coercion of the Romans, promptly avowed their allegiance to him. Nor is it clear that the operation did cause delay. Some length of time necessarily elapsed between the escape of the army from the Alps, and their competence to march forward against Scipio: and, as the movement which destroyed the Taurini may only have required a portion of the army, it may have been completed before they were ready to move in mass down the Po: in which case no increased procrastination of the campaign resulted from it.

I have pointed out as clearly as I can, the nature and the

* Polyb. iii. 17.

† De Bello Gallico, iv. 22.

value of Livy's argument in favour of the Cottian Alps: and now, let me ask, what is the effect of his disquisition on the passage of Hannibal? The facts which we know through his disclosure of them are,—that there was a prevailing belief that Hannibal entered Italy by the valley of Aosta: that a foolish assimilation of the word Penine to Pœni had induced the notion that he came into that valley over the Penine pass; and that Cælius recorded him to have reached it by the pass of Cremona. Is it not curious, that Livy himself, the advocate of the Cottian pass, should be the reporter of these striking and important facts? The legitimate application of them is purely in favour of the pass of Cremona. Livy, however, objected to that pass: he did not believe it to have been open in so early times. The pass of Cremona, the Little St. Bernard, had been traversed by Roman armies from the time he was born; and it became a great Military Way of the Empire. He advances no good reason to impeach that pass: but discloses matters which are powerful to support it. If, besides all this, his argument for his own hypothesis is as nugatory as I have on fair examination shown it to be, we are entitled to claim him as a witness, an involuntary witness, in support of Polybian truth.

CHAPTER III.

Of writers prior to Livy no one favours his hypothesis. In addition to the historians Polybius and Cælius, we find some evidence in Sallust and Cornelius Nepos, tending in favour of the Little St. Bernard. Writers after Livy give no light. Silius Italicus. Pliny. Appian. Ammianus Marcellinus.

SALLUST.

THERE is an observation in Mr. Merivale's *History of the Romans under the Empire*, which, being found in so great a

work, I cannot leave unnoticed. In vol. i c. 6. p. 290, having stated that Cæsar hurried back into Gaul by the route of the Cottian Alps, we read in a note, "The more usual but longer route would be that by the Col de Tiniers and Barcelonette, discovered by Pompeius. Sall. *Fr. Hist.* iii. 3. Appian, "B.C. i. 119. Walckenaer, *G. des G.* i. 225, 538."

I can only suppose that Mr. Merivale has stated the opinion of the Baron Walckenaer without scrutiny, entering as authority the references of that writer without consulting them himself. There is nothing which appears to warrant or provoke the introduction of the name of Sallust, for carrying Pompey over the Pass here denominated Col de Tiniers. This singular notion seems to have been caused by an unsuccessful effort on the part of Baron Walckenaer to render a few words of Appian, whereby he has converted a disaster of Pompey in Spain into a success of Pompey in France.

Let us first vindicate Sallust. Among the fragments of his works is a despatch addressed by Pompey to the Senate about the year 75 B.C. Pompey is remonstrating with the Senate for starving the war in Spain. With feelings of resentment and indignation, he points out what in three years he has done for them, and what they have not done for him—"Per Deos immortales, utrum censetis me vicem ærarii præstare, an exercitum sine frumento et stipendiis habere posse? Equidem fateor me ad hoc bellum majore studio quàm consilio profectum: quippe qui, nomine modo imperii à vobis accepto, diebus quadraginta exercitum paravi: hostesque in cervicibus jam Italiæ agentes, ab Alpibus in Hispaniam submovi. Per eas iter, aliud atque Hannibal, nobis opportunius, patefeci. Recepi Galliam, Pyrenæum, &c." This must be the fragment referred to for the Col de Tiniers!

Let us look to the other references for Pompey crossing a Col de Tiniers, meaning, I presume, a pass accessible by ascending the river Tinea. The Baron Walckenaer writes

thus, p. 225 :—" Le premier qui découvrit un passage des
 " Alpes différent de celui que nous venons de nommer, est
 " Pompée, qui s'en fit un titre d'honneur auprès du Sénat,
 " ainsi que nous le voyons par une de ses lettres conservées
 " dans les fragmens de Salluste—lib. iii. p. 157. J'ai prouvé
 " ailleurs que cette route, peu éloignée de celle des Alpes
 " maritimes, était le passage du col de Tiniers et de la vallée
 " de Barcelonette ; mais comme ce passage retombait dans
 " celui des Alpes maritimes, il n'en fut jamais distingué. Le
 " lieu nommé Lauro dans Appien, où Pompée posa son camp
 " après avoir défait les Gaulois, est Laurès, dans la vallée de
 " Barcelonette." See also p. 538.

In a note to the same page (225) of Partie ii. ch. 1, of
Géographie des Gaules, there is this translation of Appian :
 " Pompée fut chargé de se mettre en marche pour l'Ibérie : il
 " prit courageusement le chemin des Alpes. Il ne suivit pas
 " la route frayée par Annibal, et il s'en ouvrit une nouvelle."
 " Appien ajoute que Pompée, après avoir défait les Gaulois,
 " posa son camp près d'un lieu nommé Lauro, qu'il le prit, le
 " saccagea, et le détruisit. Laurès, qui est Lauro, se trouvait
 " en effet sur la route de Pompée : quelques cartes nomment
 " à tort ce lieu Lauret."

Such is the Baron's version of Appian. Now see what
 that author has said according to some editions. He states
 that " Pompey, being commissioned to Spain with a fresh
 " army, struck boldly through the Alps by a new route dif-
 " ferent from that of Hannibal, and near to the sources of the
 " Rhone and the Po, rivers that rise in the Alps not far from
 " one another." He then writes—*ἀφικομένου δ' ἐς Ἰβηρίαν,*
αὐτίκα ὁ Σερτώριος τέλος ὅλον ἐπὶ χορτολογίαν ἐξίων αὐτοῖς
ὑποζυγίοις καὶ θεράπουσι συνέκοψε καὶ Λαύρωνα πόλιν
ἐφορῶντος αὐτοῦ Πομπηίου διήρπασε καὶ κατέσκαψεν—edit.
 Amstelodami, ii. 696. " When Pompey had arrived in Spain,
 " Sertorius succeeded in entirely cutting off one of his legions

"which was out foraging, together with its followers and "baggage cattle; and assaulted and plundered the town of "Lauro under the eyes of Pompey himself." The innovation of the critic seems to be, that he substitutes "*après avoir défait les Gaulois*" for *ἀφικομένου δ' ἐς Ἰβηρίαν*, and makes Pompey the nominative to *διήρπασε καὶ κατέσκαψεν*, instead of Sertorius.*

As to the supposed route, I find no meaning in the proposition, "*ce passage retombait dans celui des Alpes maritimes —il n'en fut jamais distingué.*" Such a route would from Nice proceed up the Var by Aspremont, then up the Tinea by St. Sauveur and St. Etienne, and then over the Col in question to Barcelonette in the valley of the Ubaye. This course and the route of the maritime Alps, are from the Var to the Rhone utterly dissociated. Such, however, is the Baron's "*opportunus iter.*" I should think that, if Pompey had ever got to Nice in his way to Spain, he would have proceeded by the Military Way then already established through Frejus and Aix. If curiosity should lead any man over the Col de Tiniers, let him come again and try the Estrelles: then let him say which is the easiest and pleasantest march: and let him, if he can, find the meaning of "*jamais distingué.*"

Let us now see whether this despatch of Pompey, as reported by Sallust, may throw light on the track of Hannibal. Pompey claims credit for having opened to the Romans a military way through the Alps to Spain more convenient than that by which Hannibal had come from Spain into Italy. He names neither pass; but he distinguishes his own from that of Hannibal: and speaks of the latter as a thing known and recognised by those to whom he writes. Which

* The author refers also to "*l'analyse des Itinéraires*" in his 3d vol. (p. 41, I believe); but there I found no assistance.

then was the "opportuni^{us} iter" of Pompey? Enough has been said to negative the Col de Tiniera. So also it was not the coast line: Pompey could not boast of that as his own discovery; for Roman armies had used it for half a century or more. Also we may throw aside the Col d'Argentière and the Col de Viso, as Pompey has not yet been charged with making those passages. We need only advert to the Mont Genève, the Mont Cenis, the Little St. Bernard and the Great St. Bernard.

The superior convenience and facility of the Genève have satisfied many in construing the words of Pompey, both that it was his own pass, and that it was not the pass of Hannibal: for, if it had been, there was none which Pompey could, on comparison, call "opportuni^{us}" for himself. All who carry Hannibal by any one of the three more northern passes, may acquiesce in the Genève as the route of Pompey, and acknowledge it as the most convenient "in Hispaniam." Even Mr. Ellis, who sends Hannibal over the Little Mont Cenis, as "the earliest known passage," and whose etymology compels Cæsar into the same track, even he seems to tolerate the Genève as the pass of the intermediate general. He states (*Journ. of Phil.* No. 7, p. 20)—"Mr. Law says that Pompey's march to Spain was undoubtedly over the Mont Genève. "I wish I could prove this, as it is exactly the assumption that I should wish to make." I must take exception to the word "exactly." Our routes would differ exceedingly. From the Po to Césanne they have not a yard in common. Mr. Ellis would carry him through Susa: I know that Cæsar in his march quitted the Inner Province at Ocelum: and I believe that Pompey had there established a garrison post on the frontier sixteen years before. He was bound for Spain, and his way was down the Durance. No Roman way to those Alps through Susa then existed.

But, while Pompey's letter indicates that the Genève was

his own pass, does it help us to recognise any one of the other three as the pass of Hannibal? I think that it does so; and for this reason. He takes Hannibal's route as a standard of comparison, as a thing known to, and acknowledged by those whom he is addressing: and it is probable in itself, that the passage so understood between them should be the same, which at that time stood designated by one historian of established reputation, Cælius Antipater, and which soon after was so clearly pointed out by another, Cornelius Nepos. It is far less probable that the track which in this correspondence was recognised as the iter of Hannibal, should be a track which is not found mentioned or referred to in history till fully 900 years later.

The Cenis is, I believe, not to be recognised in the whole range of ancient literature. Even that curiosity of later date, the Chart of Peutinger, while it exhibits new tracks within the Alps not known to the Roman itineraries, is exempt from any discovery of the Cenis route. I have never urged the ancient ignorance of the Cenis as itself conclusive on this question of Hannibal: but it is a very important circumstance: and when the great general, who had triumphed over the Alps in his way to Spain, is bringing forward, for comparison as ascertained things, the two routes, his own and the earlier course of Hannibal, it is greatly to the purpose that we know only of two writers prior to the controversy afterwards made by Livy, who gave a name to that earlier course: and that they pointed out unmistakeably the course of the Little St. Bernard; Cælius in the term "*Cremonis jugum*," and Cornelius Nepos as the pass of the Graian Hercules. Pompey writes between the periods of these two definite commemorations: he treats the pass of Hannibal as a known thing, and negatives the more commodious pass of the Genève: may we not then believe, that he apprehended that which had been named by the standard historian who

preceded him, and was soon named again by the accomplished writer who succeeded him?

This recognition of the pass by the earlier authorities aids the belief that the controversy began with Livy. The only good sense which belongs to his criticism is available, not against the truth, but against that which had chanced to pervert the truth: like other critics, he vanquishes a phantom. The nonsense about the Penine, which he exposes, had not embarrassed the minds of Pompey or Nepos: we hear of it first in Livy's report. I may add, that, if any should not credit the despatch of Pompey, but think it to have been written, as speeches are, by the historian for his hero, the argument remains the same: Sallust was of a generation prior to Livy.

Cornelius Nepos.

This author, writing, as I have said, before the criticism of Livy, notices the Carthaginian passage in his *Life of Hannibal*. He says this:—"Ad Alpes posteaquàm venit quæ Italian " ab Galliâ sejungunt, quas nemo unquam cum exercitu ante " eum præter Herculem Graium transierat (quo facto is hodie " saltus Graius appellatur), Alpico conantes prohibere tran- " situm concidit; loca patefecit, itinera muniit, effecitque ut " cû elephantus ornatus ire posset, quâ ante unus homo " inermis vix poterat repere."

The anonymous critic of Cambridge, 1830, who has been occasionally alluded to, denies that this evidence favours the Graian Alp. He denies (pp. 25, 26), that the words represent Hannibal to have crossed the Graian Alp, or followed the steps of Hercules: his opinion is, that "is saltus" means only the pass where Hercules crossed; not the "pass of Hannibal." But he is mistaken: "is saltus" is not explained by grammatical relation: for no "saltus" or pass has been spoken of before. But, as "is saltus" must mean some pass, we seek it in the context of the previous words; and from them we find

it to mean "that over which none but Hercules had gone with an army before Hannibal." Accordingly, Hannibal was the first who crossed it with an army after Hercules: and the pass spoken of is that of Hercules and Hannibal. If the words in parenthesis were wanting, the idea that none but Hercules had ever crossed with an army before Hannibal might be applied to the entire Alps that range between Gaul and Italy: but the words "quo factu is," &c. limit the application of that idea to the one particular pass. Cornelius Nepos would never have applied the proposition to all those Alps: he could not mean to say that none but Hercules ever led an army over the Alps till 218 A.C. He was well aware of the large bodies which before Hannibal's time had crossed the Penine under Viridomarus and others: it was the Graian Alp which he considered to have been traversed before Hannibal only by the expedition of Hercules. The way was called Graian, from the Graian Hercules who first crossed it. But what way? The way of Hannibal: Hannibal's way is the subject which employs the writer.

The same critic has discovered another reason that Cornelius Nepos did not impute the same pass to Hercules and Hannibal: namely, that the wretched track of the latter, "quâ unus homo inermis vix poterat repere," could not be one which had given passage to Hercules and his army: he is confident that Hannibal would have found a good wide road if he had followed Hercules. I cannot admit this necessity. Without disparaging the merit of Hercules as an engineer, one may conceive his improvements to have become obliterated after the lapse of ten centuries.

Here, again, as in the dispatch of Pompey, it is to be observed that the author, a learned and accomplished man, the friend and biographer of Cicero, speaks of the pass of Hannibal as a thing known to his readers, without any mark of doubt.

Writers after Livy.

An author so popular and fascinating as Livy, was likely to make proselytes to his opinion. But his influence does not appear to have been so great of old as upon the savans of the 18th and 19th centuries. Indeed his successors are not seen to have made a question on Hannibal's march.

Silius Italicus is claimed as an ally by some French critics ; and they are welcome to his assistance. He was born soon after the death of Livy, and, as to the route, is to some extent a versifier of Livy, but not without poetical variety. From the Pyrenees he seems to conduct Hannibal to Lyons : for he describes the more vigorous stream embracing the gentler waters of the Arar, and carrying them along with his own. So, when we come to Asdrubal's expedition, whom Livy brings from Spain through the Arverni, the poet seems to do the same, by placing in his way the dwellers on the lazy Arar : after which this general appears to cross the Alps by following the steps of his brother, Hercules having been the precursor of both.

When the armament has crossed the Rhone, the poet contrives to fall into the track of Livy : we meet with "*Tricastinus finibus, rura Vocontia, turbidus Druentia ;*" and when Hannibal has subdued the Alps by combustion, he is brought to an encampment "*Taurinis campis.*" The noble Roman does not further mark his own view of the controversy on the route. When Hannibal has reached the summit, no locality is to be found for it, unless through the remote idea of Taurini. The poet exhibits Venus coaxing Jupiter to favour the descendants of *Æneas* : but she does not happen to mention the particular Alpine heights against which it would be expedient to hurl the divine thunderbolt for arresting the Carthaginian progress.

Pliny was a very learned man : but his belief was not diverted from the valley of Aosta to the Cottian Alp : enume-

rating places and peoples in a geographical work, he fixes the position of Aosta, giving the names of the two Alpine tracks which meet there—*Salassorum Augusta Prætoria, juxta geminas Alpium fauces, Graias atque Peninas*—and he adds the vulgar reputation of their origin, “*His Panos, Graiis Herculem transisse memorant.*” Lib. iii. 21.

Appian, who flourished about 60 years later, in his book on the wars of Hannibal (p. 315) says, that he made his way through the Alps with fire and vinegar; that he descended into the plain; and, having rested for a time, moved on to Taurasia, a Celtic town, and, taking it by storm massacred the inhabitants, and then advanced to the Po and encamped. He further informs us, *De Bell. Civit.* p. 419, that Pompey did not adopt the same track; that he ascended the Alps, not according to the great enterprise of Hannibal, but cutting through by a different way about the sources of the Rhone and the Po, rivers which rise not far from one another. Thus Appian appears impartial in the patronage which he affords to the two great historians. The conquest of the Alps by fire and vinegar is favourable to the authority of Livy: the source of the Rhone is quite opposed to it; so that Mr. Whitaker was satisfied with Appian as confirming his own preference of the Great St. Bernard.

Ammianus Marcellinus, writing towards the end of the fourth century, as we have seen already, paints strongly the horrors of the descent into Italy from the Cottian Alp: but at the same time states it to be the best and most frequented in his day. He adds that other ways were used in ancient times: the first having been constructed by Hercules near to the Maritime Alps. The author then undertakes to explain the reason why the Poenine Alp came to be so called. The explanation is this, and no more: that Scipio, finding he could not overtake Hannibal, who crossing the Rhone got three days' start of him, made a rapid voyage to Genoa, and

waited there to catch him on his descent from the Alps : that Hannibal, being too cunning for him, "Taurinis ducentibus accolis, per Tricastinos et oram Vocontiorum extremam ad saltus Tricorios venit : indeque exorsus, aliud iter antehac insuperabile fecit, excisâque rupe in immensum elatâ, quam cremando vi magnâ flammâ acetoque infuso dissolvit, per Druentiam flumen gurgitibus vastis intortum regiones occupavit Hetruscas."—So the story ends : The problem, "hac excusâ sunt Alpes excogitatæ Pœninæ," is not further elaborated : but the author, as if suddenly inspired by Livy, defeats a prodigious precipice with fire and vinegar and then rushes through the whirlpools of the Druentia into Etruria. I leave it to the followers of Mr. Whitaker, Lord Woodhouselee, and Mr. Ellis, to decide whether the whirlpools of Ammianus Marcellinus belonged to the Arve, the Dranse, or the Drac.

I have noticed the ancient memorials of the Carthaginian march of invasion, as far as I am invited to do so by the adverse efforts which have been made on the subject. Livy was the only litigant : the only writer who plainly challenged existing opinions. When he approached the subject, there had been no dispute, save a competition of the two lines which join one another at Aosta : and I have endeavoured to show that his evidence adds strength to one of them.

As to writers who came after Livy, their allusions to the matter are futile, and neutral in their futility. Some, as Pliny, inherited the impression on the northern entrances, without heeding that Livy had proposed another. Others, such as Silius and Ammianus, show by their incoherent and contradictory stories, that Livy's theory floated with others in their memories. Some say too much : some too little. Appian suits no party : and Florus, caring for no party, omits the Taurini altogether. None treat it as a matter of dissension : none argue it, reasonably or unreasonably. Nothing

shows that Livy's views on the passage of Hannibal swayed the minds of his countrymen as they have disturbed the judgments of the savans of modern times.

The earlier memorials, which could not be influenced by his conceptions, are adverse to his hypothesis : all indicate the passage which is here maintained : and he himself, though looked upon as the champion of a contrary opinion, is in truth an effective witness for verifying the same passage. As such, he closes a continuous series ; Polybius, Cælius, Pompey, Nepos, Livy. The first explainer of the track receives confirmation from all the rest : all, when we examine them, carry us to one conclusion, not excepting the adversary himself. His evidence is strong, though he felt it not : its impulse is against the intention of the writer ; who, as the advocate of an unsound proposition, has disclosed the better reasons for the worthier cause. Truth required not this corroboration : but we have it. If the march of Hannibal had found no memorial in the writings of Polybius and others, there is in the history of Livy that which should incline us to reject the opinion which he himself cherished, and to believe that the invaders were launched into the Italian plain through the valley of Aosta. His own statement, which is aimed against both the courses for entering that valley, exhibits good reason for believing that the invasion was made by one, and that it was not made by the other.

THE ALPS OF HANNIBAL.

PART XII.

CAUSE OF DOUBT. CONCLUSION.

CHAPTER I.

Doubt has come by neglect of Polybius. D'Anville failed, in ignorance of Polybius. Gibbon failed, in deference to D'Anville. Niebuhr did not fail. Melville had unveiled the Truth: and De Luc had proclaimed it adding fresh light.

ONE who has noted the phenomena of this controversy, may feel what has been said by Mr. Babbage concerning more serious inquiries—"It is a condition of our race, that we must ever wade through error in our advance towards truth." I would add that, when error has been surmounted, it is useful to account for its having existed. Prominent among the causes of failure in this long fought question, is found that disabling prejudice, the fear of difficulty. There has prevailed a sort of timid acknowledgment that it is full of difficulty and doubt: and this impression has dissuaded instead of stimulating the spirit of original search. Many a critic has known the Latin narrative of events rather than the Greek: and it has happened, that better men have adopted the doubts of their less competent predecessors. Doubt which originated in incompetence has thus become inveterate, engendering a general

persuasion that there is not intelligible evidence, and many, giving undue weight to prior opinions, have consented to blame the obscurity of truth, themselves making no effort to discern it. There has been no want of courage to embrace a theory first, and work up arguments for it afterwards, but great want of resolution for the independent purpose of sincere inquiry and interpretation.

The subject has become one, in which a theory cannot be effectively enforced without fairly combating other theories: some writers abstain from the pugnacious effort; and this is no proof of confidence in their own tenets. The cause with some is, that the spirit of just inquiry has yielded to the desire to be original: others have found it easier to invent than to explain; and some are open to the suspicion of struggling against their own conviction. Livy was an original sceptic: and was too easily satisfied on a hasty and superficial view of the subject: one excuse for him may be that he had no knowledge of Alps: an excuse which men cannot plead now. After reading Polybius he resolved to have an hypothesis of his own: he expresses neither assent nor dissent; nor inquires into that great authority on the invading march. If it were asked, why did he, in his discussion of other men's opinions, bring forward Cælius, and not bring forward Polybius, the most plausible excuse, though not the true one, would be, that Cælius had named the pass of the Alps, Polybius had not. This want of a name is an excuse better suited to the moderns, under which they are tempted to disregard the chief authority, or avoid the task of interpreting him.

In progress through the subject, I have exhibited by instances the extravagant resources which I began with imputing to the defenders of many hypotheses. But there have been grave and strong minds—minds not given to wild fancies or deformed with the desire of novelty—whose failure to hit the truth may well surprise us. It was said in the

outset, that when the views of distinguished men are adduced for gaining assent to some interpretation of the problem, their arguments only should be heeded, not their names. Profiting by this caution, we may still be perplexed to conceive how some have been deluded into error, or disabled from detecting it. The fundamental cause of mistake, whether in critics the most distinguished or the least so, has been always this, that Polybius has not been studied. By many he has not been studied at all; by some under the bias of unreasonable prepossession; by few with any fixed and steady attention. Ignorance of his history in some, and neglect of it in others, has been the primary cause of failure.

If, as has been said, the data are really insufficient for solving the question, all must fail. But it is hasty to pronounce them insufficient, till every effort has been made to comprehend and apply them; and this effort is due now, among others, that we should strive to discern the causes of failure in those who seem best qualified to have been successful—men such as D'Anville, Gibbon, and Arnold. If we can safely see the reasons why they have not established the truth before the world, it is more conceivable that success may be reserved for others. Also, by seeing where they have erred, we may more easily believe that the larger catalogue of unsatisfactory reasoners could be confounded by their own mistakes, or the blundering of their predecessors.

D'Anville failed.

It is not without regret that we miss the respected name of D'Anville from the list of partisans in all the theories for interpreting Polybius. If it is asked how such a man could fail to hit the truth, the question has a ready answer. Though deservedly esteemed in matters of ancient geography, he took no pains to explore the text of Polybius. The pretensions of the Graian Alp were unknown to him: he would have written

differently if De Luc had written before him; he partook of the common inclination to reconcile the two histories, or rather to presume on their concurrence. This has caused, in many, a careless study of that which claims the greater study, and which, without that greater study, is not to be interpreted. The narrative of Polybius is a tale of fact and description, written by an original inquirer, suspecting no controversy. The narrative of Livy is rather a tale of names, written in a later age for a theory in a declared controversy. The latter has this chance of success in the hands of an interpreter—it is easier to make description bend to names than to make names yield to description: by the first course a man deludes himself with a seeming conciliation; when he strikes out a name, he is conscious of an act of violence. The pass of Alps intended by Livy could not be mistaken by so reasonable a man as D'Anville; and if, as appears, he took for granted the coincidence of the two histories, he might think it enough to interpret that in which the pass intended was hardly open to doubt, and which, perhaps, was the more familiar to him. If he had been told that he had made no effort to interpret Polybius, he would have acknowledged the imputation, and struggled further.

D'Anville's *Carte pour l'Expédition d'Annibal*, published in 1739, (see *ante*, Part IX. c. iii.), shows an early intention simply to follow Livy. When, in 1760, he published his *Notice de l'Ancienne Gaule*, he had still the wish to illustrate Hannibal's march; and his neglect of the authority which would best have guided him, is as plainly apparent as his mistake on that which did guide him.* If we turn to the word Allobroges, we find that his account of that people, as concerned with Hannibal, is given on the scanty notice of them by Livy: the ampler account of the Allobroges by the Greek historian, who wrote one hundred and fifty years earlier,

* See *ante*, Part IX. c. iii.

is not noticed ; Polybius being only mentioned, together with Plutarch, Dion, and Appian, as spelling the word Allobroges with an "i," instead of an "o." There is the same neglect of him in the article "Allobroges" of Dr. Smith's *Dictionary*, from the pen of a well-known writer, where we read : "The "Allobroges are first mentioned in history as having joined "Hannibal (B.C. 218) in his invasion of Italy.—*Liv.* xxi. 31." The earlier historian is not alluded to. In either *Dictionary*, however, both that of 1760 and that of 1856, there is a subsequent article, "Insula Allobrogum," where the name of Polybius is introduced on the geographical character of the Island. It is curious that, in Dr. Arnold's account of Hannibal's progress, neither the Allobroges nor the Island are ever mentioned at all.

D'Anville assumed that Livy represented Polybius, and therefore read the earlier narrative with little attention. He says, in *v. Tricorii*, that the two historians give the reason for Hannibal, on crossing the Rhone, deviating to the Isère ; but Livy alone speaks to that effect. I am not aware of D'Anville's bringing any statement of Polybius into discussion on the effect or bearing of it. Once, when he seeks to give probability to Livy's march, "depuis l'Isère jusqu'aux Alpes," also in *v. Tricorii*, he adduces the 800 stadia of Polybius. A most unhappy illustration ! To serve Livy, he invents his worst error ; besides which, the thing was not applicable : the 800 of Polybius was 800 along a river ; and D'Anville thought to corroborate a measurement which was quite across country. I believe that D'Anville never discusses the meaning of Polybius, or the application of his words ; nor alludes to the possibility of his having intended a route differing from that which he is imputing to Livy. He does not seem to apprehend that any one would suppose the two to disagree ; and shows, in a few words, the summary and infirm process by which he allied himself to Livy :—"Comme Annibal des-

"cendant en Italie, rencontra d'abord les Taurini, cette circonstance détermine en effet le passage d'Annibal par cet endroit des Alpes." It is clear that the French geographer never sifted the Greek history, nor adverted to the necessity of doing so. Accordingly, there was nothing which could bring him to the result of renouncing the French Alps of Livy, or to a suspicion that his Tricastini, Vocontii, Tricorii, and Druentia were fallacious. While these stood unsuspected in the line, his pass was necessarily the Mont Genève.

I have spoken only of the error for which D'Anville is accountable in the neglect of Polybius, not of the blunder in his conception of Livy. That misfortune might have happened to any man in 1739, when he published the map which tells of his construction of Livy's track. (See *ante*, Part IX. c. iii.) Most men were then unacquainted with Mont Pelvoux, and liable to be misled by an apparent authority framed 1,300 years before. D'Anville is not for that less entitled to our respect. But it was his own fault that he was uninstructed by Polybius. Yet, under the circumstances, he might have done worse. Two candidates, at the most, to represent the pass, were likely to arise in his mind, as a disciple of Livy. He voted for the Genève: he might have done worse, voted for the Cenis.

Gibbon failed.

One should have expected that the opinion of a man having the powers and the advantages of Gibbon for a subject like the present, would be a safe opinion: and we have a good lesson on the imperfection of critical inquiries, when we see the result of the "reading and careful reflection upon the subject," which he states himself to have bestowed.* He began well, for he cleared the common stumbling-block, the determination to reconcile the histories:

* *Miscellaneous Works*, vol. v. p. 370.

and he promptly apprehended two strong points of Polybius, of which so many critics are insensible ; the continuance of the march up the Rhone, and the emerging from the Alps into the Insubres. This amount of observation might have led to more, and have encouraged him to probe the whole text. But he did not persevere : he heeded not the plain country to the first Alps, nor the Allobroges defending them, nor the measurement of the march which led to them. He hurried up the Rhone to Martigny, blind to the other prescriptions of the historian.

His faculties of inquiry seem to have been paralysed by a most unreasonable impression with which he embarked in it, and from which he never escaped. He entertained the subject as a matter of competition between the Great St. Bernard and the Mont Genève, as if he had only to arbitrate between their respective advocates. He declares the former to be the pass of Polybius, as promptly as he declares the latter to be the pass of Livy ; and the chief thing which he agitates is the question of credit between the two authorities. On this point he writes with spirit and interest, pronouncing a laboured eulogium of Polybius, as the historian of higher truth. But he ends the matter miserably. He is dissatisfied, as might be expected, with the two Alpine passes which he has admitted to the competition ; he does not suspect the possibility of a third candidate, and at last, in despair, generously surrenders his right of thinking to the name of D'Anville, and for the very strange reason that that writer had not disclosed the grounds of his opinion. He says : " In " M. D'Anville's map of Hannibal's expedition, that accurate " geographer, whose positions are always chosen on reflection, " makes the Carthaginians pass by the Cottian Alps. I am " stopped and silenced by the authority of this learned man, " which in this case is the greater, because he conceals the " reasons on which his opinion is founded." Thus does one

man desist from a comparison of two historians in deference to another man, who had never thought it necessary to compare them at all.

It is evident that Gibbon, being under the impression that the question was wholly between the Great St. Bernard and the Genève, and seeing which of the two was related by Livy, looked into Polybius only so far as to be assured that he differed from Livy. He neglected to investigate the story of Polybius as a subject of itself. If he had read the narrative with fair attention, not caring for the opinions of others, he could not have mistaken it. After all, it is strange that his attention was not compelled to the evidence; for he cites the 1,200 stadia as the "breadth of Alps," and yet the 1,400 which in the enumeration of Polybius immediately precedes the 1,200, is unobserved. It is said erroneously, in the Preface to the *Oxford Dissertation*, that Gibbon was ignorant of the passage alluded to by Polybius, *i.e.* of the Little St. Bernard. He may, indeed, have forgotten it for a moment when he was writing these words (v. 380):—"Hannibal at the confluence of the Rhone and Saône followed the shortest route into Italy, when he crossed the St. Bernard."* But this was carelessness, not ignorance. He deprives himself of all excuse when (p. 378) he thus retails the ideas of Strabo. "In the reign of Augustus, when Roman policy had levelled the Alps, that prince made two military ways, which, diverging from Augusta Prætoria, again united at Lyons. One of those roads, which crossed the Pennine Alps, was still so difficult that it could not be passed by carriages." He who wrote this might have paused to ask himself whether the other of those two ways, which he well knew as a course of Roman armies, might not be the line of Hannibal intended by Polybius.

* He has already said, "Livy carries Hannibal over the Cottian Alps, properly Mont Genève; Polybius leads him by the Summus Penninus, or Great St. Bernard."

I say then of Gibbon, that he failed in his study of Polybius. He began inquiry under a false prepossession; that is to say, with a contracted notion of the scope of it. But he was dealing with evidence, and had the fairest prospect of encountering the truth, which was in a line which lay between his line and D'Anville's. They were both wrong, and he saw it; but instead of prosecuting the search for truth by renouncing both errors, he says a civil thing to D'Anville and gives the matter up. What was this but the fear of difficulty? The result of a little perseverance would have been that the world would owe the development of truth to Mr. Gibbon instead of General Melville.

If any one had happened to address Mr. Gibbon, "What say you to the Graian Alp?" he would have opened his eyes, quickened his attention, and determined the question. He wrote his comment in 1763: in a later day he would at least have said one thing which is said by his friend and editor, Lord Sheffield: "Perhaps the subject is best understood by the late General Melville." The noble editor is alluding, in a note, to Mr. Whitaker's treatise of 1794, and he speaks with kind commendation of the criticism which followed it by Mr. Tytler, Lord Woodhouselee, a Lord of Session. That short work is but an indiscreet eulogium of the vagaries of Mr. Whitaker. But the compliment to the pamphlet is duly superseded by the words that follow, "Perhaps the subject was best understood by the late General Melville." See Gibbon's *Miscellaneous Works*, v. 381.

Niebuhr did not fail.

Niebuhr was not spared to embrace in his great work the career of Hannibal, and to pourtray in all its dimensions the genius of that wonderful man: accordingly, he was not brought to deal deliberately with the invading march. His history, however, though not reaching that period, is not

without allusion to the subject, and it may be seen that the Polybian narrative of the track through the Alps is accepted with its obvious interpretation.

Speaking of the invasion of the Gauls, he says :—"It may be regarded as clearly certain that the Gauls came down into Italy through the valley of Aosta. It would be idle to inquire whether, like Hannibal, they crossed the Little, or like Buonaparte, the Great St. Bernard, and whether their march followed the Isère, or the northern shore of the lake of Geneva." Translation by Hare and Thirlwall, ii. 535.

In his last lectures on Roman history, given in the winter of 1828-9, and published by Dr. Leonhard Schmitz in 1844, Niebuhr shortly alludes to the controversy, and in very plain terms. He gives to General Melville the credit of having shown the truth to the world: he speaks, indeed, as if the General had himself published the result of his investigations. These are his words—"After the researches of General Melville, there can be no longer any doubt as to the road which Hannibal took: and, if any one who has a practical mind compares with the researches of General Melville the account which Polybius gives, he must see that no other road is possible." Vol. i. p. 170. The name of De Luc might with justice have been added to that of General Melville.

CHAPTER II.

Arnold recognised the Truth: and might have extinguished Doubt. But not giving to Polybius the credit of showing him the Truth, he blamed him where he should have commended him. Conclusion.

IN investigating the narrative of Polybius, I have sometimes adverted to comments of Dr. Arnold, according to my view of

their merits. Though some have required to be canvassed, he plainly leaned to our hypothesis. But there is from time to time one general persevering criticism, more likely than any comments on the narrative, to influence the judgment of others; his censure of the authority on which the question rests. Those who may be inclined to treat the question as depending on the authority of Polybius, are taught by that censure to distrust the value of his evidence.

The distinguished writer of whom I speak, whose death is still a fresh grief to literature and to society, and whose memory every good man must cherish, was one of rare power and attainments. His mind was characterised by zeal for all that was right and tending to the happiness of his fellow-creatures. His days were devoted to vigorous and various research. As a traveller with keen faculties of observation, as one who must have worked laboriously * on the career of Hannibal before he grasped the history of Rome, and to whom the line of the great invasion continued to be a subject of strong interest and repeated study, he must be deemed amply conversant with the question in which I am engaged. For these reasons I cannot disregard his declared sentiments: and not disregarding, I must either resist or embrace them.

One who recognises the superior ability of Dr. Arnold for scrutinising the style and merits of a Greek author, may nevertheless be excused for objecting to the particular crimination here spoken of: for it arises out of, and is specially applied to the history of the march through the Alps. The charges brought against Polybius are illustrated expressly from this subject: and, if the attacks are just and fair, they damage the authority, on whose strength I rely throughout. I will examine them with the freedom that would have been approved by him whose views provoke the comment.

In the third volume of the *History of Rome*, remarks on

* See *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*.

the geographical incompetency of Polybius, and the consequent inaccuracy and obscurity of his writings, appear in many places. The most injurious matter, which I will presently exhibit, is in the text. Much that is curious and interesting is found in the notes: the following is an elaborate instance. Note L. to ch. xliii. "The question, in what direction this famous march was taken, has been agitated for more than eighteen hundred years: and who can undertake to decide it? The difficulty to modern inquirers has arisen chiefly from the total absence of geographical talent in Polybius. That this historian indeed should ever have gained the reputation of a good geographer, only proves how few there are who have any notion what a geographical instinct is. Polybius indeed laboured with praiseworthy diligence to become a geographer; but he laboured against nature; and the unpoetical character of his mind has in his writings actually lessened the accuracy, as it has totally destroyed the beauty of history. To any man who comprehended the whole character of a mountain country, and the nature of its passes, nothing would have been easier than to have conveyed at once a clear idea of Hannibal's route, by naming the valley by which he had ascended to the main chain, and afterwards that which he followed in descending from it. Or, admitting that the names of barbarian rivers would have conveyed little information to Greek readers, still the several Alpine valleys have each their peculiar character, and an observer with the least power of description would have given such lively touches of the varying scenery of the march, that future travellers must at once have recognised his description. Whereas the account of Polybius is at once so unscientific and so deficient in truth and liveliness of painting, that persons who have gone over the several Alpine passes for the very purpose of identifying his descriptions, can still reasonably doubt whether they

"were meant to apply to Mont·Genèvre, or Mont Cenis, or "the Little St. Bernard." Again, in note F, he says: "His "descriptions are so vague and imperfect, and so totally "devoid of painting, that it is scarcely possible to understand "them."

Thus does the Alpine traveller of the nineteenth century, charge him of 160 B.C. with neglecting his facilities. He may be defended by denying the facilities. Neither Polybius, nor any man of his day or of ages which succeeded him, had the means "to comprehend the whole character of a mountain country and the nature of its passes." No civilized community possessed the necessary facts, or knowledge, or experience. I conceive that Polybius was fully on a par in geographical instinct with Larauza, Arnold, and Ellis: and that, if he had possessed their advantages, and seen what they have seen, he would have conveyed by names and otherwise, as clear an idea of the several passes, as they could do. He has plainly told them the valley by which Hannibal gained his first Alps; and is hardly listened to. He has not named that by which he ascended to the main chain: and possibly he hardly knew that in that valley the invaders regained the river over which they crossed into the Island a fortnight before. Geography from authors he had none: maps there were none: and the identity may not have been conveyed to his mind through the varying dialects of successive Alpine tribes: the name, as articulated at Conflans or St. Maurice, may have been neither *Scoras* nor *Isaras*, nor anything which would have given light to his narrative, had he attempted to pourtray it in Greek characters. I may at least reply to such objection—"As you do not understand his valley of the "Rhône, say not that he would have made you understand "the valley of *Scez*."

Dr. Arnold, always conceiving that the course through the Alps should have been characterised by a lively pourtraying of

its varied scenery, wrote in 1835: "I have been and am "working at Hannibal's passage of the Alps: how bad a "geographer is Polybius!—The dulness of his fancy made it "impossible for him to conceive or paint scenery clearly: "and how can a man be a geographer without lively images "of the formation and features of the country which he "scribes? How different are the several Alpine valleys: "and how would a few simple touches of the scenery which "he seems actually to have visited, yet could neither understand nor feel it, have decided for ever the question of the "route! Now the account suits no valley well, and therefore "it may be applied to many." While I doubt that such touches of scenery would have decided the question, I consider that the plain leading facts of the narrative do decide the question. They pronounce the path of Hannibal by landmarks which are ample for our guidance, though so many are unsuccessful in the recognition of them. The clouds which have so long obscured this subject were not produced by the defective painting of Polybius. It is the false light streaming from the more familiar tale of the Roman historian which has diverted many from observation of the better guide: and, if that guide has not led to knowledge, it is because they who most wanted it have so feebly sought and accepted his instruction.

The landmarks of Polybius are these—The arrival at the Island. The operations in it. The clear description of that country. The further ascent of the Rhone to the Alps. That this march was over ground practicable to cavalry. That it traversed the country of the Allobroges. That the first Alps were forced against leaders of that people. The precipitous descent on the other side of the barrier. The quiet of the succeeding march. The productiveness of the district, apparent from the supplies obtained after the first conflict, and again on the sixth day of Alps. The white rock at the scene

of action on the eve of the summit. The broken way, and the last year's snow on the first day of descent. The pasture valley below. The arrival in the plain among the Insubres. These things, with the arrangement of the whole track of the march into intelligible sections, and the assigning to each of them its proper measurement and period of time, these are the landmarks of Polybius: more or less strong, when taken separately; conclusive, when combined.

An inquirer into the Polybian history ought at least to apprehend these leading features of the tale, before he complains of the absence of instruction. When it is asked how for so many miles we read no names, the historian himself has provided the answer: * and it is philosophical and just. When something more lively, more pictorial, more poetical, is required, we feel that it is not reasonable to exact, that Polybius should have painted the features of Hannibal's Alps in the spirit of contrast with those of other Alps. He did not go to solve a disputed point of history: dispute had not begun. He found the track, and he pursued it. We know not that he ever explored any other Alpine pass. He alone of his rank and station encountered the perils of this.

The illustrious of Rome in his day had little, if any personal intercourse with the Alps. The Greek hostage threw himself into those mountains in search of truth, and has recorded it in sufficiently clear characters. It was not presented to his mind, that he should guard it against misapprehension, by cumulating characteristic notices in the chance of distinguishing this pass from others of which he had no experience. He could not foresee the singular fatality by which truth has been resisted, nor the inventions which have led to feuds among his interpreters. He affected only the historian. His employment was on facts, not the embellishment of facts: and the indicia which he has given us are better than

* Polybius, iii. 36.

painting or poetry. But even here his defects may be exaggerated. He could paint, and with a strong hand. When man or nature gives obstruction to the march, that strength appears. When all is easy and unimpeded, he bestows a lighter touch. His subject was history, not landscape: Hannibal, not the Alps. Is there the imputed dulness? Many a page of more popular history may be read, without finding a truer or livelier picture than that which Polybius has given of the passage of the Rhone by the Carthaginian armament. The account of the assault on the unwinding column, as they surmounted their first Alps, and trod the margin of the precipice, is strikingly clear and forcible. The descriptive power of Polybius, not enough for some, is too great for others. The *δρη δυσπρόσοδα καὶ δυσέμβολα, καὶ σχεδὸν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἀπρόσιτα*, represent effectively the outworks of the great natural bulwark which seemed to defy the progress of the invaders. If truth fails here, not weakness nor dulness is the cause: for grave authorities have, on this force of description, been seduced to say, that through such mountains no way could be for Hannibal. Dr. Ukert, arguing to that effect, is called sagacious by Dr. Thirlwall.*

I repeat that none are entitled to impute their difficulties on the track to the dulness of the author, so long as they are blind to the main facts through which he has exhibited it. Dr. Arnold had not that blindness. His error is peculiar to himself. He saw the truth, and was qualified to grasp it; and did grasp it. My complaint is, that he did not do justice to the great authority from which he learned it. The struggle made by the multitude for a march up the Isère, is made only in the pretence of following Polybius. Livy did not misapprehend his predecessor. He did not insist that Hannibal, on reaching the Island, proceeded to the Alps by keeping the valley of any river. He disregarded the track of Polybius,

* Philol. Museum, ii. 681.

and preferred an hypothesis of his own. No modern commentator, French, German, or English, has the courage to do this. None say that they disown Polybius. All say that he must be right. Let them then accept his evidence. Let them see that his course is up the Rhone to the Alps; being of necessity irreconcilable with ever reaching the Genève. Let them see that his descent from the Alps into the Cisalpine Gauls places him in incurable contradiction of any pass which they can call Cottian: and that his distances negative irremediably an approach to Italy from the Penine.

When broad instructions are openly misconstrued, truth is challenged and error can be met. It is more injurious that they should be passed by, with saying that the author fails to throw light upon the subject. I will advert here to a most important point in the disputed track, and one on which Dr. Arnold has shown more courtesy to critics than justice to the historian; the continuance of the march up the Rhone. While Polybius is blamed for the evidence which he is said not to give, there is hardly an acknowledgment of the evidence which he does give. Instead of thanks for his instruction, he receives censure for the want of it. It will perhaps be said that, as Dr. Arnold believed in the march up the Rhone, to the Mont du Chat, he had no occasion to enlarge his pages by giving the data which commanded his assent. But unfortunately the comment that he does find room for is a reprehension of Polybius touching the very points on which that march depends. There is not, I believe, in ancient writings, a hint which would guide Dr. Arnold up the Rhone to the Mont du Chat, save in the plain words with which Polybius has made the facts known. And it is to be lamented here, that the censure is rashly and hastily applied.

Dr. Arnold's narrative of Hannibal's arrival on the Isère, and advance towards the Alps, is in these words:—"In four days they reached the spot where the Isère, coming down

“ from the main Alps, brings to the Rhone a stream hardly
“ less full or mighty than his own. In the plains above the
“ confluence, two Gaulish brothers were contending which
“ should be chief of their tribe : and the elder called on the
“ stranger general to support his cause. Hannibal readily
“ complied, established him firmly on the throne, and re-
“ ceived important aid from him in return. He supplied the
“ Carthaginian army plentifully with provisions ; furnished
“ them with new arms ; gave them new clothing, especially
“ shoes, which were found very useful in the subsequent
“ march ; and accompanied them to the first entrance on the
“ mountain country, to secure them from attacks on the part
“ of his countrymen.”

Such is the historical statement as imputed to Polybius by the pen of Dr. Arnold, who immediately adds this criticism, accounting for the doubtful information which it contains :—
“ The attentive reader, who is acquainted with the geography
“ of the Alps and their neighbourhood, will perceive that this
“ account of Hannibal’s march is vague. It does not appear
“ whether the Carthaginians ascended the left bank of the
“ Isère, or the right bank, or whether they continued to ascend
“ the Rhone for a time, and leaving it only so far as to avoid
“ the great angle which it makes at Lyons, rejoined it just
“ before they entered the mountain country, a little to the
“ left of the present road from Lyons to Chamberi. These
“ uncertainties cannot now be removed, because Polybius
“ neither possessed sufficient knowledge of the country, nor
“ sufficient liveliness as a painter, to describe the march so
“ as to be clearly recognised.” Having thus fixed the blame
on the historian, he expresses his own opinion on the line of
march, according to the line which Polybius has pointed out.

Though the uncertainties which the incapacity of Polybius has bequeathed to us are pronounced irremovable, they are made to vanish before the opinion of Dr. Arnold. In truth

they only appear to us by the way in which Dr. Arnold has told the story. The account which he impeaches as vague, is his own. It affirms nothing upon a river with a name, or without a name, and raises no question. In the statement of Polybius himself, Hannibal marches *παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν*, and I greatly doubt that any man ever rose from a first perusal of the history itself, with the impression that the author by *τὸν ποταμόν* meant anything but the Rhone. Polybius teaches plainly enough for any one, that Hannibal marched up the Rhone till he found the Alps: he teaches, moreover, that the march was through the Allobroges, menaced by that people, and ultimately resisted by them. If Polybius had been the liveliest of painters he could hardly have identified the river more intelligibly. "The river" by ordinary reference is the Rhone, and no one need stray from that construction to assume that the local guides would take the army away from the Alps into angles only to bring them back again and increase the length of march. If Dr. Arnold saw doubt in the *ποταμόν* of c. 50, he might have said so: if he was not satisfied with Polybius's statement of the march, *ἀπὸ τῆς διαβάσεως τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν ποταμόν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς πηγὰς ἕως πρὸς τὴν ἀναβολὴν τῶν Ἰαλπεων* in c. 39, he might have said so. But is it credible that, with those words before him, Dr. Arnold could admit either shore of the Isère to be a competing line of march within the words of Polybius? The authority of Dr. Arnold condemning the vagueness and uncertainty, more than anything that has been written, is calculated to engender a suspicion that the text of Polybius is ambiguous. The danger of this, is my best excuse for having dwelt so deliberately on the text and context of the historian touching the progress to the first Alps; protesting against the many who shirk that evidence, and the few who have ventured their feeble argument in favour of the Isère—(Part IV. ch. iii.) A careful exhibition of the facts and the

context was indeed called for by the scepticism of less potent writers. But it was still more due after the defective report and the ready reproaches of one so looked up to as Dr. Arnold. Viewing, as I do, the clearness and cogency of that evidence already pointed out by De Luc, I am at a loss to understand, that Dr. Arnold can have so read the story, as to find the pretensions of the rivers and of his three suggested tracks doubtfully balanced; and that, while he himself gives preponderance to a march up the Rhone, he could lament that the uncertainties cannot be removed, and could denounce Polybius as the cause of them. The plain words of Polybius, and nothing else, taught Dr. Arnold that Hannibal went up the Rhone to find the Alps: and it is unfortunate, that the author of a work so universally read, did not employ a few words for aiding the judgment of his readers with that which had compelled his own. Instead of giving Polybius credit for the instruction, and using a few words to vindicate his meaning, he reprehends him as the cause of the uncertainty through his incompetence to apprehend and to relate.

Polybius is innocent of the uncertainty. Misconstruction has long been favoured, and confusion nursed by those who would distort him into an accordance with Livy. But such confusion might have been cleared away by one who was himself proof against it. That idle longing to reconcile irreconcilables has been to others the spring of the mischief. If Polybius had been the only witness, a famed Helléniste of the *Collège de France*, Letronne, would no more have thought to construe *ποταμόν* the Isère than he would have thought to construe it the Seine. Larauza, Ukert, Ellis, and the rest, would have been spared their curious efforts in the same deceptive cause. And, if the favourite and popular blunder, the doubtfulness of the river, had not been so engrafted into the controversy when Dr. Arnold came to deal with it, he would never have told his reader that the river of the march

does not appear; and that the uncertainty cannot be removed: he would not, when suggesting the truth for himself, have condemned the very source that gave it him, and found excuse for doubts which were unworthy and unable to shake his own judgment. I have come to the conclusion, that no reader of Polybius is to be excused for not understanding that Hannibal found the Alps by marching up the Rhone to the Alps. Dr. Arnold did understand it: such a man could not help understanding it. But he missed the opportunity of doing a just thing, and of vindicating the historian, rather than the host of authors who had perverted the meaning of his words. Toleration of doubt by him has been more injurious than argument from others.

The incompetence of the historian is proclaimed, as having caused reasonable doubts of modern inquirers. I deny that the doubts are reasonable, and assign a different cause for their existence. Livy reasoned feebly: he avowed his belief in a line of march, and seemed to have the belief: and critics have shrunk from rejecting it. While none dare avow that they reject Polybius, this has sustained a state of doubt. The perplexity has been increased by the efforts to escape from it. Volumes, that have been written with inventions for solving it, have been but a waste of words to establish an impossible conciliation. Many constructions of Livy had not their origin in doubt of the pass which he favoured, but in the struggle to reconcile him with Polybius. Both are mutilated, that they may be one. Men would never have been provoked to misconstrue the pass, if there had been but one history to construe. If Polybius were the only writer, the Rhone would be the accepted criterion of the march to the Alps. If Livy were the only writer, the accepted criterion would be the Durance. All theories, except the Graian, are infected with the spirit of conciliation. This alone could have produced the laboured theories of the Mont

Cenis. Conciliation dislocates rivers, and builds upon their banks with etymology. An exchange of names is made between the Rhone and the Isère. Strange casualties awaited the Druentia: it was not enough that in the last century two of our countrymen discharged that river into the Rhone, one at Geneva, and one at Martigny. The bold Cenisians, coming thirty and sixty years later, empty him into the Isère instead of the Rhone.

Such are specimens of the rise and progress of doubt. Charge them not to the dulness of Polybius: but to the vain spirit of conciliation. Cease to make Polybius responsible for the doubts of "those who have gone over the several Alpine passes for the very purpose of identifying his descriptions." Dr. Arnold himself really travelled in that purpose: and, though he did not declare all doubt dispelled, he hardly resisted the full result that we desire. Others have contemplated the Alps, not for the purpose of identifying the descriptions of Polybius, but for the purpose of reconciling them with the descriptions of another writer. This has been, and, according to their own express resolves, this ought to be, the definitive aim of their exertions—"Concilier Polybe et Tite-Live, voilà le problème; le but définitive de nos efforts."

Dr. Arnold travelled with a mind free from that disturbance: he was not a man to be awed by the numbers, weight, or pertinacity of the heroes of this controversy; but he laboured under a strong distaste of the author. Depreciation of Polybius had become habitual to him: the doubt between the right of Isère, the left of Isère, and the Rhone, is pronounced irremovable: the description of the march by this historian is said to be so obscure as to defy recognition: vagueness and want of painting are said to make it unintelligible. Dr. Arnold made repeated efforts to understand this matter of history: we read of his labours and his scruples in 1825, and 1830, and 1835: and in 1841 he declares, that his

sense of Polybius's merit as an historian is becoming continually less and less. This feeling did not favour the success of a search into the author for instruction : and the result has been, that justice is not done to him, and that false critics are spared at his expense. Had Dr. Arnold sifted more severely the wayward interpretations of those for whose errors he finds excuse, and tried them by the words of the unpalatable history, he might not have added his weight to denounce the obscurity of a plain straightforward tale.

It is the great Roman historian, who has led the world astray by his conception of the Carthaginian invasion. His fame is riveted by the eulogies of one who owns his faults, the illustrious Niebuhr. Let those eulogies adorn the name of Livy. But let the interests of literature and historical truth prompt us to sustain also the fame and character of Polybius. Homage that is paid to the memory of Livy, the same lament over the spoils of time is due, though for other virtues, to the historian of Megalopolis.

Conclusion.

Of the comprehensive histories of Polybius, five books only have survived entire. Others are partially saved. Their value is inestimable. Through the few years to which these relics belong, we cling to them as to a great and safe authority. We find in their author not only a narrator of facts, and an expounder of geography, but an accomplished soldier, statesman and philosopher. He taught his countrymen and the world to found the success of human enterprise on the provisions of skill and industry, noting the moral causes of events, without imagining at every step the miraculous interposition of a patronising deity. Such precepts tended to improve mankind by inducing them to rely for success on their own merits and exertions. They have been censured by critics of different periods as the offspring of

an irreligious mind. Do they not betoken rather a mind breaking from the gloom of the religion which surrounded it, and struggling to discern a light beyond !

I venture upon this tribute to the merits of Polybius, notwithstanding the following criticism :—“ Polybius, by temper “ and by circumstances a rationalist, is at great pains to assure “ his readers that Scipio owed no part of his greatness to the “ Gods, and that his true oracle was the clear judgment of his “ own mind. According to him Scipio did but impose upon “ and laugh at the credulity of the vulgar, speaking of the “ favour shown him by the Gods, while he knew the Gods to “ be nothing.” Dr. Arnold conceives that Scipio is misrepresented ; he vindicates the hero, impeaching the historian.

I venture to doubt that Polybius imputed such sentiments to Scipio, or that he entertained them himself. Such animadversions are not made now for the first time. Casaubon found occasion to refute the errors of those “ qui malè de “ Diis et Divinâ Providentiâ Polybium sensisse ausi sunt “ scribere.”* The Roman people indulged the notion that Scipio was a favourite with the Gods, that he held converse with them, and that his schemes prospered under their special interposition. It appears that that great commander countenanced a superstitious feeling beyond what his own mind accepted ; that he encouraged his soldiers to believe that there was a divine inspiration in his enterprises, and that the Gods were on their side, knowing that this persuasion would raise the spirits of other men nearer to a level with his own, and work them to a state of resolution for mighty deeds—*πρὸς τὰ θεῖα τῶν ἔργων*. The historian gives Scipio the credit due to his actions, of wisdom in his designs, and vigour in the prosecution of them, and upon this is based

* See his dedication to Henry the Fourth of France, given by Schweighæuser, as *Præfatio Casauboni*.

the imputation that the power of the Deity was held of no account, and the superstition of the Romans treated as an object of ridicule.

It is to the honour of Polybius, that he did not keep pace with the superstitions of the age, nor suppose the noble Roman whose achievements he recorded to have ascribed all happy results to dreams and omens and the caprice of the Gods. He gave its due rank to the genius of that illustrious man, while feebler observers, incapable to appreciate his sagacity, and blind to the connexion of moral causes and effects, imputed each successful effort to chance or to the special interference of the Gods.* It is unjust to charge Polybius with a scorn of the Deity, because he censured those writers, or because he extolled the greatness of Scipio. Difficult as it is to dissect the thoughts of men, and tell where religion ends and superstition begins, there is no reason to doubt that both the hero and his eulogist were men of reverential minds.

One might suppose from the terms of condemnation, that Polybius was the patron of a system in which there was no God, and man was everything. But in truth the ground he takes is on the defensive against those who deemed the virtues and abilities of man to be nothing, and who referred each success of human labour to the caprice of a God or the agency of chance. If we could study the whole of such a controversy, we might find the religious principle beaming with a purer light from Polybius than from his opponents.

There is good sense, and no impiety, when he rebukes other writers for introducing divine agents where they are not wanted : and, when this reasonable censure is deemed a contempt of the Gods, it is like denouncing a man as an infidel because he does not believe in ghost stories. Polybius insists that the wisdom and energy of a man produces fruits, though

* Polyb. x.

not backed by preternatural means ; and he dissents from those who ascribe each prosperous result to dreams, omens, Gods, and fortune. He was intolerant of the story that some divinity appeared in person to escort Hannibal over the precipices ; and, if he had heard of the celestial vision on which that hero was enjoined to fix his eyes, with the gigantic serpent and the destroying tempest in the rear,* he would have remarked that the great invader made his way through Spain and France without those auxiliaries. He did not credit the special interference of Neptune to accomplish the assault of Carthage, though he tells how Scipio encouraged his soldiers to the belief of it. The sentiments of Polybius were not only not hostile to religion, but they accorded with the sounder notions on the divine government of the world. In denying false agencies and vindicating the energies of man, he best asserts the power of God.

The distinguished writer and editor of the *Dictionary of Biography*, as if adopting the censure to which I object, pronounces Polybius to be "a decided rationalist;" but he adds this: "Although he regards Fortune (Τύχη) as the Goddess "who regulated the affairs of men, whose hand may always be "traced in the history of nations, and to whom the Romans, "therefore, owe their dominion (comp. *e.g.* i. 4, 58, 86, ii. 35, "70, iv. 2, viii. 4), still he repeatedly calls the reader's attention to the means by which Fortune enabled this people to "rise to their extraordinary position. These he traces first of "all in their admirable political constitution (vi. 1), and in "the steadfastness, perseverance, and unity of purpose, which "were the natural results of such a constitution."

One who so speaks of the Τύχη of Polybius, might have omitted the designation of rationalist. The term Τύχη, representing Chance or Fortune, is in frequent use with Polybius, as with others. It is familiarly used by some for

* Livy, xxi. 22.

good luck : and why not ? Polybius personifies her ; so do we. If he deifies her, which I am not aware of, so do we. The gravest modern writer can speak of the smiles and the frowns of the fickle goddess, but his conscience bears no allegiance to such divine personage, neither did the conscience of Polybius. There is no sentence of his in which the word appears, that might not be written by a Christian. When, in opposition to certain writers, he denies the agency of *Τύχη*, he intends Chance. But when, in discussing the mutability of human affairs, he reprehends those who complain of *Τύχη*, he has regard to the dispensations of Providence. The words just quoted from Dr. Smith express a power “ which regulates the affairs of men, and whose hand may be traced in the history of nations.” What is this but the Providence of God ?

While Polybius with sound discernment traces effects to their moral causes, he does not pretend to explain all results by his own efforts of reasoning. He applies the ideas of bad and good fortune as we do, when events seem not the fair and probable consequences of things precedent : as when one, who has ably done all within his reach, is defeated by overpowering circumstances. This is not peculiar to him, nor wrong in any one. We do not offend the religious sentiment, when we call the man unfortunate, who with honest efforts fails of success : nor is Polybius to be blamed for saying, that fortune prevailed against Hannibal, who had done *πάντα τὰ δυνατὰ πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν*.

He denies the agency of Chance, when, in praise of the energy and perseverance of the Romans (i. 63. 9), he states them to have attained the ends they aimed at, *οὐ τύχη, καθάπερ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐδ' αὐτομάτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν εἰκότως*. This very repudiation of Chance might be thought to involve him in irreligion by those who deemed all praise of man to be a slight of the Gods. Insisting on human

sagacity and labour as bearing their fruits, he condemns those who gave to Chance the merit of success and the blame of failure, and says (ii. 38. 5), "Charge it not to Chance, but look for a cause." Still we find him inclined to show that the course of events is just, and cautioning his readers against the hasty assumption that it is unjust. Speaking (xv. 20. 5) of the conspiracy of the two kings against the infant sovereign of Egypt, and their spoliation of his possessions, he says that there had indeed been excuse to complain of *Τύχη*: but he calls attention to the retribution which followed, *τοῖς ἐπυγενομένοις κάλλιστον ὑπόδειγμα πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν*. Here Providence is the object of vindication.

If there is reason in these remarks, the comment which has invited them cannot be just. The severity of it is pointedly clear: that the rationalist Polybius laboured to show that Scipio owed no part of his greatness to the Gods, while he laughed at the vulgar credulity and knew the Gods to be nothing. I believe that, in all the works of Polybius, no such nor similar sentiments are to be found. In these our times rationalist is a well known term of reproach: it embraces that with which Polybius could not be chargeable, a rejection of divine truth; a distrust of the word of God, in resting on the standard of human reason. This with us is irreligion: for it shows the paramount duty of obedience; and we are commanded to believe though we cannot comprehend. Where was the revealed word, which claimed this duty of Polybius? Was it in the favoured communications that were rumoured as vouchsafed to Scipio, or in the familiar interventions with human society which the ancients imputed to their Gods? What breach of duty constituted the rationalism charged against Polybius? To repudiate all divine interposition in the affairs of mankind was in any age impious. But an ancient philosopher is not to be stigmatised for withholding his assent from notions which his reason could not accept;

for disbelieving miracles which he had not witnessed, or striving to account for them by natural causes. Before we join in the reproach, we should at least know the character of the things which he questioned: if, for instance, he discredited a knowledge gained through the flight of birds or the entrails of beasts, was the scepticism vicious or praiseworthy?

See now the rationalism of Polybius: he challenged the absurdity of writers, who asserted a statue of Diana, standing open to the heavens, to be privileged against rain and snow:* he impeached the authors, who declared that the forms of those who entered a certain temple would throw no shadow from the light:† he exposed the ignorance of a commander, who, being blockaded by a superior force and having contrived a plan of escape, was deterred from the execution of it by an eclipse of the moon.‡ He was indeed the assertor of human reason: like Strabo, he found in the glorious work of Homer a depth of knowledge not heeded in the poorer praise of some who went before him.§ Polybius denied the splendid course of Scipio to be the mere result of the patronage of Gods, and applauded the judgment, wisdom, and energy that worked the welfare of his country. They too, who in the poverty of their reasonings had celebrated the Carthaginian hero as achieving the impossible Alps under the present guidance of a God, are rebuked with the assurance that this extraordinary man had ascertained and estimated all difficulties, and foreplanned the efforts to surmount them.

These instances of right reason will perhaps be conceded, and the charge made to touch a more serious chord, the acknowledgment of a Supreme Being. Is it true then, that Polybius imputed to Scipio, that he believed the Gods to be nothing? His desire was to do justice to the memory of that great man on points where others did not do him justice.

* Polyb. xvi. 12.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid. ix. 19.

§ Strabo i 23, &c.

He was not called upon to extol his devotional character. In the purpose of portraying other great features, he was more likely to soften than to exaggerate the tinge of superstition which belongs to the anecdotes that he relates. It seems a great mistake, that because he bestows not the praise of superstition, he is taken to deny the grace of religion: and the historian is himself held up as a libeller of the Gods, because he ascribes to his hero merit of his own. That merit was, that he served his country with transcendent ability and perseverance. Polybius complains (*lib. x.*) that all who had hitherto written about him, had left those merits untold, only proclaiming him a child of good fortune and a favourite of the Gods. A long period had elapsed since the death of Scipio, when Polybius so vindicated his fame, and declared that the world remained uninstructed on the greatness of his genius and energy by those who had pretended to write the history of his time: he therefore was resolved to show to the Romans what that illustrious commander had done for their country, and that his successes were the intelligible results of wisdom and energy, not the offspring of dreams and omens.

Before he exhibits by facts the marvellous industry and talent displayed by Scipio in war, he relates, as heard from Lælius, an incident in his early life, which encouraged the general impression of his supernatural support: and the historian's report of it has tended perhaps to bring censure on himself. The story is, that the elder brother Lucius was a candidate for the office of *Ædile*, and that his mother was trying to propitiate the Gods by sacrifice. Scipio, conscious that he would himself be most acceptable to the people, and might carry his brother's election also, assured his mother that he had dreamed that he and his brother were both elected, and so obtained her permission to offer himself. This incident, with the success which followed, aided the reputation

of Scipio as a favourite with the Gods. This is the comment of Polybius—"of which things the dream was none: but, "being generous, munificent, and of kindly demeanour, he "reckoned on the good-will of the multitude towards himself. "In the result, having happily hit the right time both with "the people and with his mother, he not only gained his "object, but was thought to do so through some inspiration "of the Deity. For those who cannot survey with exactness "the seasons, and the causes, and the coincidences of things, "whether from poverty of spirit or from inexperience or "indifference, ascribe to the Gods and Chances the originating "of that, which is accomplished by sagacity with reasoning "and foresight. I make these observations for the sake of "my readers, lest, being led away falsely by the current notion "concerning him, they should be insensible to the most "honourable and the noblest features of the man: I mean "his skilfulness and perseverance in toil."

These sound remarks are found in the remains of the tenth book: where afterwards, in the admirable account of the siege of Carthage and the recovery of the Roman preponderance in Spain, Polybius traces the effect to its cause, and explains the singular merit of the general. All is plain common sense, and creditable to him who tells it: there is no more impiety in one who thus commends the insight of Scipio into the affairs of life, than in those who extol the military instinct of Wellington or Napoleon. Well does the historian portray the character which he celebrates, when he says of the youthful proconsul, going forth to Spain two years after the anecdote just related,—*εὐθαρσῶς διέκειτο πρὸς τὴν ἔξοδον, οὐ τῇ τύχῃ πιστεύων ἀλλὰ τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς*. We find in Strabo a similar contrast between Chance and Design, where it is applied to a higher subject, the beneficent providence of the Creator, testified by arrangements made *οὐχ ὅπως ἔτυχεν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν μετὰ λογισμοῦ τινός*. iv. 189.

The unfavourable impressions which I am here combating, have, I believe, been founded partly on what Polybius has said in the sixth book on the *δεισιδαιμονία* of the Romans ; to which he attributes, among other things, their superiority in moral principle to Carthaginians and Greeks, and their resistance to pecuniary corruption. He extols as a whole their studious system of observances, and their awe of the præterhuman, the influence of which was practically interwoven with all affairs of state and the usages of domestic life. He notices, however, the excess and exaggeration to which these things were carried, and observes that it had been so done *τοῦ πλήθους χάριν* (for the sake of the mass) : adding, " that such a method would be unnecessary to a community " of wise men, if a State could be composed of them ; but " that, as the mass everywhere is thoughtless, full of illicit " cravings, irrational impulse, violent passion, they must be " constrained by uncertain terrors, and such theatrical solemnities (*τοῖς ἀδήλοις φόβοις καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τραγηδία*). That " the ancients therefore appeared to have designedly introduced for the mass, notions about the Gods, and conceptions " of things done in the infernal regions ; and that the moderns " rather were unwise in rejecting them." In the same spirit, and without the tinge of irreligion, Strabo says that " you " cannot rouse the mob of mankind by philosophic reasoning to reverence, holiness, and faith (*πρὸς εὐσέβειαν καὶ " ὁσιότητα καὶ πίστιν*), but must act also through superstition (*ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας*). i. 19.

The religion of the Romans did indeed embrace a wide field of wonders, some of which might, for swaying inferior minds, receive a qualified sanction from philosophers. *Δεισιδαιμονία* is not here employed merely in its best sense, the fear of God : nor *τὰ ἐν ἄδου* to express the fact of a future state. To dispense with the recognition of those ideas, would be to teach that religion is needed only as a bugbear to terrify the way-

ward and headstrong. But it was not those instincts of a reasonable mind, that wanted merit in the eyes of Polybius, or that he would dismiss as unnecessary from a society of wise men. The fables of a heathen mythology were an unreal mockery to his sober mind: and the *δεισιδαιμονία* of the Romans, however politically useful, abounded in the false agencies which he rejected. He repudiates the notions that the wise Lycurgus had learned to found his polity by the teachings of a Pythian priestess, and that Scipio had raised his country through the impulses of dreams and omens.* He predicates an undue *δεισιδαιμονία* of him whose courage quailed under an eclipse of the moon, and shows that he would have been the better for some knowledge of astronomy.† On Timæus he observes, that, while he opposes the audacious statements of others, he is himself full of dreams, and wonders, and incredible fables, abounding, in short, in low superstition and womanish nonsense (*δεισιδαιμονίας ἀγεννοῦς καὶ τερατείας γυναικώδους*). xii. 24.

It seems to me that in these matters Polybius exhibits a sound discrimination: and that he is not to be censured, either for the resistance which he offers to superstition, or for the modified toleration which he extends to it. If he is charged with imputing atheism to Scipio, it seemed relevant to consider whether he could be so charged himself: therefore I have alluded to some matters in the sixth book. But in truth, in those comments on Roman institutions, he is not dealing with the principles of religion and the duty of man to his Creator: his subject is the perpetual blending of sacred ceremonies with the ordinary transactions of life: and he treats with respect forms and observances which awe the ordinary mind into rectitude. Thus he notices the oath of office, the obligation of which, *ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὅρκον πίστις*, made

* Polyb. x. 3.

† Ib. ix. 19.

the Roman faithful to his trust of public money, a virtue unknown to the Greek. Shall we also not allow, that in a society of wise and good men, oaths would be superfluous? Yet not the less must we agree with Polybius in the principle by which they are required. We claim the oaths of witnesses : a process as needless to bring truth from a good man, as it is vain for stifling the lies of a bad man : but upon the shadowy multitude that intervenes, the solemnity has a clear practical influence to the daily benefit of society. The religion of an oath has merit in its political usefulness : but he who approves it on that ground is not to be construed as undervaluing religion.

The mind of such a man as Polybius was likely to become cautious of superstition, and bold in the cause of Truth, by the variety of circumstances in which his life was placed, and his opportunities of viewing with deliberation, and scanning without prejudice, the institutions of the civilized world, their beauties and their blemishes. He was free to use the voice of reason, and to grapple with those who invited the belief of mankind to things, which he designates as " falling beyond the scope, not only of what is probable, but of what is possible." He could doubt what others believed ; and censure what others sustained : but did he withhold honour and praise where honour and praise were due? Were his scruples not based in truth? If they were, blame him not for moderating his acquiescence in the delusions of his age. Had he gone further, we might have excused without applauding him. Things, not reasonable in themselves, may from circumstances be entitled to excuse, or almost to commendation. Cicero believed in the unity of a wise and beneficent Creator : yet it became his duty to observe, and to enforce the observance of the religion of his country. So let it stand. If it be required to bring these merits into critical balance, and to

pronounce for one the greater praise, that praise must be rather that he was a sceptic among heathens, than that, an enlightened theologian, he was an actor in heathen ceremonies.

What was it, then, which the philosophy of Polybius rejected? Not the belief in a Being greater and wiser than man: but the surrender of the understanding to notions preposterous in themselves, and irreverent of that greater and wiser Being. He defines the extent to which superstition may be tolerated, limiting it to that which is subservient to religion, and protesting against the nonsense which, offending our reason, does not tend to a reverence of God. "We may excuse some historians," he says (xvi. 12, 9), "when they deal in miracles and fables, so far as it tends to sustain the piety of the multitude towards the Deity (*ἵνα μὲν συντελεῖται πρὸς τὸ διασώζειν τὴν τῶν πλῆθους εὐσέβειαν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον*); all beyond this is inadmissible." This comment is in check of superstition: but even that superstition was not the subject of ridicule: still less could religion be so. If there are passages in which his accusers find the Gods to be nothing, let them be pointed out. In the meantime there are those which tell plainly his contrary impressions. When he speaks of religion, of the duty of man to God, his terms are *εὐσέβεια* and *τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ὅσια*: these always had an advocate in him. In treating of democracy as a form of government (vi. 4), he desires to be understood as meaning, "not the wilful rule of a mob, but a system which cherishes as national the worship of the Gods, honour of parents, respect of seniors, obedience to the laws." His praise of his countrymen, the Arcadians (iv. 20), is that, "while they habitually fulfil the duties of society and hospitality, they are chiefly distinguished by their reverence of the Deity"—*διὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ θεῖον εὐσέβειαν*.

One who so writes can hardly be moved only by worldly usefulness; but, if more is wanted to show that there was a duty of religion in which Polybius sympathised, a heartfelt principle, not the mere approval of an invention convenient to society, there is that may satisfy the most scrupulous. In the very passages (x. 2) where he has been supposed to heap honour upon Scipio at the expense of the Gods, there is plain proof that his was the true spirit of piety, and which retorts the impiety upon his opponents. "All other writers," he says, "introduce Scipio as the man of good fortune, whose "endeavours prospered as of themselves and beyond reason: "they hold such men to be more godlike, more admirable, "than those who act in all matters upon a fixed principle. "They see not the distinction between that which is praise-worthy and that which is prosperous. The latter may fall "to any sort of men; the other is proper to those who are "endowed with mind and reason: these we are to esteem as "godlike—these the dearest to the Gods." This doctrine of a divine approbation of human merit is worthy of the writer; while there is a vulgarity in its opposite, which wantonly visits with celestial patronage those who have not merit of their own. And let us not forget that Polybius was one who acknowledged a divine justice and a divine vengeance. It is enough to note his words upon the rebels, reduced by Hamilcar, and perishing by famine: "The deity executing "upon them an appropriate retribution for their impiety and "lawlessness towards their neighbours—*τοῦ δαιμονίου τὴν οἰκείαν ἀμοιβὴν αὐτοῖς ἐπιφέροντος, τῇ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας ἀσεβείᾳ καὶ παρανομίᾳ.*" i. 84.

Such sentiments are not those of a contemner of divine power, but of one who believed in the ever-present miracle, unscanned by human reason,—the government of the invisible God. When such sentiments have sprung under the light of

nature, not of revelation, let us give credit to the author of them for a pure rather than a perverse impulse, nor depreciate the source of that which in itself is wise and true. If the doctrines of Polybius are challenged as adverse to the duties of Paganism, let them be hailed as akin to purer influences by which Paganism was to be overthrown. He vindicates the dignity of man's intellectual and moral nature, and claims that great and good actions shall bring him honour. Shall this be treated as contempt of the Gods? Different was the impression of one to whom his full works, unhappily wanting to us, gave ampler evidence of the spirit of his opinions. Suidas, a Greek writer of the eleventh century, thus alludes to those opinions, as in harmony with the sentiments of a Christian: "Fortune, with Greeks, is the government of the world without a Providence; a course from uncertain to uncertain, of events turning up as of themselves. But we Christians acknowledge God as administering all things; and to this effect speaks Polybius."*

I hope to be excused for these notices of a great and good man, whose claims to our respect I believe to be not sufficiently estimated. While he is the only safe authority on an important period of the history of the Roman commonwealth, he is not among those whose works every one reads in the course of classical study, as pursued for improving the taste and the conception of universal language. He is read by the laborious few who read everything, by the professed historian, and by those who find themselves directed to him for a particular object; not by the mass. Though not en-

* Τύχη, παρ' Ἑλλήσιν, ἀπρονόητος Κόσμου διοίκησις· ἥ φορὰ ἐξ αἰδήλων εἰς ἄδηλον καὶ αὐτόματον. οἱ δὲ Χριστιανοὶ Θεὸν ὁμολογοῦμεν διοικῆν τὰ πάντα. καὶ Πολύβιος φήσι. Suidæ *Lexicon* in v. Τύχη, and see Casaubon's dedication, and Schweigheuser's edition of Polyb. *Fragmenta Grammatica*, v. Τύχη.

dowed with the splendid eloquence of Thucydides, nor with the masterly and charming flow of Livy, he is in the highest rank of historians. Much of Aristotelian wisdom and accuracy is found in his written counsels; but he belonged not to the days when letters were fostered by liberty in Greece: and there was in him a sobriety of thought not favouring the higher polish of composition. Some, viewing him in contrast with the more brilliant models, have been extreme in disparaging his genius: not satisfied with proclaiming him "a decided rationalist," they denounce him as "not possessing a particle of enthusiasm in his nature." * I venture to think that in every sentiment there is to be traced a disciplined and right-feeling mind—the merit of enthusiasm, without its extravagance. His nature knew the better kind; an ardent zeal in illustrating, without the waywardness of fancy, all that is great and noble, and that sheds honour and dignity on our species. His doctrines, without attracting by style of expression, are persuasive with energy and warmth. He "had musick in himself;" and if there be anything in ancient literature worthy to have suggested to our own great poet his charming eulogy of the musical sense, it is in the congenial spirit of Polybius, with which he enforces the wisdom and the duty of its cultivation. We sympathise in the disdain with which he rejects the notion of Ephorus, that music was given to man for deceit and witchery, and insists that it was to reclaim and soothe the ruggedness of our nature. We sympathise in his condemnation of his savage and uncivilized neighbours, and in his prayer for their conversion to music.† The men of Cynætha were "fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils," wanting that sweet softener of humanity.

One who shall diligently study the writings of Polybius

* Dictionary of Biography, "Scipio," 12.

† Polyb. iv. 20, 21, 22.

which time has spared, not diverted by undue contrasts and the bias to which they lead, and who will observe the station which he took in the promotion of general knowledge and in the active business of the world, will find many high faculties to be respected, many admirable features to be contemplated in his character as a citizen and a philosopher. The study is of one, whose endowments commanded the affectionate respect, and whose care framed the minds of the sons of *Æmilius*; whose wisdom under national affliction secured the gratitude of the cities of *Achaia*; and whose monument recorded, that he reclaimed from the oppressor the memorials of those who had asserted their country's freedom; of one whose fame it is, that, if she had obeyed his counsels, that country would have averted her degradation.*

And with these merits, let us remember the sacred attribute, which, though it can consist with inferior claims, was in him the controlling guide of a great and powerful intellect. They who, in the easy enjoyment of the fruits of modern science, look down upon the hard-earned knowledge of the ancient geographers, and they whose literary taste is most unsatisfied with the style and diction of this historian, fail not to confer one praise, while they cling to censure that impairs it. All are constrained to own, that among those to whose labours we are indebted for a knowledge of the times that are past, there is no name that lives ennobled above the name of *Polybius* by the clear spirit of truth. This was the light of his path, and thus he hails it:—"Truth is the eye of history: for, as the living thing deprived of sight becomes all useless, so, if truth be taken from history, what remains is an unprofitable tale."† And again: "If one has come to knowledge, then is the most difficult thing of all;

* *Pausanias* viii. 37. *Polyb.* xl. 8.

† *Polyb.* l. 14.

“ for even the eye-witness to control his knowledge, and, despising the paradoxical and marvellous, to give for his own sake the first honour to truth, and tell us nothing that transgresses her.” * While such his zeal, and such his sense of danger, he felt the higher principle in which this virtue has her safety : he taught the bright lesson, that truth to man is kindled in sincerity to God—τὸ γὰρ μαρθάνειν ἀφρευστεῖν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπόθυψις ἐστὶ τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀληθείας.†

* Polyb. iii. 58.

† Ibid. vi. 59.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX A.

TRANSLATION OF PART OF THIRD BOOK OF POLYBIUS.

(c. 39 to c. 61.)

From Schweighæuser's ed. Oxford: Baxter. 1823.

Carthaginian Power in Spain.

39. THE Carthaginians at this period ruled all those parts of Libya which border on the Mediterranean sea, from the altars of Philæus, which are on the Great Syrtis, as far as the Pillars of Hercules, a line of coast exceeding 16,000 stadia. Crossing the strait at the Pillars, they had in like manner subdued all Iberia, as far as the rocky ridge which on our sea terminates the Pyrenean mountains, that separate the Iberians and the Celts. That place is distant from the Herculean strait about 8,000 stadia. For from the Columns to the new City whence Hannibal began his expedition to Italy, it is 3,000 : some call the new City, New Carthage.

The line of March to Italy in five Sections.

And from this City to the river Ebro it is 2,600 stadia : and from the Ebro to Emporium, 1,600 : and from thence again to the passage of the Rhone, about 1,600 : (for these distances have now been stepped and carefully marked at every eight stadia by the Romans.*) And from the passage for those who travel along that river as if towards its source,

* I conceive that this remark ought to follow the 1,600 to Emporium.

as far as the ascent of Alps which leads into Italy, 1,400 : and the rest of the way over the heights of Alps, about 1,200 : surmounting which, he was to enter into the Padan plain of Italy. So that the entire distance which he had to traverse from the New City was about 9,000 stadia. Of his march through these regions he had already accomplished nearly half in distance : but in difficulty, the greater part of the march remained to be performed.

Roman Preparations. Rising of the Gauls.

40. Hannibal was now encountering the defiles of the Pyrenean Mountains, having some fear of the Celts by reason of the defensible nature of the positions. About the same time the Romans, having learned from their ambassadors to Carthage all that had been resolved and the words spoken, and the news of Hannibal's passing the river Ebro having come upon them sooner than they expected, determined to send off the consuls with their armies, Publius Cornelius to Iberia, and Tiberius Sempronius to Libya. While the consuls were engaged in the enrolment of the legions and other matters of preparation, those who had been before appointed to dispatch the colonies into Gaul, were hastening to the fulfilment of the business : they were actively walling the cities, and they ordered the settlers to repair to their posts in thirty days, in number as much as six thousand for each city ; one of which they founded on this side of the Po, calling it Placentia, and the other on the other side, naming it Cremona.

No sooner were these colonists settled, than the Gauls called Boii, who had long been watching, as it were, to break their alliance with the Romans, but as yet had not the opportunity, now elated and confident, through the emissaries, of the approach of the Carthaginians, broke off from the Romans ; abandoning the hostages delivered by them on the close of the

last war, of which I have given account in a former book. Having called to them the Insubres, and laid their plans together under the feelings which already impelled them, they plundered the district which was allotted to the colonists by the Romans: and jointly pursuing those who fled to Mutina, which was a Roman colony, besieged them there. Among these were three men of distinction, who had been commissioned to the partition of the lands; Caius Lutatius of Consular rank, and two of Prætorian rank. On these demanding a conference, the Boii assented: but, when they came forth, seized them in breach of good faith, hoping by this means to recover their own hostages. Lucius Manlius, who was Prætor, and had charge of the posts thereabouts with a force under his command, hearing what had taken place, hastened to their assistance. The Boii, aware of his approach, prepared an ambuscade in a forest district; and, as his force moved on into the wooded parts, fell upon them at once from all sides, and slew many of the Romans. The survivors at first made a precipitate flight; but, on reaching high ground, they made a stand in some measure, so as to effect, though with difficulty, an orderly retreat. But the Boii pursued these into the village called Tannes, and shut them in there. When the news reached Rome that the fourth legion, surrounded by the Boii, was besieged by open force, they sent off in haste to their relief, under the command of a Prætor, the legions which had been equipped for Publius, and ordered him to raise and enrol fresh legions from the allies.

Scipio lands in Gaul. Hannibal on the Rhone.

41. Such then was the state of events among the Gauls from the first, and until the coming of Hannibal; and such the issue of them, as I have detailed in what I have written both before and now. The Roman generals, having got all things ready for their respective enterprises, set sail, when

the season came,* to their appointed duties: Publius for Iberia with sixty ships; Tiberius Sempronius for Libya with a hundred and sixty quinqueremes, with which he purposed to carry on the war in so astounding a manner, making such equipments too at Lilybæum, by collecting every necessary from every quarter, as if he was straightway on landing to lay siege to Carthage herself.

Publius, making his voyage along the Ligurian coast, came to the parts about Marseille on the fifth day from Pisæ, and mooring off the first mouth of the Rhone, he landed his forces, hearing indeed that Hannibal was already crossing the Pyrenees, but persuaded that he must still be far distant, on account of the difficulty of the country and of the great population of the Celts who lay between. But Hannibal did arrive, beyond all expectation: having overcome the Celts, some by force of arms, others with bribes, he came with his forces, having the Sardinian sea on his right hand, to the passage of the Rhone. When it was made clear to Publius that the enemy was at hand, doubting it in some respects because of the speed of his appearance, but still anxious to know the real truth, he recovered his force from the effects of the voyage, and deliberated with the tribunes, as to the positions which they should take, and where they should bring the enemy to action. He sent forward three hundred the most valiant men of his cavalry, adding to them as guides and fellow-warriors some Celts, who were with the Massaliots as mercenaries.

Preparations for crossing. March of Hanno.

42. Hannibal, having arrived in the country upon the Rhone, straightway set about effecting the passage where the river ran in a single stream, being encamped at a distance of

* Scipio was delayed, and cannot have sailed from Pisæ so early as Sempronius put forth from Lilybæum.

nearly four days' journey from the sea : and, having in every way conciliated those who dwelt along the river, he purchased from them all their single timber boats, and their barges, which were sufficient in number, as many of the dwellers on the Rhone carry on a trade from the sea. Moreover, he got from them suitable timber for making the canoes ; from which there was in two days a numberless multitude of vessels of transport ; each man striving to be independent of his neighbour, and to have in himself his hope of a passage.

By this time, a crowd of the barbarians was collected on the opposite shore for the purpose of preventing the passage of the Carthaginians. Looking well at these, and considering from existing circumstances, that it would neither be possible to force a passage in the face of so numerous an enemy, or to keep his position without expecting the enemy upon him from all sides, Hannibal, as the third night is coming on, sends off a division of the army under the command of Hanno, son of the king Bomilcar, joining to them guides who are natives of the country. After marching along the river up the stream for a distance of 200 stadia, and coming to a place where the river is divided into two branches round an island, they halted there : and having got timber from a neighbouring forest, they soon fitted out a number of rafts sufficient for the present purpose, partly by framing the timbers together, partly by tying them. On these they were safely carried over, no one obstructing them ; and, having taken up a strong position, they remained there that day, giving themselves a respite after the hardships they had undergone, and preparing themselves for the coming emergency, according to the plan concerted. Hannibal too was doing the same with the force that remained with him. His greatest difficulty was the passage of the elephants : there were thirty-seven of them.

The Passage of the Rhone.

43. As the fifth night came on, the division, which had already crossed the river, pushed forward about the morning watch along the river, against the barbarians who were opposite to the Carthaginian army. Hannibal now, having his soldiers all ready, was intent on the work of crossing, having filled the barges with the light-shielded cavalry, and the canoes with the lightest of the infantry. The barges were ranged highest up and along the stream; the small craft were ranged below them; that, the former sustaining the chief force of the current, the crossing of the canoes at the passage might be accomplished more safely. And they made a plan of drawing on the horses swimming at the sterns of the barges, one man managing three or four with reins from either side of the stern, so that a sufficient number of horses were at once carried over with them in the first crossing.

The barbarians, seeing the purpose of their enemies, rushed out from their entrenchments in a disorderly and confused manner, persuaded that they could readily prevent the landing of the Carthaginians. But Hannibal, as soon as he perceived that his own troops were already drawing near on the other side, for they made signal of their approach by smoke as was agreed upon, at once gave orders for all to embark, and for the managers of the transport vessels to contend forcibly against the current. This being speedily done, and the men in the boats vying with each other, and shouting and striving against the force of the stream, and the two armies standing forward on either side to the brink of the river, their own men sympathizing and shouting and cheering them, the barbarians in front raising their war song and challenging to the danger, the scene was one of terror and of excitement to the struggle.

At this moment, the tents of the barbarians being left

vacant, the Carthaginians, who had before passed to that side of the river, falling upon them suddenly and unawares, some set fire to the camp, while the mass rushed upon those who were guarding the passage of the river. Seeing an event so utterly unlooked-for, the barbarians ran, some to protect their tents, others stood against the assailants and fought. Hannibal, all things succeeding according to his purpose, straightway drew up together those who first landed, encouraged them, and engaged with the barbarians: the Gauls, from their want of order, and from the strangeness of all that occurred, soon turned and made a precipitate flight.

Conference with the Gaulish Chiefs.

44. The general of the Carthaginians, victorious at the same time over the passage and over his enemies, immediately attended to the transport of those who yet remained on the other side: having in a short time brought all the troops over, he encamped that night along the river. On the morrow, hearing that the expedition of the Romans had anchored off the mouths of the river, he selected five hundred of the Numidian cavalry, and sent them off to ascertain where the enemy might be, and in what numbers, and what they were about: at the same time also he appointed fit persons for bringing over the elephants. Then, himself assembling his forces, he introduced the chieftains who were with Magilus: for they were come to him from the plains of the Po: and he made known to the soldiers through an interpreter all that had been resolved upon among them. Of the things brought forward, the most effective for giving confidence to the mass were, first the fact of the presence of those who were inviting them on, and who declared that they would make common cause in war against the Romans; next, the credit that seemed due to their promises when they engaged to conduct them through regions by which, with no

want of necessary means, they should accomplish the march into Italy safely and by a short route : and beyond all this, the richness of the country which they would arrive at, its extent, and the zeal of its inhabitants, in conjunction with whom they were to contend against the armies of Rome.

The Celts, having discoursed to this effect, retired. After them, Hannibal coming forward himself, first reminded his multitudes of their past deeds ; that, engaged in many an enterprise of difficulty and danger, they had not failed in one, having obeyed his judgment and counsel : next to this he exhorts them that they will now also be of good cheer, seeing that the most important work has been performed with success ; for they have mastered the passage of the river, and have been eye-witnesses of the zeal and good feeling of their allies : that they should make themselves easy on matters of detail, as being his care ; and, obedient to orders, should be good soldiers worthy of their past exploits. The multitude applauding and exhibiting great zeal and eagerness, he commended them, and having prayed to the gods on behalf of all, he dismissed them, with orders to get themselves refreshed, and to make their preparations with activity, as the camp would be broken up the next day.

Conflict of Cavalry. March up the Rhone.

45. When the assembly had broken up, the Numidians, who had been before sent forward to reconnoitre, came in after the loss of most of their number and the total route of the remainder : for on their falling in, not far from their own camp, with the Roman horse who had been sent out on the same service by Publius, both parties brought such a zealous emulation to the conflict, that there were slain of Romans and Celts as many as an hundred and forty, and of Numidians more than two hundred. On this, the Romans in the pursuit came up to the Carthaginian entrenchments ; and, after recon-

noitring, made all haste in their return, in order to confirm to their general the fact of the enemy's arrival : reaching the camp, they made their report. Publius immediately, having put all his baggage on board the ships, broke up with his whole army, and led forward along the river, eager to bring the enemy to action.

On the day after the holding of the assembly, Hannibal with the first light placed out all his cavalry in direction of the sea, drawn up as a corps to cover his operations : the infantry force he put in motion from the entrenchments on their march ; and waited himself for the elephants and the men who were left with them.

Passage of the Elephants.

46. The transport of the elephants was effected in the following manner :—Having constructed a good many rafts, they joined together two of these strongly, and so as to fit closely one with the other, and planted both firmly in the shore at the place of embarkation, the two together being about fifty feet wide : then joining other rafts together in the same way, they attached these on to the former at the outer end, carrying the fabric of the bridge forward in the line of passage : and, that the whole structure might stay together and not be carried away down the river, they secured the side which was against the stream by cables from the land fastened to some trees which grew on the brink. When they had thrown out this bridge to the length of two plethra (200 feet) in the whole, they added at the extremity two rafts constructed more perfectly than others and the largest of all ; bound with great strength to each other, but to the rest in a way that the fastenings could easily be severed : to these they fixed a number of towing lines, with which the towing barges were to prevent their being carried down the river, and holding them by force against the stream, to take over the elephants

upon them and land them on the other side. After this they brought a quantity of dug earth to all the rafts, and spread it till it was level with and looked just like the road that led over the dry land to the crossing place. The elephants were used always to obey the Indians to the edge of the water, but never yet ventured to go into the water: they brought them therefore along this bank of earth, putting two females first; and the beasts obeyed them. When they got them on to the furthest rafts, then, cutting away the fastenings by which these were fitted to the rest, and laying a strain on the two lines with the barges, they soon carried away the beasts and the rafts which bore them from the earthy pier: thereupon the animals, quite confounded, turned themselves about and rushed in every direction: but, surrounded every way by the stream, they shrank from it and were compelled to stay where they were: and, in this way, the two rafts being fitted on repeatedly, most of the elephants were brought over upon them. But some cast themselves into the river in the midway across through fright; and it happened that all the Indians belonging to these were lost, but the elephants were saved: for with the power and size of their probosces, raising them above the surface of the water, and breathing through them, and spouting out all that got into them, they held out, making their way for the most part erect below the water.

March up the river: the Rhone: the Alps.

47. The elephants having been brought over, Hannibal, bringing up them and the cavalry, and covering the rear, put forward along the river; making his march away from the sea as towards the east, as if for the midland of Europe. The Rhone has his sources above the Adriatic gulph facing westward, in those parts of the Alps which slope away to the north: his course is to the winter sunset, and he discharges himself into the Sardinian sea. He flows for a considerable

way through a defile, to the north of which dwell the Ardyes Celts, while the whole southern side of it is bounded by the mountain sides of the Alps which slope northwards: the higher Alpine chain separating the plains of the Po, on which I have often spoken already, from the valley of the Rhone, and spreading from Marseille as it were to the head of the Adriatic gulph: which higher chain Hannibal having surmounted from the country on the Rhone, invaded Italy.

Errors of Authors.

Some of those who have written on this passage of the Alps, wishing to astound their readers with marvellous stories on the regions here spoken of, fall unconsciously into two things most adverse to all history: in fact they are driven to state falsehoods and to write things which refute themselves. For, while they proclaim Hannibal an incomparable general, both in daring and foresight, they unquestionably exhibit him to us as quite void of reason: at the same time, unable to reach a conclusion or any result of their fictions, they introduce Gods and the sons of Gods into practical history: for, when they represent the impregnable ruggedness of the Alpine mountains to be such, that not only horses and armies with their elephants, but even light-armed foot-soldiers almost find them impassable, and when, in the same way, they describe such complete desolation in these regions, that, unless some God or hero had appeared and pointed out the ways to Hannibal's soldiers, they must all have perished without resource, it will be acknowledged that in these representations they fall into each of the faults here described.

48. In the first place, what general could show himself a more senseless and stupid leader than Hannibal, if, commanding so vast a force, and resting upon it the high hope of succeeding in his main purpose, he was, as these writers allege, altogether uninformed on the ways and the positions, and as

to where he was marching, and into what nations he was marching ; and if, moreover, the enterprises which he pursued were not such as might by some means be compassed, but were on the contrary just impossible. And yet what even those who have utterly failed in their measures, and are in every way reduced to emergencies, do not venture upon, namely, to plunge with an army into a country of which they have made no inquiry, this these writers ascribe to Hannibal at a time when upon the whole undertaking his hopes were in their full integrity. In the same manner, their stories of the desolation and insuperable difficulty of these parts, plainly falsify themselves : for, not being informed that in fact the Celts who dwelt upon the Rhone, having before the coming of Hannibal, not once or twice only, and not in former times only, but of late, crossed the Alps with great armies, had faced the Romans, making common cause with those who inhabit the plain of the Po, as told by me in what has gone before, and moreover not aware that a numerous race of men do in fact inhabit the Alps themselves ; ignorant, I say, of all these things, they tell us that some hero, appearing to the Carthaginians, attended as the guide of their course. Herein, as might be expected, they fall much into the way of the tragedy writers ; with all of whom the catastrophe of a plot requires to have a God or some artifice, inasmuch as the hypotheses on which they rely are fundamentally false and against reason : the same thing necessarily happens to writers of history, when they conceive a basis of their narrative that is incredible and false : they too must provide the apparitions of gods and heroes : for how is it possible to give a rational end to an irrational beginning ?

The truth is, that Hannibal, far otherwise than as these persons have written, pursued his enterprises throughout in the most business-like manner ; for he had investigated accurately the nature of the country which he designed to come

down upon, and the estrangement of the population from the Romans ; and for all the difficult country which lay between, he employed native guides and conductors, men who were to share the same hopes with himself. I give account of these things with confidence, because I have sought information upon the transactions from those who belonged to the times when they took place, and have inspected the scenes of action, myself making a journey through the Alps, that I might know and see.

Scipio returns to Italy.

49. Now Publius, the Roman general, coming up three days after the decampment of the Carthaginians to the place where they had crossed the river, and finding the enemy gone forward, was greatly astonished : having felt persuaded that they would never venture to make their march into Italy that way, on account of the numbers and lawlessness of the barbarians inhabiting those parts ; seeing, however, that they had ventured, he hastened back to his ships, and on reaching them embarked his forces : he sent his brother off to carry on the war in Spain, and himself set sail back for Italy, eager to anticipate the enemy by reaching the passage of the Alps through Etruria.

Hannibal in the Island.

Hannibal, having marched four days consecutively from the passage of the Rhone, came to the Island, as it is called ; a very populous and corn-growing country ; and which has its appellation from this incident, that the Rhone, on one hand, and a river called Isara, on the other, flowing on either side of this region, bring its form to a point at their confluence with one another. It nearly resembles in size and shape what is called the Delta in Egypt : only that one side of the Delta is connected with the streams of the rivers by the sea ; while the third side of this region is formed by mountains, difficult to

approach, difficult to penetrate, and almost, so to speak, inaccessible.

Coming to this Island, and finding there two brothers in dissension upon the sovereignty, and in the field against each other with armed forces, and the elder seeking to gain him and imploring his co-operation for securing the command, Hannibal assented; and, as it was easy enough to see the advantages that would result to him for his present purposes, he joined forces, and attacked and drove out the other; and he earned great assistance from the conqueror: for not only did this chief supply the army liberally with corn and other necessaries, but also, by changing all their arms that were old and worn, he renovated the whole force most seasonably. Moreover, by furnishing most of them with clothing, and in addition to other things, with shoes, he rendered them vast service towards the passage of the mountains. But the greatest of all was this: as they were in a state of much apprehension about their march through the country of the Gauls called Allobroges, he covered their rear with his own forces, and secured their march until they drew near to the ascent of the Alps.

Hannibal surmounts the first Alps, defeating the Allobroges.

50. Hannibal, having in ten days made a march of 800 stadia along the river, began the ascent of the Alps: and it happened that he fell into the greatest dangers. As long as they were in the plain country, all the detached chieftains of the Allobroges held off from him, partly in fear of the cavalry, partly of the barbarians who escorted them. But when the latter had turned back homewards, and Hannibal's troops were beginning to advance into the difficult places, then the leaders of the Allobroges, collecting themselves together, being an ample force, preoccupied the advantageous posts, by which it was requisite that Hannibal's forces should effect their ascent.

If then they had kept their intentions secret, they might have utterly destroyed the Carthaginian army: as it was, being detected in their purpose, they still inflicted a heavy loss to Hannibal's force, though not a less one to themselves. For the Carthaginian general, aware that the barbarians had pre-occupied the advantageous posts, encamped his army in front of the heights and waited there: then he sent forward some of the Gauls who were acting as guides, in order that they might see into the designs of the enemy and their whole plan. When these men had executed all that was arranged, the general, learning that the enemy steadily kept to his post and watched the passes through the day, but that they went to their repose at night in a neighbouring town; acting suitably to that state of things, he contrived this scheme: putting his force in motion, he led them forward openly, and having come near to the difficult places, he made his camp not far from the enemy: when night came on, ordering fires to be lighted, he left the greater part of his forces there, and, having lightly armed the most effective men, he made his way through the defiles in the night, and took possession of the posts previously held by the enemy; the barbarians having retired to the town as they were accustomed.

He forces the Pass, and takes the enemy's town.

51. This being done and day coming on, the barbarians, when they saw what had happened, at first abstained from any attempt: but afterwards, observing the crowd of beasts of burthen and the cavalry winding out from the defile with much difficulty and in a long-drawn column, were encouraged by these circumstances to close in upon the line of march. When this took place, and the barbarians fell on at many points, a great loss ensued to the Carthaginians, and chiefly in the horses and beasts of burthen; not so much from the enemy as from the nature of the ground: for, the pass being

not only narrow and rugged but also precipitous, at every movement and every shock numbers of the carrying cattle were sent with their loads over the precipices. And most of all, the wounded horses were the cause of these shocks : for some of them, in the panic caused by their wounds, driving right against the baggage-cattle, others with a rush forward knocking over everything that came in their way in this difficult passage, completed the vast confusion. Hannibal observing this, and reflecting that, even though the troops should escape, the loss of the baggage must be attended with the ruin of the army, advances to their aid with the detachment which had occupied the heights during the night ; as he made his attack from higher ground, he destroyed many of the enemy, not however without suffering equally in return : for the disorder of the march was much increased by the conflict and clamour of these fresh troops. But when the greater part of the Allobroges had perished in the combat, and the rest had been forced to fly for shelter to their homes, then, only, the remainder of the beasts of burthen and cavalry, with great toil and difficulty, succeeded in emerging from the pass.

Hannibal, having then drawn together all the troops he could collect after the engagement, proceeded to assault the town, from whence the enemy had made their attack ; and finding it almost deserted, because the inhabitants had been all induced to go forth in quest of booty, he easily became master of it ; and from thence derived many important advantages, both for his immediate as well as his future wants.

For his present supply he obtained a vast number of horses and beasts of burthen and captives ; and besides, a quantity of corn and cattle sufficient to maintain the army with ease for two or three days : he also infused such terror into the neighbouring people, that none of those who dwelt near the ascent of the mountains would easily be induced to form any enterprise against him.

After a day's halt, march resumed. On fourth day conference with natives, who attend the march two days : then attack.

52. Here then Hannibal encamped ; and after staying for one day, set forward again. In the days which followed, he carried the army through safely up to a certain point : but in the course of the fourth day, he again came upon great dangers : for those who dwelt near the passage, having conspired to entrap him, met him bearing green branches and wreaths : for this is the symbol of friendship among nearly all barbarians, as the caduceus is with Greeks. Hannibal, who was inclined to be suspicious of such a pledge of friendship, sifted scrupulously their intentions and their whole design : when they said that they were perfectly aware of the capture of the town and the destruction of those who had attempted injury to him, and explained that they were come for this reason, desiring neither to give nor to receive any annoyance, and promised moreover to give hostages from among themselves, he was for a long time apprehensive and quite distrustful of what they said : but reasoning with himself that, if he should admit their proposals, he might perhaps soon make those who had come to him the more cautious and more quietly disposed, but, if he should not receive them as friends, he would certainly have them for his enemies, he consented to what they had spoken, and professed, as they had done, to establish the friendship.

On the barbarians delivering the pledges, and bringing a most bountiful supply of sheep and goats, and in fact putting themselves completely into their hands without any precautions, Hannibal's men trusted them so far as to employ them as guides for the difficult country which lay before them.

But when they had gone in advance for two days, then the people I have spoken of and those who had followed with

them, collecting themselves together, set upon the Carthaginians, as they were making their way through a defile where there was very bad footing and much precipice.

The Engagement.

53. At this juncture Hannibal's army must have been utterly destroyed if they had not, still retaining some degree of fear and an expectation of what was coming, kept the baggage-cattle, and the cavalry in the van of the march, and the heavy armed infantry in the rear: these being always ready in reserve, the calamity was less than it would otherwise have been, for they withstood the onset of the barbarians. Not but that, even under these circumstances, a considerable number both of men and horses and beasts of burthen were destroyed, for the ground occupied by the enemy being on a higher level, the barbarians made a corresponding advance along the sides of the mountains, and rolling down fragments of rock on some, and striking others with stones thrown by the hand, threw them into the utmost consternation and danger, to a degree that compelled Hannibal to pass the night with half his force about a certain white rock—a strong position—away from his horses and beasts of burthen, on guard for their protection till in the whole night they with difficulty defiled out of the ravine.

The army reaches the Summit and encamps for two days.

On the morrow, the enemy having retired, he joined force with the cavalry and beasts of burthen, and led forward to the summit of the pass of Alps, no more falling in with any complete organised body of the barbarians, but harassed by them partially, and at particular points, some of whom carried off a few baggage cattle from the rear, others from the van of the march, dashing at them as opportunity favoured. The elephants rendered Hannibal the greatest service, for in

whatever part of the line they showed themselves that part the enemy did not dare approach, being astounded with the strangeness of the look of the animals.

On the ninth day Hannibal, having accomplished his march to the summit, encamped there, and staid on two days, wishing at the same time to give rest to those who were brought up safe, and to wait for those who were left behind, during which time many of the horses that had run off in fright, and many of the beasts of burthen that had thrown off their loads, came again beyond expectation, following the tracks of the army, and joined the camp.

Hannibal addresses his Soldiers.

54. The snow having by this time become collected about the tops of the mountains, for the setting of the Pleias was at hand, Hannibal, seeing his multitudes in a disheartened state, both from the hardships which had already befallen them, and those which were still anticipated, assembled them and made an effort to cheer them, having for this end one resource, the clear evidence of Italy. For she so lies stretched under the mountains which I have before described, that, when both are contemplated together, the Alps seem placed as citadel to the whole of Italy. Wherefore, pointing out to them the plains of the Po, and reminding them generally of the friendliness of the Gauls who dwelt there, and at the same time suggesting to them the very situation of Rome herself, he succeeded to some extent in confirming the spirits of his men.

March resumed—The Snow—The broken path.

On the next morning, resuming his march, he began the descent, in which he no longer fell in with enemies, excepting those who pillaged by stealth; but from the character of the country, and from the snow, the number

that he lost was not much inferior to that of those who perished during the ascent. For the downward way being narrow and very steep, making it impossible for any one to know what he stepped upon, everything that erred from the right track and lost its footing, was carried down the precipices. Still, however, they endured these calamities, as being familiar with such hardships. But when they came to a place such that neither horses nor baggage-cattle could possibly pass on account of its narrowness, the path having before been broken away for nearly three half stades, and now lately being still more broken away, then was the army again thrown into despondency and alarm. At first the Carthaginian general made an effort to go round the bad parts, but fresh snow coming and making this impracticable, he desisted from the attempt.

Causes which prevented the going round.

55. For the circumstance was peculiar, and at that time excessive. The snow of the present year had recently fallen upon snow that was already lying, having remained since the last winter. The new snow was easy to be cut through, both because being fresh it was soft, and because as yet it had little depth; but when, after treading through this, their steps came upon that which was beneath it and of a firm consistence, they no more trod through, but slipping at once with both feet slid upon it, as happens on any ground to those who walk where there is a surface of mud. But the consequence of all this was still more distressing, for the men, unable to penetrate the under snow, when after falling they tried to raise themselves on their hands or knees in order to get up again, slid on so much the more, together with anything they tried to hold by; the places being for some way on a declivity. When the baggage-cattle fell, they broke through into the lower snow in their efforts to rise, and,

having penetrated it, remained with their loads as if fixed there, both by reason of their weight, and of the firmness of that older snow.

The Path repaired—Horses pass on, and at last the Elephants.

Wherefore, abandoning this hope, Hannibal made his camp near the mountain ridge, having cleared away the snow that was upon it : and after that, turning out his whole force, built up the precipice with very laborious effort. Thus in one day he completed a passage fit for horses and baggage-cattle, so that carrying these through at once and pitching his camp about parts which had as yet escaped the snow, he forwarded them away to the pastures. He brought out the Numidians in successive gangs to the building of the road ; and it was with difficulty and after much suffering that in three days he got the elephants through. They had come to be in a wretched state from hunger, for the higher points of the Alps, and the parts which reach up to the heights are utterly without trees and bare, because of the snow remaining constantly summer and winter ; but the parts along the middle mountain side produced both trees and underwood, and are altogether habitable.

Hannibal comes down into the Plain and the Insubres.

56. Hannibal, having got together all his force, moved down, and in the third day from the precipices which have been spoken of, completing the Alps, touched the plain, having lost many of his soldiers, both by the hand of the enemy and by the passage of rivers during the entire march ; many too from the precipices and rugged regions of the Alps ; not men only, but still more horses and baggage-cattle. At last, having performed the whole march from Carthagena in five months, and the passage of the Alps in fifteen days, he came down daringly into the plain of the Po and the nation of the

Insubrians, having safely brought through of his Libyan force 12,000 infantry, and of Iberians 8,000, and cavalry in the whole not above 6,000: as he himself sets forth on the column at Lacinium, which bears an inscription concerning the strength of his army.

Scipio on the Po.

About the same time, as I have said, Publius, having left his forces with his brother Cnæus, and enjoined him to devote himself to the affairs of Spain and prosecute the war vigorously against Asdrubal, sailed himself with a small number of men to Pisæ: then, after making his way through Tyrrenia and having taken the command of the armies from the Prætors, armies which were in the field sustaining the war against the Boii, he arrived in the plains of the Po and, having encamped, was intent on the enemy, eager to engage with him in battle.

57, 58, 59. (*In these chapters, which may be omitted, Polybius excuses himself for not enlarging on geographical description, when writing history. Though some readers might expect him to describe the Pillars of Hercules and the outer sea, the British islands and the tin mines, Spain and the silver mines, &c. &c., he considers that such a course would too much interrupt the narrative, and divert attention from the proper subject. He therefore reserves his own geographical knowledge, which has cost him much labour, for a separate work, and gives reasons for doing so.*)

Hannibal encamps—Restores his Army to condition—His Losses—He chastises the Taurini.

60. We have already shown the amount of force with which Hannibal entered Italy. Having made his encampment close under the mountain range of Alps, he first recruited the health of his forces: for the whole army was brought into wretched condition, not only by their marches

of ascent and descent, and further by the ruggedness of the footing in the heights of Alps ; but by the scantiness of necessary supplies and the neglect of their persons they were in miserable plight ; and many absolutely gave themselves up under this state of destitution and continued fatigue. For they were quite unable to convoy through such places provisions adequate for the sustenance of so many thousands ; and of the quantity which they had provided, these, in the destruction of the baggage-cattle, were to a great amount destroyed also. By which causes he who had set out from the passage of the Rhone with 38,000 foot-soldiers and more than 8,000 cavalry, had lost nearly half by some means in the passes of the Alps, as above told : and those who were saved had all become savage as it were, both in appearance and condition, from the constancy of their sufferings.

Hannibal having great providence for the care of his men, recruited both their minds and their bodies, and also his horses. When these things were done, his force being now recruited, the Taurini who dwell in front of the mountain side, being then at war with the Insubres and not placing faith in the Carthaginians, Hannibal in the first place invited them to his friendship and alliance ; and, as they would not listen to him, he invested their chief town, and in three days took it by storm : and, having put to death all who opposed him, threw such terror into the neighbouring tribes of barbarians, that they all promptly joined him, giving themselves up into his confidence. The remaining mass of Celts inhabiting the plain, hastened to make common cause with the Carthaginians, according to their first impulse. But, as the Roman legions had already passed the chief part of them and shut them in, they remained quiet : some indeed were compelled to join force with the Romans. Hannibal, looking upon these things, determined to make no delay, but to lead

on forward, and accomplish something for encouraging those who were ready to join their hopes with his.

Each Chief wonders at the presence of the other.

61. Taking these things into consideration, and hearing that Scipio had already crossed the Po with his forces, and was near him, he at first distrusted what was reported to him, remembering that a few days before he had left Scipio near the passage of the Rhone, and considering that the voyage from Massalia to Tyrrhenia was somewhat long and difficult in the performance ; and, moreover, ascertaining that the march from the Tyrrhenian sea through Italy to the Alps was long and nearly impracticable for armies. But as more were always bringing him the same information and more clearly, he wondered and was struck with the whole enterprise and performance of that general. A similar feeling arose also to Scipio : for he had at the first promised himself, that Hannibal would never attempt a march through the Alps with a force composed of various races ; and that, if he should dare it, he would evidently be destroyed. With these reasonings therefore, when he learned, both that he had arrived in safety, and that he was already laying siege to Italian towns, he was struck with the desperate daring of the man.

APPENDIX B.

TRANSLATION OF PART OF TWENTY-FIRST BOOK OF LIVY.

(a. 22 to c. 39.)

From Drakenborch's edition. Oxford: Baxter.

March from Carthagera.

22. FROM Gades Hannibal has come back to Carthagera, the winter quarters of the army; and from thence, having marched by the city of Etovissa, he leads them to the Iberus and the sea-coast. There the story is that a youth of god-like form appeared to him in the time of sleep, who declared himself sent by Jupiter for a guide to Hannibal into Italy—let him then follow, and by no means turn away his eyes from him. Alarmed at first, he followed, not looking about, not looking behind: then, in the anxiety of human temper, as he turned in his mind what it could be that he was forbidden to look back on, he could no longer control his eyes; that he saw behind him a serpent of wondrous size, borne on with vast destruction of trees and thickets, and after him came on a rain-storm with a crash of the heavens: then, seeking to know what was this monster, what did it portend, that he was told, It was the devastation of Italy—Let him go forward, nor ask more, but let the fates be undisclosed.

Across the Ebro.

23. Rejoicing in this vision, he led his forces in three divisions across the Iberus, having sent forward some who

might propitiate with gifts the minds of the Gauls through whom the army had to pass, and examine the passages of the Alps. He carried across the Iberus ninety thousand foot and twelve thousand horse. He then reduced the Ilergetes, the Bergusii, the Ausetani, and Lacetania, which lies under the Pyrenean mountains ; and placed Hanno over all this line of country, that he might command the defiles which connect Spain and Gaul. He gave him ten thousand foot and a thousand horse, for garrisoning the region that he was to occupy. When the army had begun to move through the passes of the Pyrenees, and reports of war against Rome were spread with more certainty among the barbarian allies, three thousand of Carpetanian infantry marched away at once ; not so much influenced, as was evident, by dislike of the war, as by the length of the march and apprehension of the insurmountable Alps. Hannibal, as it was hazardous to countermand them or to retain their services by force, and an irritating of the fierce spirits of the other barbarians was to be avoided, sent back seven thousand more to their homes, whom he knew to be averse to the campaign ; pretending too that he had himself discharged the Carpetani.

Through the Pyrenees to Ruscino.

24. He straightway passes the Pyrenees with the remainder of his force, that their minds may not get uneasy by delay and inactivity ; and encamps at the town of Illiberis. The Gauls, though they understood that the war was being carried into Italy, still, as it was said that the Spaniards on the other side the Pyrenees had been subdued by arms, and strong bodies of men were set over them, some states roused to arms by the fear of being enslaved, assemble together at Ruscino. Which when it came to the knowledge of Hannibal, fearing delay more than hostilities, he sent envoys to their chiefs, representing that he desired a conference himself

with them; and either they might come nearer to Illiberis, or he would go forward to Ruscino: that they might more readily meet from head-quarters: for that he would be happy to receive them into his camp, or would himself without hesitation come to them. That he had arrived as the guest, not the enemy, of Gaul, and should not draw a sword before he reached Italy, if the Gauls would favour that intention. So much was notified through emissaries. Now, when the Gaulish princes, having at once advanced their camp towards Illiberis, came to the Carthaginian without any feeling of mistrust, overcome by his presents, with the greatest goodwill they forwarded the army through their territories past the town of Ruscino.

Affairs in Italy.

25. In the meantime no further intelligence had been brought to Rome by the emissaries of the Massilians, than that Hannibal had crossed the Iberus; when the Boii, having roused the Insubres, revolted, just as if he had already passed the Alps: and this, not so much from the old causes of animosity against the Roman people, as that they could not patiently endure the colonies newly established on the Po within the Gaulish territory, Cremona and Placentia. Accordingly, having in an instant taken up arms, and made irruption into that very district, they caused so great terror and confusion, that not only the rural populace, but the Roman Triumvirs themselves, who had come to apportion the lands, C. Lutatius, C. Servilius, and T. Annius, not trusting to the walls of Placentia, took refuge in Mutina. There is no question on the name of Lutatius. Instead of C. Servilius and T. Annius, some annals have Q. Acilius and C. Herennius: others P. Cornelius Asina and C. Papirius Maso. It is doubted also, whether the persons of ambassadors sent to remonstrate with the Boii were violated, or whether the attack was made on the Triumvirs measuring the ground. While

they were besieged in Mutina, and a race of men with no experience in the art of attacking towns, and very slow in military operations, were sitting lazily before the unassailed walls, they begin pretending to enter into terms of accommodation : and the ambassadors invited out to a conference by the chiefs of the Gauls, are seized, not only against the law of nations, but in violation also of the faith pledged for this occasion : the Gauls declaring, that they will not release them unless their own hostages should be restored.

When this affair of the ambassadors was reported, and that Mutina and the garrison were in peril, the Prætor L. Manlius, furious with anger, heads a large force in loose march to Mutina. In those days there were woods about the line of road, most parts being uncultivated. There, marching through ground which had not been examined, he went headlong into an ambush, and with difficulty gained the open country after much slaughter of his men. There he fortified an encampment ; and as the Gauls hoped for nothing by making any attack upon that, the spirits of his soldiers were revived ; although it was clear enough that his resources were impaired. He then renewed his march : and so long as he was carrying his force through open places, no enemy appeared. When the woods were entered again, then attacking his rear to the great confusion and alarm of all, they slew eight hundred soldiers, and captured six standards. The terrors of the Gauls and the fears of the Romans came to an end, on their getting out of the trackless and entangled forest. From thence the Romans, easily protecting their column of march in the open country, made their way to Tanetum, a village rear the Po. There they maintained themselves with an entrenchment for the occasion, and with supplies obtained by the river, and with the aid of the Brixiani Gauls, against the masses of the enemy which were increasing daily.

Scipio at the mouth of the Rhone.

26. When this sudden outbreak becomes known at Rome, and the *Fathers* have learned that a Carthaginian war is grown larger by the addition of a Gaulish war, they order the Prætor C. Atilius to proceed and reinforce Manlius with one Roman legion and five thousand of the allies, just raised by the Consul on a new levy. He reached Tanetum without any fighting, the enemy having retired in fear of him. And P. Cornelius, a new legion having been made over to him in place of that which had been sent off with the Prætor, proceeding from Rome with sixty ships of war, along the coasts of Etruria and Liguria, and the mountainous coasts of the Salyes, gets to Massilia, and makes his camp at the nearest mouth of the Rhone (for the river comes down into the sea divided into many streams): hardly now fully believing that Hannibal has passed the Pyrenean mountains. When he comes to know that he is actually preparing for the passage of the Rhone, then, undetermined as to where he should oppose him, his own men too not yet quite recovered from their tossing about at sea, he sends forward three hundred cavalry, picked men, guided by some Massilians and auxiliary Gauls, to gain information on all things, and to get a sight of the enemy from a point of safety.

Hannibal is already crossing the Rhone.

Hannibal having quieted the other nations either by fear or gifts, had now arrived into the country of the Volcæ, a powerful state. They also occupy both banks of the Rhone. But, having no confidence in their ability to keep the Carthaginians off from their country on the right bank, and in order to have the protection of the river, they were now occupying the left bank in arms, having carried over nearly all that belonged to them across the Rhone. The other dwellers on the river, and such of this people too as had remained in their

homes, Hannibal induces by gifts to get together vessels for him, and to build them : at the same time they were themselves anxious for the army to be carried over, and for their own district to be relieved as soon as possible from the pressure of so great a multitude. And thus was brought together hastily a vast force of vessels and boats, which happened to be ready for the use of the neighbourhood ; and other new ones the natives, beginning them first, hollowed out of single trees ; and then the soldiers themselves, encouraged by the abundance of material and the easiness of the work, made hastily illshapen barks, not caring for more than that they should float in the water and hold their burthens, and so carry them over with what belonged to them.

The March of Hanno.

27. And now, when all preparations for crossing had been adequately made, the enemy on the other side gave them much alarm occupying the whole bank, men and horsemen. To divert these, he orders Hanno, son of Bomilcar, in the first night-watch to proceed for a day's march up the river with part of the force, and cross it where first he should be able, as secretly as he could, and bring his troops round for attacking the enemy in their rear, at the convenient time. The Gauls who were given as guides for this operation, point out that about five and twenty miles higher up, the river offers a place for crossing, flowing on both sides of a small island, being wider where it is so divided, and accordingly of less depth. Materials were hastily cut there, and rafts made, on which men and horses and other burthens might be carried over. The Spaniards, not adding to this mass, put their clothes into leathern bags, and placing their bucklers under them, to lean upon, swam over the river. The rest of the troops also, carried over on the rafts fastened together, after they had made their camp near the river, weary with the

night march and the labour of these operations, are recruited with one day's rest, their leader being bent on fulfilling his design in the most advantageous manner. On the following day, having made their march from that place, they give signal by sending up a smoke, that they have got over, and are not far off. As soon as Hannibal has recognised it, he gives the order for crossing, that he may not fail in his opportunity.

The Crossing.

The infantry now occupied the boats ready and fit for them. The mass of vessels higher up the stream, carrying over the horsemen, who were mostly near their swimming horses, broke the force of the current, and made the passage smoother for the boats that crossed lower down. A great part of the horses were drawn by reins at the stern, besides those which they had got into the ships equipped and bridled, that they might be ready for the use of the horsemen immediately on disembarking.

28. The Gauls rush to the bank to oppose them, with various yelling and singing in their fashion, shaking their shields above their heads, and flourishing their weapons in their right hands, although such a mass of vessels from the other side terrified them, together with the prodigious noise of the river, and the various shouts of the sailors and soldiers, who were struggling to break through the force of the stream, and of those who from the opposite bank were encouraging their comrades in their passage. And now, being amply frightened by the uproar in face of them, they are assailed by a more alarming clamour from behind, their camp having been taken by Hanno. And presently he himself was upon them, and a twofold terror surrounded them; in the multitude of armed men poured out of the ships on to the land, and the battle pressing unexpectedly from behind. The Gauls, after being repulsed in the attempt to force their way forward, now

break through wherever a way seems most open to them, and fly trembling in all directions each to his own village. Hannibal, having brought over his forces leisurely, for he now holds the Gaulish tumults in contempt, makes his encampment.

Passage of the Elephants.

I conceive there had been various plans for getting the elephants across: there are certainly various accounts of the accomplishment of it. Some relate that, when the elephants were assembled on the bank, the most savage of them being irritated by his driver, pursued him on his retreating swimming into the water, and drew all the rest after him; and that each, as the ford failed him, in his fear of the deep water, was carried by the very force of the stream to the opposite bank. But it is rather the common belief that they were carried over on rafts; and as this would have been the safer plan before the thing was done, so, since it was done, it is the more fit to be credited.

One raft of two hundred feet in length, and fifty in breadth, was extended from the bank into the river, and this, that it might not be carried down the stream, was firmly bound with several strong cables at the higher part of the bank, and was covered with earth like a bridge, in order that the beasts might walk on to it with confidence as on the land itself. Another raft, of the same breadth, and one hundred feet long, fit for passing over the river, was fastened to this; and when the elephants, driven, with the females going first, had passed over the fixed raft, as a road on to the smaller one which was attached to it, the fastenings with which the latter had been slightly fixed on were at once loosened, and it was carried on by some towing vessels to the opposite bank. So the first being landed, the others were then sent for and taken over. They were not alarmed at anything, so long as they were driven on a bridge

which held, as it were, to the land. Their first fright was when, the raft being detached from everything, they were hurried on to the deep water: then, pressing upon one another, as those on the edge of the vessel shrank from the water, they showed some amount of trepidation, till fear itself rendered them quiet, looking on the water around. Some indeed, growing savage, fell into the stream; but standing by their own weight, when their riders were thrown, and feeling their way in the shallows, they came to land.

Conflict of Cavalry. Boian Envoys.

29. While the elephants are being brought over, Hannibal had in the meantime sent five hundred Numidian cavalry towards the Roman camp to reconnoitre; to discover where they were, and in what force, and what they were preparing to do. The three hundred Roman horse, sent, as said before, from the mouth of the Rhone, fall in with this squadron of cavalry. An encounter takes place more severe than in proportion to the numbers: for, besides many wounded, the number of killed was pretty equal on both sides. The flight and panic of the Numidians gave the victory to the Romans, when they were already much exhausted. There fell of the victors to the number of a hundred and sixty: and not all Romans, some were Gauls. Of the vanquished more than two hundred fell. This, a beginning and an omen of the war, as it portended to the Romans a prosperous issue to the sum of events, so it portended a success, not bloodless, but through a fluctuating struggle. When, after this affair so performed, each party returned to their general, Scipio could come to no resolution beyond this, that he would regulate his proceedings according to the plans and undertakings of the enemy. Hannibal, undetermined whether he should push on the march into Italy which he had begun, or give battle to this

the first Roman army that had thrown itself in his way, is dissuaded from present hostilities by the arrival of the Boian envoys and the potentate Magalus; who, declaring themselves the guides of his marches, the associates of his dangers, give their judgment that Italy must be invaded in the freshness of the war, not sooner making any experiment of strength. The multitude were indeed in fear of the enemy, retaining the memory of the last war: and yet they were in greater fear of the unmeasured journey, and of the Alps, an object which report made terrible to men wholly ignorant of them.

Hannibal addresses his Troops.

30. And so Hannibal, when his own resolution was formed, to push forward and march for Italy, having summoned an assembly, works upon the minds of his soldiers in various ways by chiding and exhortation. "He wondered," he said, "what sudden alarm had entered into breasts always "undaunted: that they had served so many years victorious, "and only quitted Spain when all the nations and countries "which the two opposite seas enclose were subjected to the "Carthaginians: and then, indignant at the Roman people "demanding that the besiegers of Saguntum should be delivered up as to punishment, had crossed the Iberus to "destroy the Roman name and liberate the world. At that "time, no one thought it long if they stretched their march "from the setting of the sun to its rising. Now, when the "far greater part of the journey was seen to be performed, "when the passes of the Pyrenees had been surmounted "through the fiercest peoples, when they had crossed the "Rhone, so great a river, so many thousand Gauls resisting "them, and the power of the stream itself being overcome, "when the Alps were in sight, whose other side was Italy, "they became weary, and paused in the very gates of the "enemy. What did they suppose the Alps to be but the

" heights of mountains? Let them be thought loftier than
" the Pyrenees : earth nowhere reaches the heavens, nor is
" impassable to mankind. The Alps are cultivated; they
" produce animals and maintain them. Are they practicable
" to a few, and not to armies? The ambassadors who were
" then before them had not come over those mountains on
" wings. Their ancestors had themselves not been aboriginal
" dwellers, but had come over these very Alps to cultivate
" Italy, as strangers migrating from time to time in numerous
" hosts with wives and children. What could be an obstacle
" or insuperable to an armed soldier, bearing with him nought
" but the munitions of war? For the capture of Saguntum,
" what dangers for a space of eight months, what toil did they
" not endure? When the aim is Rome, the capital of the world,
" shall anything seem arduous and rough to arrest their en-
" terprise? The Gauls of old had vanquished that which the
" Carthaginians despaired of reaching. Let them then yield in
" courage and spirit, to a race which they had of late so often
" vanquished : or let them trust that their journey's end would
" be the plain between the Tiber and the walls of Rome."

March to the Island. Transactions with Allobroges.

31. He now orders his men, encouraged by these exhortations, to refresh their bodies and prepare themselves for the march. The next day, having gone forward on the further side of the Rhone, he bends his way towards the inmost parts of Gaul : not because it was the more direct way to the Alps, but because he thought, that the further he withdrew from the sea, the less chance there was of encountering the Romans ; with whom it was not his purpose to engage before he should arrive in Italy. In four days' march he comes to the Island. There the rivers Rhone and Isère, running down from different Alps, and having encircled a good district of land, flow together into one stream. The name " Island " has been given

to the country which they enclose. Near at hand, the Allobroges inhabit it, a nation already then inferior to none in Gaul for power or reputation. It was then in a state of discord. Two brothers were at variance in a struggle for the sovereignty: the elder, he who had ruled it before, named Brancus, was then excluded by his brother and the mass of younger men, who prevailed by force, not by right. The arbitrament of this insurrection being very opportunely referred to Hannibal, he being thus umpire of the kingdom, restored the government to the elder one, because this had been the opinion of the senate and men of rank. For this service he was supplied with provisions, and all things in abundance, chiefly clothing, of which an ample preparation was demanded by the intense cold of the Alps.

March towards the Alps: to the Druentia.

When Hannibal, having settled the disputes of the Allobroges, was now in march for the Alps, he did not shape his course by the direct way: but turned to the left into the Tricastini: from them, going through the further borders of the Vocontii, he went on into the Tricorii; the march being nowhere impeded till he came to the river Druentia. This, being itself an Alpine stream, is by far the most difficult to pass of all the rivers of Gaul, for, while it carries a prodigious force of water, still it does not admit of navigation; for, not confined within banks, flowing in many channels, and not always the same, constantly forming new shallows and new whirlpools (whence the track, even to a pedestrian, is uncertain), moreover rolling gravelly rocks, it affords nothing that is steady or safe to him who steps into it: and at that time, happening to be swollen by rains, it caused immense confusion to those who were crossing it, while beyond all other things they were confounded by their own terrors and bewildered cries.

Scipio returns to Italy.

32. The Consul Publius Cornelius, in about three days after Hannibal moved from the banks of the Rhone, had arrived, marching in square order, at the enemy's encampment, meaning to make no delay in engaging him. However, when he sees that the entrenchments are deserted, and that he shall not easily overtake them, having got so much in advance of him, he returns to the sea and his ships, that he may by so doing more safely and more easily oppose Hannibal on his descent from the Alps. Nevertheless, that Spain, his allotted province, might not be destitute of Roman reinforcements, he sent his brother Cneius Scipio, with the larger part of his force, against Asdrubal : not merely that he might protect old allies and conciliate new ones, but that he might even drive Asdrubal out of Spain : he himself sails back to Genoa with very few troops, meaning to defend Italy with the army which was then on the Po.

*Hannibal's March from the Druentia to the Alps.**His Stratagem.*

Hannibal made his way from the Druentia to the Alps, chiefly by a route through plain country, on peaceable terms with the Gauls inhabiting those parts. Then, although the subject was preconceived from report (which carries beyond the truth things not ascertained), yet the height of the mountains seen when close approached, and the snows intermixed with the sky,—hideous dwellings put upon rocks, flocks and cattle parched with cold, men unshaved and uncivilized,—all things animate and inanimate stiff with frost, and all besides more foul to see than to tell,—renewed their terror. As they brought up their march to the first acclivities, the mountaineers were perceived posted on the eminences that hung above ; who, if they had planted themselves in the more

hidden valleys, and sprung suddenly together to an attack, would have inflicted great slaughter and rout. Hannibal orders his standards to halt; and finding, after he had sent forward his Gauls to inspect the places, that there was no passage by that way, he encamps in the most extensive valley he can command, where all places were rugged and broken. Having learned through those same Gauls, who had got into conversation with the mountaineers—from whom, in fact, they differed little in language and manner,—that the pass was only beset in the daytime, and that at night every one betook himself to his own dwelling, he moved up towards those heights, at the dawn of day, as if intending to force the narrow passes openly and in daytime. Then, the day having been employed in pretending a plan different from the one in preparation, after they had fortified their camp in that position where they had halted, as soon as Hannibal perceived that the mountaineers had gone down from the heights, and that the keeping guard was relaxed,—having, for the sake of appearance, lighted more fires than the number who were staying behind would require, and leaving the baggage and cavalry, and the larger part of the infantry,—he himself, with some light-armed, every man being of the most valorous, dashed through the narrow pass, and took post on the very same heights which the enemy had occupied.

*He defeats the Natives; takes their Fort and Villages;
proceeds for three days.*

33. And now, when day dawned, the camp was broken up, and the rest of the army began to move forward. The mountaineers were now coming together, on a given signal from their fortresses, to their accustomed posts; when all at once they descry the enemies, some threatening from above, having got possession of their citadel, others coming through by the road. And these things, being offered at once to their

eyes and their minds, kept them for some time motionless. Presently, when they saw the wavering in the narrow passes, and the army itself confused by its own disorder, the horses being exceedingly terrified,—then, thinking that any additional alarm which they could themselves inflict would complete the destruction, they ran on, dispersing themselves round the rocks, by places untracked and devious, which they were familiar with. The Carthaginians then were thus opposed both by the enemy and by the hostile nature of the ground; and the struggle was greater among themselves than with the enemy, each man striving for himself first to get clear of the danger. But the horses caused the greatest disorder in the march, who, in fright at the discordant cries, which were multiplied by the forests and echoing valleys, and struck, perhaps, or wounded, became terrified to such a degree, that they caused a vast destruction both of men and baggage of all kinds; and, the narrow passages being abrupt and precipitous on either side, the throng forced many down to a prodigious depth; some, too, being the armed soldiers, but the great crash was in the rolling over of beasts with their burdens.

Though these things were frightful to see, yet Hannibal paused awhile, and restrained the force that was with him, that he might not aggravate the confusion and unsteadiness. Afterwards, when he saw the line of march to be broken, and that there was a chance that he should have brought the army through to no purpose, if deprived of its baggage, he rushes down from the higher ground; and when he had overthrown the enemy by the very force of the assault, he also increased the confusion to his own troops. That confusion, however, is quieted in a moment, on the passage becoming clear by the flight of the mountaineers; and soon all were brought through, not only without molestation, but in silence. Hannibal then took possession of the fort, which

was the chief place of that district, and the circumjacent villages; and he fed the army for three days with the flocks of his captives: and as no obstruction was offered by the mountaineers, who had thus in the beginning received an overthrow, nor much by the nature of the country, he made good progress in his march for those three days.

Conference with Natives. Assault in a narrow Pass.

34. He then arrived into another nation, abounding in cultivators of the soil, considering it was a mountain country. There he was nearly defeated, not by open war, but by his own arts, deceit, and then ambuscades. The chiefs of their fortresses, men advanced in years, come as spokesmen to the Carthaginian leader, expressing to him that, taught by the calamities of others a useful lesson, they would rather experience the friendship than the strength of the Carthaginians; they would, therefore, be obedient to his orders, and furnish supplies and guides for the expedition, and hostages for the good faith of their promises. Hannibal, when—by neither rashly trusting in them, nor disdaining them, lest, being rejected, they should become openly hostile—he had answered graciously, and received their hostages, and possessed himself of the supplies, which they had themselves brought down into the road, follows the leaders of them in compact marching order, not as among a people brought into peaceful subjection. The first body consisted of the elephants and the cavalry: he himself followed with the strength of the infantry, anxiously watching all things around. When they came to a narrower road, subject on one side to overhanging heights, the barbarians from their ambush attack them at once on all sides, from the front, from the rear, in close combat, and from afar. They roll down enormous rocks upon the marching column: the greatest force of men pressed them from behind. When the front of infantry was turned

against these, it was apparent that, if the rear of the march had not been made strong, a vast slaughter would have been met with in this pass. Even then, they came into extreme peril, and almost destruction; for while Hannibal hesitates to push forward the march through the narrow pass, having no support to his infantry from behind, like that which he afforded to his cavalry, the mountaineers attacking them laterally, broke through the middle of the column, and beset the way; and one night was passed by him without his cavalry and baggage.

*The next day order of March restored. Summit reached
on ninth day.*

35. The following day, the barbarians becoming less active in their incursions, the forces were reunited, and the pass was overcome, not without loss, but with more destruction of cattle than of men. After that, the mountaineers engaged them in smaller numbers, and rather in the way of plunder than of warfare—now against the head of the column, now against the tail of it, according as either the ground might be favourable, or as opportunity was given by those who got too forward or who lagged behind. The elephants, while they were urged headlong through the confined tracks with slow progress, still, wherever they went, they rendered the march safe from the enemy, who feared to come near to those strange creatures. On the ninth day, they reached the summit of the Alps, through parts without a track, and errors that were caused either by the deceit of guides, or, if these were distrusted, by guessing at the route, and striking at random into valleys.

*Two days on Summit. Snow. March renewed at daybreak.
Hannibal addresses the Army on the march. View.*

The encampment was stationary on the summit for two days: rest was given to the soldiers, wearied with toil and

fighting; and in this time some of the cattle which had fallen down among the rocks reached the camp, by following the track of the march. And now a fall of snow, for the constellation of the Pleiades was setting, added a great terror to men worn with the pressure of so many disasters. When, on the standards being raised at daybreak, the march was proceeding very slowly, through snow that covered everything, and languor and despair was marked in every countenance, Hannibal, going forward in front of the standards on a certain promontory, whence the view was far and wide, and having ordered a halt, displays to the soldiers Italy, and the plains around the Po, lying under the Alps, impressing upon them, "that they are now scaling the walls, not of Italy only, but " of the Roman city; that all to come will be smooth and " straightforward; that by one, or at the most a second, engagement they will have the citadel and capital of Italy in " their possession and control." After this, the column began to get forward; the enemy now not even attempting more than occasional petty thefts. The way, however, was far more difficult than it had been in the ascent (as, indeed, most of the Alps are on the Italian side steeper as well as shorter); for nearly the whole track was precipitous, narrow, and slippery; so that they could neither keep themselves from falling, nor could those who had once tottered a little, and become distressed, keep their footing, but were falling, men and beasts, one over another.

*Broken Path. Fall of 1,000 feet. Attempt to go round.
Old Snow.*

36. They now came to a much narrower course of rock, and masses of it so upright, that an unencumbered soldier, feeling his way, and grasping with his hands twigs and stumps which stood out about him, could hardly let himself down. This place, naturally very steep before, had by

a fresh fall of the ground been broken away to a depth of about a thousand feet. When the cavalry had come to a stand here, as at the termination of all track, it was reported to Hannibal, who wondered what could be stopping the march, that the rock was impassable: he then went off himself to inspect the spot. There seemed to be no doubt, but that he must carry the march round, though by a long circuit, through pathless places as yet untrodden. But that way was not practicable: for, as there was a shallow surface of new snow lying upon the old snow that was undamaged, the feet of those who first stepped upon it easily rested on the soft snow of little depth. But when this had fallen to pieces by the treading of so many men and cattle, they had then to step on bare ice beneath in the fluid mess of melted snow. Then was a frightful struggling; when, from the slippery ice which would not hold their steps, and the foot tripping up more readily in the declivity, whether in the attempt to rise they had sought help in their hands or knees, they again fell forward, these very supports sliding away from them, there were neither twigs nor roots about, which any one could strain at with the hand or foot: so they only tumbled about on the smooth ice and melted snow. The cattle both cut into the under snow walking upon it, and sometimes plunging about with their hoofs more heavily in the effort to keep themselves up, quite broke through it: so that many, as if snared, became fixed in hardened and deeply compacted ice.

*Repairs. Trees cut. Fire. Vinegar. Four days so spent.
Three days' rest. Descent to the Plain.*

37. At length cattle and men being wearied to no purpose, the camp was formed near the ridge of the mountain, and a space cleared for that very purpose with very great difficulty: so large a quantity of snow had to be dug up and

removed. Then the soldiers selected for repairing the rock, by which alone a passage could be obtained, for stone required to be broken, having levelled huge trees which were near and lopped them, made a vast pile of timber; and, as a strong wind had arisen calculated to encourage the burning, they set it on fire, and pouring vinegar on to the stone in a glowing state, loosen its substance: thus they lay open with iron the rock hot with the conflagration, and lessen the declivities by gentle turnings, so that not cattle only, but the elephants also could be brought down. Four days were spent at the rock, the cattle being almost worn out with hunger: for the tops of the mountains are mostly bare, and, if there is any feed, the snows cover it. The lower parts have valleys and some sunny hills, and streams near the woods, and at last places worthier of human occupation. There the cattle were turned to pasture, and a rest of three days was given to the men wearied with the repairs. Thence they came down to the plain, where the climate was milder as well as the disposition of the inhabitants.

*On the Force which Hannibal brought into Italy. Livy's
Argument on the Pass.*

38. In this manner for the most part they arrived in Italy, in the fifth month from New Carthage (according to some writers), the Alps being overcome on the fifteenth day. Authors are by no means agreed on the amount of the force which Hannibal had when he had crossed into Italy. Those who state the most, say that there were 100,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry: those who say the least, state 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. L. Cincius Alimentus, who writes that he was taken prisoner by Hannibal, is an author who would most influence me, if he did not make a confusion of the numbers, by reckoning Gauls and Ligurians. With these, he makes out that 80,000 foot and 10,000 horse were brought into

Italy—(probably still more joined him, and so some writers say.) And he states that he heard from Hannibal himself, that from the time he crossed the Rhone, he had lost 36,000 men, and an enormous number of horses and other cattle, when he was in the Taurini, a people which to him, after his descent into Italy, was contiguous to the Gauls. As that is a matter on which all are agreed, I am the more surprised that it should be doubted, by what route he came over the Alps; and that it should commonly be believed, that he crossed the Penine (also that the col got its name from this circumstance): Cælius states that he came over by the col of Cremona: both which passes would have brought him down not into the Taurini, but through the Salassi, who are mountaineers, to the Libuan Gauls. Neither is it probable, that those passages into Gaul were then open: indeed the parts which lead to the Penine, were beset with nations half German; and by Hercules, if any are led by the name, the Veragri, who dwell on that col, know nothing of its being named from the passage of the Pœni; but from him, whom the mountaineers call Peninus, consecrated on their highest summit.

Insubres at war with Taurini. Hannibal's Army unfit for service. He destroys the Taurine town; then proceeds against Scipio.

39. Most opportunely for the commencement of operations, a war had been raised against the Insubres, by the Taurini, a neighbouring people. But Hannibal was unable, for the assistance of either party, to put his men under arms, who were now most conscious of the wretched state they had been brought to, in the effort to repair it. For repose after toil, abundance after want, personal comfort after disease and filth, were in various ways taking effect on their squalid and almost savage-looking bodies. This was a reason

with the Consul P. Cornelius, when he got to Pisæ with his ships, for hastening to the Po, with the army which he received from Manlius and Atilius, being raw soldiers and dismayed with the recent disgraces of their arms, in order that he might bring the enemy to action before he should recover his efficiency.

But when the Consul reached Placentia, Hannibal had already moved from his encamped position: and had taken by storm one town of the Taurini, the chief place of that people, because they would not come readily into his alliance; and he would have associated with himself the Gauls of the Po, not by fear only but by inclination, had not the arrival of the Consul suddenly overpowered them, when looking out for the opportunity of deserting his cause. Hannibal too now moved from the Taurini, thinking that the Gauls, hesitating which party to follow, would follow him, being on the spot. And now the armies were almost in sight, and the commanders brought together; not yet sufficiently known to, but impressed each with some admiration of the other. For the name of Hannibal had become very famous among the Romans even before the destruction of Saguntum: and Hannibal looked upon Scipio as a superior man from the fact that he had been chosen to take command against him. Moreover each had increased such opinion in the other; Scipio, that having been left behind in Gaul, he was ready to meet Hannibal when he had come over into Italy: Hannibal, by his daring enterprise to cross the Alps, and the fulfilment of it.

APPENDIX C.

Encounter with Scipio on the Po.

THE error which I have combated as affecting the line of march to the Alps, is not the only instance in which learned men have caused confusion by misinterpreting the words *παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν*. As some have converted the Rhone into the Isère, so others have converted the Po into the Tésin. Polybius, telling of events in the valley of the Rhone, speaks of the Rhone as "the river." When the valley of the Po becomes the scene of operations, he speaks of the Po as "the river." A contrary opinion has been expressed by those who in other matters are my allies, De Luc and Cramer. Both have pronounced it to be the Tésin: De Luc favouring the left bank, Cramer the right bank.

De Luc writes (2d edit.) :—"On voit clairement que l'armée Romaine étoit encore sur la rive gauche du Tésin lorsqu'elle eut avis de l'approche de l'armée d'Annibal; celle-ci avoit donc déjà traversé cette rivière entre Novare et Milan pour se réunir aux Insubres qui étoient alors en guerre avec les Romains, et qui devoient être les plus puissans alliés des Carthaginois. Au moment de la bataille, les Romains avoient nécessairement, comme le dit Polybe, le Tésin à leur gauche, et les Carthaginois l'avoient à leur droite; ce qui fixe l'emplacement de la bataille un peu au-dessus de Pavie, sur la route de Milan." P. 233.

This notion of the engagement being on the left bank of the Ticinus is contradicted by the context of the history, which shows that Hannibal never crossed that river, but was pre-

vented from doing so, and had to give up his pursuit of the enemy, and to retreat up the Po, in order to find a fit place for transporting his army.

Cramer, in his *Ancient Italy*, i. 55, says :—" Polybius informs us, that Scipio had crossed the Po, and was employed in throwing a bridge over the Ticinus, for the purpose of passing that river also. Having exhorted his troops, he marched along the Ticinus: while the Carthaginian army, which had now come up, was advancing to meet him on the same bank of that river." Cramer explains, that Hannibal was marching up the right bank of the Ticinus: and (p. 56) "that Scipio, having crossed that river at a considerable distance above its junction with the Po, was moving parallel with the current;" so that, after his defeat, he had to retreat up the river and regain his bridge; over which Hannibal could not follow him. His opinion is, that "these operations of Hannibal, as they are reported by Polybius (iii. 66), are perfectly natural and intelligible, if we understand the action to have taken place on the right bank of the Ticinus." P. 58.

As I consider all these marches to be told as along the Po, I will quote the narrative. We read in the 64th chapter :—" Scipio about this time, having already crossed *the river Po*, and being further resolved to cross the Ticinus, gave orders for a bridge to be made by those to whom this service belonged; and, assembling the rest of his forces, addressed them." After the address, the history, c. 65, proceeds thus :—" On the following day, both put forward *along the river*, προῆγον ἀμφοτέροι παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν, on that side of it which is towards the Alps, the Romans having the stream on their left hand, the Carthaginians having it on their right." This river is the Po. Cramer construed it the Ticinus.

The plain of the Po has become the scene of operations. Hannibal reached the plain of the Po before he turned his

arms against the Taurini. When Scipio landed in Italy, the plain of the Po was named as the object of his march. He has now crossed the river, and crossed the Ticinus also. The side of the river on which the armies are seeking each other, τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἀλπεὺς μέρος, shows where they were: though Cramer considered this circumstance to indicate the right bank of the Ticinus, it seems to me to suit the left bank of the Po: and is in accordance with the author's descriptions where the Alps are spoken of as the northern side of the great plain, and the Po is said to bisect it, running from west to east.

The narrative proceeds thus:—"On the next day, finding "that they were coming near to one another, each encamped "and waited: and on the day after that, the two commanders, "taking with them all their cavalry, and Scipio his javelin "men also, pushed forward over the plain, each hastening to "survey the force of his adversary." The conflict is then described: and in c. 66, Scipio's retreat "in haste to regain "the bridge by which he had crossed the Po." Hannibal pursued "as far as the first river and the bridge over it." He found that the bridge had been rendered unserviceable, and made prisoners six hundred Romans who had not got back over it. Then, "hearing that the rest of the Roman force had "already made a great start forward, he turned round again, "and marched *along the river* in the contrary direction, "hastening to find a place on the Po where he might make "a bridge. In the second day he halted, and having bridged "a crossing with vessels belonging to the river, he committed "the transport of the army to Asdrubal, and immediately "passing over himself transacted business with emissaries from "the neighbouring districts, who were ready for him. Having "given to all a hearty reception, when he had got his forces "over from the other side, he led them forward *along the river* "in a direction contrary to the prior one: for now he marched "down the stream, hastening to come up with the enemy."

This narrative tells three movements of Hannibal, all *παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν*: 1. his first advance, which, after the conflict, was continued in pursuit to Scipio's bridge on the Ticinus : 2. his march back in search of a place for crossing the Po : 3. his onward march after crossing. To know one is to know all : for the second was retrograde to the first : and the third was retrograde to the second. The contrast between the second movement and the first is in these words :—*μεταβαλλόμενος αὐθις εἰς τὰναντία παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν, σπεύδων ἐπὶ τόπον εὐγεφύρωτον ἀφικέσθαι τοῦ Πάδου*. The contrast between his third movement and the second appears by these words :—*παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν τὴν ἐναντίαν ποιούμενος τῇ πρόσθεν παρόδῳ· κατὰ ῥοῦν γὰρ ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν, σπεύδων συνάψαι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις*. No one doubts that the river now crossed was the Po, or that the march after crossing it was down the Po : this was contrary to the prior march, which therefore was up the Po : and that was contrary to the first march, which therefore was down the Po.

It is said that this battle was always called the “*pugna ad Ticinum*”; but Polybius himself, as remarked by Schweighæuser, refers to it in the tenth book as *ἱππομαχία περὶ τὸν Πάδον*. When Cramer wrote about the Ticinus, he was arbitrating on the disputes of Italian antiquaries, whose contest was, whether the armies met on the right bank or the left bank of the Ticinus, and for determining this question they were searching for vestiges of Scipio's camp and bridge up that river as far as Sesto Calende. These ingenious persons could not have desired a better arbitrator : but, as in this matter they happened all to be wrong, my friend need not have decided in favour of any of them. His error resembles that of Gibbon, who, in treating the main question, only performs an arbitration between the Penine and Cottian passes, blind to the possibility of a third candidate.

APPENDIX D.

On the Battle of the Trebia.

It is curious that Niebuhr should have forgotten or disregarded the narrative of Polybius which we have just been construing ; and should ever have conceived, as he must have done, that Hannibal crossed the Ticinus instead of turning back from it. This casualty in the memory of such a man is so much connected with the incidents which we have just been dwelling upon, that I hope to be excused for alluding to it. It appears, though not from anything which he himself published, that Niebuhr conceived Hannibal to have crossed the Po below Placentia ; and to have been encamped on the right bank of the Trebia when the battle was fought on that river. He was in error on both points. Dr. Arnold has followed him on one, and Dr. Liddell on both.

There is in the *Life of Niebuhr*, both that by Madame Hensler, and the later one by the Chevalier Bunsen, a letter written by him to the Count de Serre, of 22nd May, 1823, containing this passage :—“ Vaudoncourt’s work, though
“ printed at Milan, was not to be got at Rome ! I expect
“ that one of Buonaparte’s generals will have perceived, what
“ the scholars have not dreamt of, that Hannibal’s course
“ before the battle of Trevia, was exactly that of Buonaparte
“ before Marengo ; namely, that he crossed the Po below
“ Piacenza, and cut the Roman army off from the road to
“ Rome : the Po and the fortresses were behind him ; there-

accounting for that position, that Niebuhr imagines him to have crossed the Po below Piacenza; a notion which is in plain contradiction of Polybius, who states him to have crossed the Po much above the influx of the Ticinus, describing it circumstantially. If there were any ground for supposing the two armies to have changed places before the battle of the Trebia, it still was not necessary to invent a new place for Hannibal's crossing of the Po.

Dr. Arnold misplaces the combatants at the Trebia, as Niebuhr does: but he accepts Hannibal's crossing of the Po as Polybius relates it: he was aware of Niebuhr's idea on the subsequent position of the armies; for in Note N. to p. 99, he quotes with approbation that letter, in which Hannibal is said to have acted like Napoleon at Marengo, throwing himself between the Romans and the line of their retreat: but on the passage of the Po he has followed Polybius without comment. I will give the reasons for believing that the two armies kept their relative places as natural to retreat and pursuit; and that the Romans crossed the Trebia from the right bank to attack the Carthaginians on the left bank.

Polybius, in telling Scipio's retreat after the first engagement, says that he made the best of his way to his bridge on the Po, first crossing the Ticinus; and that, after crossing the Po, he encamped *περὶ πόλιν Πλακεντίαν*, towards or near Placentia; or, as one might say in sea phrase, off Placentia. *Περὶ* is a word used with much latitude. Strabo says of Vercellæ and Ictumuli, v. 218, *εἰσι περὶ Πλακεντίαν*. This retreat was effected by Scipio with the utmost speed; as well as the push made after him by Hannibal, who had first had to retreat from the Ticinus up the Po. As soon as he came within fifty stadia, he offered battle. Then came the revolt of the Gauls in the Roman camp, on which Scipio retreated across the Trebia: and if the Carthaginian soldiers had not wasted time in the pursuit by stopping to plunder and burn his camp, the

success would have been more complete. A few Romans were slain, and a few made prisoners : but nearly all had crossed the Trebia before the Carthaginians came up with them. Surely this flight over the Trebia by Scipio was from west to east. No crossing of that river by Hannibal is ever mentioned at all. The Trebia has not been mentioned before : and neither here nor elsewhere is there a word which imports that the retreating and the pursuing army had changed places. It is the tale of a continuous retreat ; consistent with what follows, as with what has gone before. Sempronius joins Scipio without interruption. Hannibal communicates with the traitor of Clastidium without interruption. He continues to be on the left bank, till Sempronius crosses the river to attack him.

Both Niebuhr and Arnold, in pronouncing that the battle was fought on the right bank of the Trebia, speak positively of the previous junction of the two consular armies on the left bank. Niebuhr's comment is this :—" We must suppose " that the Romans had crossed the Po in the neighbourhood " of Pavia : it is said that they transferred their camp from " the left bank of the Trebia towards the foot of the Apennines." He should have said, " from the left bank *to the right bank.*" By omitting the latter idea, he represents them as being still on the left bank when Sempronius arrived, and still there when the battle took place. Under this impression as to the army of Scipio, he provides for Hannibal being on the other side, by imagining, in opposition to the history, that he had crossed the Po below Piacenza.

Arnold writes differently : he says that Scipio had, in his original advance to meet Hannibal, crossed the Po at Piacenza : and, speaking of the subsequent retreat, says that " the Romans " recrossed the Ticinus, and then, crossing the Po also, established themselves under the walls of Placentia." Relating Hannibal's passage of the Po according to Polybius, he says this :—" Again descending the river, he arrived, on the second

" day after his passage, in sight of the Roman army, and on the following day offered them battle. He posted his army five or six miles from the enemy," and he adds (not from Polybius), "and apparently on the east of Placentia, cutting off their direct communication with Ariminum and Rome." The reference here is by some mistake given to Polybius. But Polybius gives no hint of "communication cut off," as suggested: and he relates what Dr. Arnold omits; viz. the revolt of the Gauls, and the consequent retreat of Scipio, when he was driven across the Trebia, and not followed by his pursuer. This is not alluded to: but it is conceived and insinuated, that that retreat was from east to west.

Dr. Arnold fully sympathises with Niebuhr on the difficulty which their notion of the position involves. He says—"It is not explained by any existing writer how Sempronius was able to effect his junction with his colleague, without any opposition from Hannibal. The regular road from Ariminum to Placentia passes through a country unvaried by a single hill: and the approach of a large army should have been announced to Hannibal by his Numidian cavalry soon enough to have allowed him to intercept it. We only know that the two consular armies were united in Scipio's position on the left bank of the Trebia." The cause of Dr. Arnold's perplexity was the gratuitous assumption of that fact, which had been carelessly assumed by Niebuhr. Cramer had worked the battle rightly in his map.

I believe that Niebuhr's illusion was in the fancy about Napoleon, and that Arnold just followed that fancy: but it is possible that the error might be encouraged by what is related of the retreat to Placentia after the battle: though not by a right construction of it. The battle was fought some way up the river: ten thousand Roman infantry fought their way through the Carthaginian centre, and effected their retreat to Placentia: and some may think this to indicate that the battle

was fought on that side of the river to which Placentia belongs. Such an inference would not be just. Wherever the battle was, they would take refuge in that place: if it had been fought on the right bank, the ten thousand would have reached Placentia without crossing the river: as it was fought on the left bank, they retreated down the river till they came to the usual crossing which led to their fortified city. Polybius would have introduced a superfluous fact, if he had alleged that the survivors of the battle had to cross the river before they got to the town: he never deals in unprovoked minuteness. If conflict had attended this retreat of the ten thousand, the Trebia might again have been a feature in the tale: but there was none: they left the field compact and unmolested, ἀθρόοι μετ' ἀσφαλούς and, as the town was held by a Roman garrison (they held it till near the end of the war), that retreating force had no occasion to cross the Trebia, till they came to the usual passage of it leading to that place in the line of travelling down the Po.

The story told by Livy seems to me to correspond in its tenor with that of Polybius: it is damaged only by an incredible anecdote introduced after the battle. On the retreat of the Romans from the Ticinus, Livy says,—“Prius Placentiam pervenēre quam satis sciret Hannibal ab Ticino profectos.” This rapidity of Scipio strengthens the argument made from the speed of Hannibal. These words import that Scipio with great speed made good his retreat to Placentia; they do not show where he first placed his camp—this I apprehend must have been west of the Trebia, which was only two miles distant from Placentia. Livy adopts the details of his predecessor, saying that Hannibal found a place for crossing the Po in two days after he turned back from the Ticinus; that, when he marched down, he made his camp six miles from Placentia; that he offered battle which Scipio declined; that on the following night a body of Gauls

deserted to him from the Roman camp; and that the night after that, Scipio marched to the Trebia, pursued by the Carthaginians, and effected his passage of that river. There is no hint that Hannibal ever crossed it, or that the retreater and the pursuer ever changed places.

Niebuhr is at variance with Livy as well as with Polybius : he differs from both, in asserting that the Carthaginians crossed the Po at a lower point than the Romans : he differs from both in not mentioning the revolt of the Gauls in the Roman camp, which caused Scipio's retreat across the Trebia ; nor the incident which prevented Hannibal from continuing his pursuit beyond the river. Neither history imports that Hannibal ever got to the right bank before the battle was fought, nor gives any hint that Scipio's communications were interrupted. Livy says, "Sempronius Ariminum perveit : inde cum exercitu suo profectus ad Trebiam flumen college conjungitur." He represents Hannibal the pursuer, as keeping his place in rear of the retreater. "Traditur Hannibali Clastidium : id horreum fuit Pœnis sedentibus ad Trebiam."

Mr. Bunbury, a very able contributor to Dr. Smith's *Dictionary of Geography* 1856, gives from Polybius, under "Trebia," an accurate analysis of the successive positions of the armies, describing rightly the field of battle, with the retreat of the ten thousand : and his interpretation of the scene is the more valuable, from his having previously given undue weight to the doubts on the Ticinus, and in the *Dictionary of Biography* 1852, under the word "Hannibal" placed the Roman camp on the left bank. I would say, however, that Mr. Bunbury does not speak from Polybius in what he says of other fugitives driven across the river and joining the ten thousand, and of Scipio repairing to Placentia the following day with the force that had not been engaged.

Livy alone speaks of Scipio's movement : and he attributes it to the night after the battle. The incredible anecdote which

he then introduces is not worthy to cause a doubt on the clear narrative of Polybius, or on that which he has already given himself. He agrees with Polybius from the *ἰννομαχία* on the Po to the battle of the Trebia, including the retreat of the ten thousand from the field; and says that they reached Placentia. This fact does not show the side of the river on which the action took place: if it was on the right bank, they would not have to cross the Trebia at all: if on the left, there was equal facility of reaching the place, without the folly of crossing the stream near the hostile camp, and venturing into so dangerous a neighbourhood.

The Romans left their own camp and crossed the river to fight. After the battle, the ten thousand "*flumine interclusi*," could not have regained their own camp; and they went off straight to Placentia, which was quite practicable from the field of battle, on whichever side it was. It is not of them, but of the camp garrison and the few who had regained the camp, that Livy tells the following story. "*Nocte insequenti, quum præsidium castrorum, et quod reliquum ex magnâ parte militum erat, ratibus Trebiam trajiceret, aut nihil sensere Pœni, obstrepentē fluvîâ, aut, quia jam moveri præ lassitudine nequibunt ac vulneribus, sentire sese dissimulârunt: quietisque Pœnis, tacito agmine ab Scipione consule exercitus Placentiam est perductus.*"

Dr. Arnold has related this most improbable incident, for which the editor in mistake refers to Polybius as the authority. After saying that "the legions forced their way through the enemy's line and marched off the field straight to Placentia," he writes thus—"But those who fled towards the river, were slaughtered unceasingly till they reached it. The Carthaginians, however, stopped their pursuit on the bank of the Trebia: the cold was piercing, and to the elephants so intolerable, that they almost all perished: even of the men and horses many were lost; so that the wreck of the Roman

" army reached their camp in safety : and, when night came
" on, Scipio again led them across the river, and, passing
" unnoticed by the camp of the enemy, took refuge with his
" colleague within the walls of Placentia."

What can be more incredible than this story of Scipio electing to pass the river in the vicinity of the hostile camp ? The enterprise, as related, would involve enormous danger without any adequate motive to incur it. The torrent, in the morning, had been only just fordable : " pectoribus tenu—erat brumæ tempus et nivalis dies." After such a day, the stream would be more swollen : in the attempt to recross after the battle many had been " gurgitibus absumpti ;" and one cannot conceive that Scipio would voluntarily encounter so fearful an obstacle in the darkness of night, and near the quarters of the more vigorous enemy. The absurdity of such a thing is more striking if we imagine the Roman camp on the left bank. Scipio, in that case, would have been well satisfied that the enemy did not cross to him : he would have moved down on his own side of the Trebia, till the usual crossing of it near the mouth should carry him unmolested to the Roman fortifications.

If we except this topic of embellishment, the whole tenor of Livy's narrative is consistent, and the same with that of Polybius ; and the addition of such an anecdote does not prove that his opinion on the field of battle was different from that of his predecessor. The story may, perhaps, justify a remark of Dr. Ukert, which I find in Dr. Thirlwall's review of his work : " Livy, in drawing his accounts from various sources, failed to perceive that he was framing his narrative out of statements that were irreconcilably discordant." (*Phil. Museum*, iii. p. 677.) Dr. Arnold has shown, in a severe comment, how Livy is contradicted by his own anecdotes. (*Life of Arnold*, Letter cclxxxiv.)

Here, as elsewhere in this controversy, we see how error is

perpetuated by one commentator copying another, without exercising his own judgment. Dr. Liddell (1855), after telling of Scipio's retreat from the Ticinus, says this: "Hannibal, after spending two or three days on the north side of the Po, crossed somewhere below Placentia; and Scipio, not finding his position near that town secure, fell back, so as to place the Trebia between himself and Hannibal. On the left bank of this river he fortified a strong camp, with the purpose of awaiting the arrival of Sempronius. Hannibal followed the Romans, and encamped in view of them on the right bank of the Trebia." No part of this statement has the authority of Polybius or Livy; while the author omits that which they do relate, namely, the revolt of the Gauls in the Roman camp, which led to the flight of Scipio across the Trebia. He follows Niebuhr, not the ancient historians. If Niebuhr had lived to write the history of those times, he would perhaps have examined the authorities again.

The author of a recent work on the campaigns of Hannibal, Colonel Macdougall, being satisfied on Hannibal's position as certified by Niebuhr and Arnold, says: "It was a masterly manœuvre; for Hannibal placed himself between Scipio and the advancing army of Sempronius: he doubtless did so with the intention of interrupting the latter. Why he did not execute that intention, it is impossible to explain." As such manœuvre never took place, the failure of its object need not be accounted for.

THE END.

the 1990s, the number of people in the UK who are aged 65 and over has increased from 10.5 million to 13.5 million, and the number of people aged 75 and over from 4.5 million to 6.5 million (Office for National Statistics 2000).

There is a growing awareness of the need to address the needs of older people in the community. The Department of Health (1999) has published a strategy for older people, which sets out a vision for the future of older people's services. The strategy is based on the principle of 'active ageing', which is the process of enabling older people to live longer, healthier, and more active lives. The strategy is based on the principle of 'active ageing', which is the process of enabling older people to live longer, healthier, and more active lives. The strategy is based on the principle of 'active ageing', which is the process of enabling older people to live longer, healthier, and more active lives.

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